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ABSTRACT
 Most issues of hyper partisanship, such as health care, yield a strong constituency 
for action on the issue; the low salience of climate change, however, has failed to produce 
much change. In order to understand public opinion on climate change, this research 
draws not only on previous studies in political science, but also from psychology, 
sociology, communication studies, and other disciplines to provide a more 
comprehensive theoretical background. This dissertation emphasizes the need for more 
exploration in the field of political science and attempts to bridge some of the existing 
gaps. Findings from research such as this identify the opportunities in which support for 
policy change can be created at various levels of government. Policy makers can 
overcome the hyper partisan and low salience nature of this issue if they can successfully 
link climate change to extreme weather events and warming trends as the public signals 
for policy change as a result of such events. The public makes judgements about policy 
which change as real-world conditions change. This dissertation examines the role of 
party differences on support for government spending on the environment, identifies 
changes in [more liberal] opinions once a natural disaster strikes, and explores the effects 
of local warming conditions on beliefs about global warming. 
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CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION 
A large majority of scientists have long acknowledged problems surrounding the 
environment, and more specifically climate change. Whereas overall support for 
government spending on protecting and improving the environment has remained 
relatively high and stable since 1993 (Smith et al., 2019), we rarely see an attempt at 
policy change. As many see climate change as a problem of the distant future, their sense 
of concern is low. However, the increasing temperatures of sea water create increases in 
extreme weather events leading to short term changes in public opinion. 
 Research on public opinion on climate change is distinct from other issues as 
opinions are linked to trust in science, risk processing, and personal experience, among 
other factors. Scholarship on this topic is important as both climate scientists and public 
affairs experts believe climate change to be one of the most challenging policy problems 
of our times (Egan and Mullin 2017). While the public claims to be aware of climate 
change, it is extremely divided on whether the dangerous effects actually exist. Public 
opinion on climate change reveals that the American public is sorted on this issue and the 
current state of gridlock in Congress is hindering efforts to enact policy. Additionally, the 
relatively low salience of this issue and elite polarization in Congress provide little 
incentive for policy makers to establish climate change as a national priority. 
Nonetheless, attitudes on tangible consequences of climate change (e.g. flooding) present 
more opportunities for taking action to solve the problem of creating policy for climate 
change and thus merit increased attention from scholars (Egan and Mullin 2017).
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Several trends indicate near historical highs in American concern for the environment. It 
is possible that the public is increasingly viewing climate change as a serious problem 
which may be tied to a recovering economy.   
1.1 GLOBAL WARMING/CLIMATE CHANGE 
Data from a 2019 Gallup Poll show that the percentage of respondents stating the 
seriousness of global warming is generally underestimated has reached a twenty year 
high at 42% while the percentage responding “generally exaggerated” has decreased 
significantly in the last nine years to 35% as illustrated in figure 1.1.  Although a majority 
of Americans agree that global warming is occurring, they do not express a high level of 
concern about this issue. When asked in March 2019, "Do you think that global warming 
will pose a serious threat to you or your way of life in your lifetime,” 45% said yes and 
55% said no (Gallup 2020). The percentage believing that global warming will not be a 
threat in their lifetime underscores that many Americans view the issue as a problem to 
be dealt with by future generations. 
1.2 SUPPORT FOR GOVERNMENT SPENDING 
Nonetheless, The General Social Survey demonstrates that the public’s view that 
the government is doing too little in terms of protecting the environment has reached 
nearly a decade high (at 68%), although this has still not returned to the level of the early 
1990s. As figure 1.2 illustrates, over time a majority of Americans consistently believes 
the country is spending too little on improving and protecting the environment. While the 
percentage of the public believing the United States is spending too little on the 
environment has always been high, it increased during the 1980’s, reaching its peak at 
76% in 1989 and 1990; this percentage decreased to about 60% between 1993 and 2004, 
3 
marginally increased in 2006 and 2008, fell to about 58% from 2010 to 2014, and 
increased to 68% in 2018.   
1.3 THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE ECONOMY 
In a tradeoff question between the economy and the environment, the extent to 
which individuals agree the environment should be given priority increased significantly 
in 2016 and 2019.  The preference for the environment over the economy is the largest 
pro-environment margin since 2000 (Saad 2019). Furthermore, figure 1.3 indicates that 
individuals generally place the protection of the environment over economic growth 
(with the exception of the recession period, from 2007 to 2009).  The public has favored 
the environment when the issue has been posed as a tradeoff between the environment 
and the economy.  However, there is some indication that this may be changing as figure 
1.3 illustrates some shifts in the balance in Americans’ preference for the environment 
over the economy. This is consistent with the notion that the public mood is closely 
related to economic expectations (Coggins et al., 2014). 
The overall trends presented in figures 1.1-1.4 indicate that while the public holds 
increasingly favorable opinions of the environment it has not yet reached a level of 
consensus on this issue. Although on some issues of the environment the public 
demonstrates a majority of favorable opinions (figures 1.3-1.4), there are other areas on 
which Americans hold more divided views (figures 1.1-1.2).   
 Public opinion research on this issue has demonstrated some differences among 
traditional demographic groups. Generally, we find strong correlations with 
characteristics such as gender, age, income, and education regarding beliefs on most 
policy matters, but these trends are not consistent across studies on issues of the 
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environment. Demographics such as race, education, and income provide mixed results in 
their relationship to support for the environment (Dunlap, Xiao, and McCright 2001). 
However, one trend that is consistent across studies is that women tend to express higher 
levels of concern about the environment and express more of a sense of urgency than 
men (Konisky, Hughes, and Kaylor 2016; McCright and Dunlap 2011). While 
researchers continue to explore possible effects among demographic characteristics, 
gender differences are most prevalent and consistent across studies. 
1.4 HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 
While much of the grassroots of the environmental movement began in the 1960’s 
it did not become a major focus in the United States immediately. However, an 
‘explosion’ of environmental policy occurs from 1970 to 1980. This era is arguably when 
this country narrows focus on issues of climate change and environmental concern. 
During this era, the United States has its first earth day (April 22, 1970) followed by the 
passage of monumental environmental statutes and laws many with the common theme of 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulating the release of pollutants. These 
include:  
• the Clean Air Act (1970), providing air quality standards  
• National Environmental Policy Act (1970), requiring all federal agencies 
to prepare Environmental Impact Statements  
• Federal Water Pollution Control Act (1972), regulating surface water 
• Endangered Species Act (1973), preventing extinction of imperiled plant 
and animal life  
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• Safe Drinking Water Act (1974), establishing health standards for public 
water supplies  
• Toxic Substances Control Act (1976), regulating hazardous solid waste 
• Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act 
(1980), requiring clean-up of hazardous waste sites.   
Many of these were responses to the environmental movement and environmental interest 
groups. This era ends with the passing of CERCLA and eventually this movement 
becomes institutionalized.  This decade ends with an increase in unemployment, and a 
21% inflation rate; concern over and support for the environment tend to decrease when 
unemployment and inflation begin to rise (Guber 2003). 
The period from 1981 to 1989 was one of retrenchment in environmental policy. 
This era exposes many issues between President Ronald Reagan and the environmental 
movement.  Reagan posits a choice between environmental protection/regulation and 
economic growth, creating the idea that we must make one of the two issues a priority. 
The choice is echoed as President Reagan defends the position of the 1980 Republican 
platform that reads “we strongly affirm that environmental protection must not become a 
cover for a ‘no-growth’ policy and a shrinking economy” (Kraft and Vig 1984, 423). 
Consequently, Gallup begins asking questions on the priority of the environment and 
economic growth in 1984 due to the political climate and the belief that the trade off 
questions were more informative.  
From 1989 to present day we live within this period of `Muddling Through’ in 
which we are in environmental policy gridlock (Klyza and Sousa 2013).  Furthermore, 
we are not only in gridlock on issues of the environment, instead we are in gridlock 
6 
across the board when it comes to policy. Some of those who believe that climate change 
poses a threat will argue that there is progress as we see support for ideas and policies 
such as the Green New Deal. However, opposition to such programs remains strong and 
we still have not seen policy implementation. Until policy designed to combat climate 
change is developed and implemented, we cannot claim to have broken through the 
policy gridlock. So, while the public has indicated a more liberal mood on environmental 
policy, policymakers have not responded, leading many to wonder how much the public 
needs to turn up the heat in order to garner attention and policy response. 
7 
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CHAPTER 2 : PARTY DIFFERENCES AND THERMOSTATIC 
RESPONSIVENESS ON THE ENVIRONMENT 1973-2018 
ABSTRACT 
Political scientists have long examined the effects of partisanship in various 
arenas of political culture in the US and abroad. On the issue of climate change, a 
scientific consensus exists concerning the presence of anthropogenic climate change and 
a sense of urgency to combat some of its effects is beginning to emerge. However, the 
struggle climate scientists and those who are concerned about this issue face include 
individual’s reliance on party cues in forming opinions of climate change. Adding to their 
struggles, most proposed policies are partisan due to the messaging of party elites. This 
research uses a two-pronged approach to provide a comprehensive study of public 
opinion on the environment evaluating both aggregate and individual level data using the 
General Social Survey from 1973-2018.  Moreover, this research is among the first to 
examine whether the public is thermostatically responsive on issues of the environment at 
the individual level. The results provide support of a thermostatically responsive public 
on the issue of the environment. 
Keywords: partisan, environment, public opinion, thermostat 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 On April 22nd, 1970 Americans celebrated their first Earth Day. It is estimated 
that 20 million people participated that day, taking to the streets to protest against the 
deterioration of the environment. The first Earth Day was followed by the passage of 
monumental environmental statutes. Today, Earth Day is largely recognized across the 
world, however, there has been little policy change in the US since the mid 1980s. Issues 
of improving and protecting the environment have been partisan, especially at the elite 
level. Republicans have generally opposed policies working towards combating the 
increasing climate crisis while Democrats have generally supported such policies. 
Nonetheless, support for government spending on improving and protecting the 
environment among the general public has remained relatively high and stable since 1993 
(Smith et al. 2019).  
It has been argued that a functioning democracy requires a responsive public and 
government (Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Wlezien 1995; Wlezien and Soroka 2012). This 
is especially true for the United States as a representative democracy should embrace a 
responsive public. Hiaeshutter-Rice, Soroka, and Wlezien (2019) suggest an informed 
public drives a representative democracy and is necessary to hold governments 
accountable. While there is some debate on how informed citizens are (e.g. Delli Carpini 
and Keeter 1996), a large body of literature focused on public response to government 
actions—often finding evidence of a responsive public—exists (see Erikson, MacKuen, 
and Stimson 2002; M. Johnson, Brace, and Arceneaux 2005; Page and Shapiro 1992; 
Stimson 1991). 
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This leads to several questions. How much of a role does partisanship play in 
support of government spending on the environment? Are there other factors consistently 
influencing an individual’s relative spending preference? How responsive is the public to 
policymakers’ actions when it comes to preferences? This research sets out to provide 
answers to these questions. In doing so, I find that partisanship plays a large role in 
influencing individual’s spending preferences likely due to cues from party elites. 
Moreover, gender and age also play a significant role on spending preferences. In 
examining thermostatic responsiveness on the environment, I find the public is 
thermostatically responsive. If plans proposed by those advocating environmental policy 
change are to garner support from policy makers, then research such as the present will 
be important in informing policymakers of target groups and conditions in which policy 
change would be supported. 
2.2 BACKGROUND AND THEORY  
2.2.1 A Partisan Divide  
While much of the scholarly debate concerning polarization has moved away 
from issue polarization and towards affective polarization the role that party sorting plays 
in the formation of individual opinions on issues such as the environment is evident. The 
divide between Republicans and Democrats on environmental issues in recent years has 
been well established. The debate among scholars of American politics on the topic of 
polarization consists of varying components. The most notable element is the 
disagreement of the extent of party polarization within American politics (Abramowitz 
2010; Abramowitz and Fiorina 2013; Fiorina 2011; Hetherington 2009; Oldendick and 
Hendren 2017).   
14 
Fiorina and his colleagues have argued that despite the increasing differences in 
the issue positions of the average Republican and the average Democrat, Americans' 
overall issue preferences have been, and remain, generally moderate. About 50 percent of 
Americans either characterize themselves as moderate or are unable to place themselves 
on the liberal-conservative continuum and the public shows similarly moderate 
preferences across a range of issues, with little evidence of change over time (American 
National Election Studies 2020; Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2008). In the general 
electorate, there is little evidence of any movement toward a preference for the more 
extreme categories, and this lack of movement toward the poles on issue questions argues 
against popular polarization.  
 Although there has been a substantial increase in the relationship between party 
identification and ideological identification, as well as in the relationship between party 
identification and a number of policy issues such as the environment, Fiorina and his 
colleagues argue that what has occurred is more accurately described as “party sorting” 
rather than party polarization. Party sorting is the development of a tighter fit between 
party affiliation on the one hand and ideology and issue positions on the other 
(Abramowitz and Fiorina 2013; Fiorina and Levendusky 2006). Abramowitz and 
Saunders (2008) take an opposing view directly aimed at Fiorina’s suggestions in which 
they “test Fiorina’s assertion that ideological polarization in the American public is a 
myth.”  Their article foreshadows Abramowitz’s Disappearing Center (2010) in which he 
argues the middle is close to obsolete.  The authors strongly disagree with Fiorina and his 
colleagues in their position that very little has changed since the 1950s when it comes to 
political beliefs of the mass public (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008).    
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 Observers of polarization in American politics recognize it is difficult to reject the 
notion that some polarization exists (Jacoby 2014).  From Fiorina's (2013) perspective, 
however, the increased differences between Democrats and Republicans “do not show a 
decline in the middle and an increase in the extremes; rather, they signify a sorting of 
liberals and conservatives into the “correct” parties as compared to a generation ago.”  
What Fiorina and Levendusky describe as sorting is seen on issues relating to the 
environment when both the electorate and elite are evaluated. 
One method of evaluating these differences is to examine the results of the 
General Social Survey (GSS) support for government spending on the environment. In 
1973 the GSS began asking Americans a sequence of questions regarding support of 
government spending on social welfare issues. Studies observing partisan effects on 
public opinion on the environment have often utilized the GSS as there is consistency in 
question wording and over three decades worth of observations (Dunlap, Xiao, and 
McCright 2001; McCright, Xiao, and Dunlap 2014).  
In addition to partisan effects on public opinion on the environment scholars 
investigate the effects of other key demographics. A prominent effect is the role of 
gender on supporting the environment as many find women to be more favorable of 
supporting the environment (Brody et al. 2008; Egan and Mullin 2012; Konisky, Hughes, 
and Kaylor 2016; Leiserowitz 2006; McCright and Dunlap 2011; O’Connor, Bard, and 
Fisher 1999). Similarly, age can play some role as generational differences are relevant as 
highlighted by research in which Pew recently found that young Republicans tend to have 
more favorable opinions towards the environment than older Republicans (Funk and 
Hefferon 2019). 
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2.2.2 Thermostatic Responsiveness 
“The thermostatic model of opinion change is the undergird of the political system” 
(Coggins et al., 2014, 47). 
When working with aggregate public opinion data scholars are often interested in 
why the opinion moves in the manner it does. Wlezien (1995) provides a simple model of 
opinion change that proves to be quite operational. The public acts as a thermostat by 
expressing its preferences for warmer or cooler temperatures. He proposes the 
thermostatic model connecting government action to public opinion response. According 
to Wlezien (1995), the public will send signals (turning up the heat) to change the policy 
temperature and policymakers respond. However, the public’s signal for change declines 
once the policy temperature approaches its ideal point. The thermostatic model has been 
used in various studies across issue domains, but it has been most effective when 
observing the public’s preferences for government spending (Soroka and Wlezien 2010; 
Wlezien 1995; Wlezien and Soroka 2012). Moreover, this has been critical in analyzing 
democratic institutions. 
The thermostatic model as proposed by Wlezien (1995) and Soroka and Wlezien 
(2010) requires a public responsive to the actions of policy makers. It can be argued that 
this requires an informed public, but that is not always the case as other scholars 
acknowledge that individuals are unlikely to know the level of spending for government 
programs (Coggins et al., 2014). Coggins and his co-authors argue that unlike Soroka and 
Wlezien (2010), the public does not need to know the general levels of appropriations, as 
they can infer that spending is decreasing if Republicans are in control or increasing if 
Democrats are in control. The thermostatic model of public mood functions similarly to 
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that of the thermostatic model of public representation. When policies become less liberal 
(conservative) than an individual’s preferred policies then he or she will express support 
for more liberalism (conservatism). Additionally, opinion behaves thermostatically by 
becoming more liberal when conservatives are in power and more conservative when 
liberals are in power (Coggins et al., 2014). The variations in each individual’s 
preferences aggregate into a signal of public demand for potential policy changes in 
either the liberal or conservative direction. Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson (2002) 
express that public officials should read liberal (conservative) signals from polls. “We 
expect not only that public officials read liberal or conservative signals from the 
cacophony of polls and other indicators of the public mood, but also that the public mood 
responds to the character of public policy. In this way, the polity has a chance to govern 
itself in a reasonable fashion. Should the public not adjust its demands in accord with 
actual policy, the elaborate governing mechanism embodied in the dynamic 
representation will serve little useful purpose” (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002, 
327). They argue that the public must adjust its demands according to actual policy for 
there to be dynamic representation (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002). 
Additional research observes the importance of party cues for the success of the 
thermostatic model of public mood and opinion change. The model works when party 
cues are regular and powerful; however, it does not work when party positions are mixed 
(Coggins et al., 2014). When separating issues into their three categories (party cue, no 
party cue, and absolute change) these researchers place environmental issues into the 
category of party cues which follows the idea that opinion moves thermostatically. 
Coggins et al. test whether environmental issues demonstrate a thermostatic response at 
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the aggregate level and find the thermostatic model appropriate for this issue domain. 
Their analysis finds party cues and changes in party control are powerful enough to 
generate thermostatic responses. 
2.3 HYPOTHESES, DATA AND METHODS  
In this paper, I use a two-pronged methodology. The first approach examines 
aggregate data to examine whether specific groups in the public have become more 
liberal over time and the extent that party differences has changed over time. The second 
approach examines individual level data and the thermostatic responsiveness of the 
public. Together these provide a more comprehensive analysis of public opinion on 
government spending on the environment. I use the General Social Survey’s (GSS) 
measurement for support of government spending on protecting and improving the 
environment for each statistical technique. Using these data, in addition to budget reports 
and world bank data, I test the following hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1: Women will be more liberal than men, using the liberalism index, on 
support for government spending on protecting and improving the environment.  
Hypothesis 2: Party differences on support for government spending on protecting and 
improving the environment have increased over time. 
Hypothesis 3: Men will demonstrate greater party differences than women on support for 
government spending on protecting and improving the environment. 
Hypothesis 4: Age will have an effect on support for government spending on protecting 
and improving the environment with younger individuals more likely to respond the 
government is spending too little than older individuals. 
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Hypothesis 5: Thermostatic Responsiveness. The public will be thermostatically 
responsive on government spending on the environment in which they will indicate that 
there is too much government spending when government spending on the environment 
increases (and too little when the government spending on the environment decreases). 
2.3.1 The Data Set 
The General Social Survey has studied the growing complexities of society in 
America for more than four decades beginning in 1972. Each survey from 1972 to 2018 
was an independently drawn sample of English-speaking persons 18 years or over, living 
in non-institutional arrangements within the United States. In 2006 Spanish-speakers 
were added to the target population. Block quota sampling was used in 1972, 1973, and 
1974 surveys and for half of the 1975 and 1976 surveys. Full probability sampling was 
employed in half of the 1975 and 1976 surveys and the 1977, 1978, 1980, 1982-1991, 
1993-1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, and 2018 surveys. 
This study uses the data from the 31 GSS surveys conducted between 1973 and 2018 for 
models examining aggregate data and from the 27 GSS surveys conducted between 1977 
and 2018 for models using individual level data. While there are 64,814 interviews within 
those 31 surveys there are only 35,416 (about 54%) observations for the question on 
improving and protecting the environment in the sample. The average number of 
interviews conducted in these surveys is 2,090 and ranges from 1,372 in 1990 and 4,510 
in 2006 (Smith et al. 2019, 3189). However, the average number of observations for this 
particular variable in the sample is 1,142 and ranges from 466 in 1984 to 1,732 in 1982.  
The American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) response rate 5 (RR5) 
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for the 1975-2018 surveys range from a low of 59.5% in 2018 to a high of 82.4% in 1993 
(Smith et al. 2019, 3189). 
2.3.2 Dependent variable  
The dependent variable for the models using individual level data is preferences 
on government spending on the environment. This variable is from the questions on 
government spending in the GSS. The exact question text is: “We are faced with many 
problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I’m going 
to name some these problems, and for each one I’d like you to tell me whether you think 
we’re spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. First, 
(ITEM A)… are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on (ITEM 
A)?”(Smith et al. 2019, 268). Respondents are then read a list of several problems.1 For 
my dependent variable, preferences for government spending on the environment, I use 
the item of “improving and protecting the environment,” coded as follows: “too little” =1; 
“about the right amount” =2; “too much” =3. This variable is also used in creating the 
liberalism index measure to be discussed later in section 2.3.5. 
2.3.3 Independent Variables 
 Party Identification. Party identification is likely to influence an individual’s 
opinion on government spending as it is one of the dominant mechanisms that has 
 
1 Improving and protecting the environment, improving and protecting the nation’s 
health, halting the rising crime rate, solving the problems of big cities, space exploration 
program, dealing with drug addiction, improving the nation’s education system, 
improving conditions of blacks, the military, armaments and defense, foreign aid, 
welfare, highways and bridges, mass transportation, space exploration, the environment, 
health, assistance to big cities, education, law enforcement, drug rehabilitation, assistance 
to blacks, national defense, assistance to other countries, assistance to the poor, social 
security, parks and recreation, assistance for child care, and supporting scientific 
research. 
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structured many of the distinctions between Democrats and Republicans since the New 
Deal era. For most issue domains Republicans are less likely to support government 
spending while Democrats are more likely to support increased spending.2 The GSS uses 
a standard party identification measure that is coded on a 7-point scale from strong 
Republican to strong Democrat. In my analyses I treat party leaners as belonging to that 
respective party with strong and weak identifiers. This is due to evidence that party 
leaners are more partisan than true Independents (Klar and Krupnikov 2016; Tuchfarber 
et al. 1995). The party identification variable utilized is coded as “Strong Democrat,” 
“Not Strong Democrat,” and “Independent near Democrat” = 1; “Independent” =2; 
“Strong Republican,” “Not Strong Republican,” and “Independent near Republican” = 3. 
Gender. Gender has been found to have an effect on opinions of the environment. 
This effect could be related to the fact that women are more likely to identify themselves 
with the Democratic Party. Additionally, women have been found more in favor of 
government spending on social welfare issues than men (Campbell 2012; Shorrocks and 
Grasso 2020). Women may be more likely to favor policies on the environment as they 
are seen to protect the public (Shapiro and Mahajan 1986). Scholars have explained that 
women have been socialized as caretakers and nurturers leading to these differences 
between men and women (Chodorow 1974; Stoper and Johnson 1977; Gilligan 1993). 
Gender is coded as “male” =0 and “female” = 1.  
Environmental spending. The explanatory variable of interest for the individual 
level analysis examining thermostatic responsiveness is environmental spending. Wlezien 
 
2 On issues such as security and foreign policy Republicans are more likely to support 
increased spending (Baldassarri and Park 2016), however, such issues are not relevant to 
the current study. 
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and Soroka (2014) argue that using a measurement of current spending as a percent of the 
gross domestic product (GDP) serves as the critical test of thermostatic responsiveness. 
Their research examines six Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) countries evaluating four different policy domains—none of which are the 
environment. The authors are able to use the World Bank Data for spending levels. While 
the World Bank Data does include various environmental and climate change indices 
there are not any that measure environmental spending for the United States. Thus, in this 
paper I utilize the World Bank data and Budget Reports from the United States Office of 
Management and Budget to create a new independent variable.34 This variable of 
environmental spending is calculated from the United States Budget Reports, with a t-1 
lag, as a percentage of GDP (from the world bank data). Using the budget authority by 
function and subfunction for years 1976 through 2024 I examine the spending on energy 
and natural resources and environment. Budget authority is the “authority provided by 
law to enter into obligations that will result in outlays of Federal Funds” (U.S. Senate: 
Glossary Term | Budget Authority n.d.). The United States government has energy as its 
own function and natural resources and environment as a separate function. However, 
upon examination of the subfunctions of the previously mentioned functions it is clear 
that components of both of these functions are necessary to capture environmental 
spending. Within these functions I combine the spending for the following subfunctions: 
“energy information, policy, and regulation,” “water resources,” “conservation and land 






spending on the environment.5 I then take this amount and calculate it as a percentage of 
GDP to serve as my environmental spending variable. Variations in spending in these 
four subfunctional areas are similar during this period. The correlation between energy 
information, policy, and regulation and water resources is .979; between energy 
information, policy, and regulation and conservation and land management is .650; 
between energy information, policy, and regulation and pollution control and abatement 
is .727; between water resources and conservation and land management is .706; between 
water resources and pollution control and abatement is .747; and between conservation 
and land management and pollution control and abatement is .732. The average of these 
correlations is .757. Moreover, the results for each of the individual subfunctions that 
comprise this measure behave similarly to those of the composite measure.6 
Age. Prior research has indicated that age influences opinions on support for 
government spending on the environment (Dunlap and Mertig 2014; McCright, Xiao, and 
Dunlap 2014). In this paper I take the age variable and recode it into age categories where 
“18-24” =1; “25-34” = 2; “35-44” =3; “45-54” = 4; “55-64” = 5; “65-74” = 6; and “75-
89+” = 7. 
2.3.4 Control Variables 
 Education. In previous literature education has provided mixed results on support 
for government spending as well as environmental affairs (Dunlap and Mertig 2014; 
McCright, Xiao, and Dunlap 2014). While education is not expected to have a major 
influence on opinions about the environment it is included as it may influence 
 
5 Spending is adjusted for inflation. 
6 The results are presented in tables A.3-A.6 of the appendix. 
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government spending preferences. Education is measured by the highest level of 
education attained by the respondent. I code the education variable where “Less Than 
High School” =1; “High School Diploma” = 2; “Junior College Degree” = 3; “Bachelor’s 
Degree” = 4; and “Graduate Degree” = 5.  
Race. There is little to no theoretical justification to believe that race will 
influence an individuals’ opinion of support for government spending on the 
environment. While race is often influential in other social welfare issues the issue of the 
environment is unlikely to be affected. In this paper race is coded as “nonwhite” =0 and 
“white” = 1. 
2.3.5 Liberalism Index and Party Differences (aggregate data) 
 In order to analyze whether the public is becoming more liberal on the issue of the 
environment over time I utilize Stimson’s (1999) liberalism index. This measurement is 
the percentage of liberal responses (spending too little) divided by the percentage of 
liberal and conservative responses (Stimson 1999, 40). Conservative responses are those 
responding “too much” when asked about government spending. Higher values on the 
index indicate a greater proportion of liberal responses. Trends in the liberalism index are 
important for understanding the public’s overall views on government spending. I 
calculate the liberal indices in the thirty-one surveys from 1973 through 2018 for the 
following subsets: gender, age categories, education levels, and party identification.7 
These trends provide insight on whether there are particular groups that are more 
responsive to change in the environment. Furthermore, I measure party differences to 
evaluate whether there has been change in party differences among these groups over 
 
7 The liberalism index values are displayed in tables 2.1-2.6. 
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time. Party differences are measured by subtracting the liberalism score for Republicans 
from the liberalism score for Democrats. I calculate the standard party differences and 
further include party differences for the following subsets: gender, age category, and 
education level.8 The results will help in examining the individual level effects. 
2.3.6 Thermostatic Responsiveness (Individual level) 
 For the second methodological approach I examine opinions at the individual 
level in the twenty-seven surveys from 1977 through 2018.9 Moreover, I examine the 
thermostatic responsiveness of the public on environmental spending and relative 
spending preferences. Wlezien and Soroka (2014) suggest the thermostatic model can be 
adapted to fit individual level analyses: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑈𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡, 
Where R is the public’s relative preference for policy, i are the survey respondents, j are 
the variations in R across space, P is the varying levels of policy, U are other factors and t 
is time. I use an ordered logistic regression as the dependent variable is both ordered and 
categorical. I regress preferences of government spending on the environment on 
environmental spending, gender, party identification, age, education, and race. Since all 
of the variables, with the exception of spending, are factor variables, they will be 
analyzed compared to a base outcome of a Democratic 18-24-year-old male with less 
than a high school education responding too little. 
 
8 The party differences calculations are presented in tables 2.7-2.10. 
9 There are no records provided by the government of Budget Authority by function and 
subfunction prior to 1976 and therefore the analysis for this approach covers a shorter 
time period than the liberalism index and party differences models. 
26 
2.4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
2.4.1 Liberalism index  
 This analysis first examines the liberalism of the overall public on the issue of 
government spending on the improving and protecting the environment. Is the public 
consistently more conservative or liberal on issues of the environment? If the general 
public is becoming more liberal, then I should find increasing values on this measure 
over time. The summary statistics of the liberalism index across groups are presented in 
table 2.11 with the cross-time trend shown in figure 2.1. The public is relatively liberal on 
the issue of government spending on improving and protecting the environment. These 
scores indicate that the public supports more spending on improving and protecting the 
environment as the liberalism score is greater than 50 for each year examined. The 
liberalism score varies between 96 and 75 among all respondents over the 31 years of 
observation. Republicans have more variation in their scores while Democrats remain 
relatively stable over time on the issue. 
Visual examination of the liberalism index over time reveals a decrease in 
liberalism immediately following the 1973 survey reaching its lowest point in 1980. 
Following 1980, the liberalism scores increase through 1986 where the scores stabilize 
through 2018. Moreover, table 2.11 shows that Democrats are more liberal than 
Republicans with a slightly wider gap between the two groups in comparison to gender 
differences. This is also illustrated in figures 2.2 and 2.3. A notable trend seen in figure 
2.2 is that Republicans begin to see a decrease in liberalism scores in 1990 and have a 
slight increase following 2014.  
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Providing support for my first hypothesis, figure 2.3 illustrates females are more 
liberal than males with the exception of two years—1986 and 1990; the lowest their 
liberalism score reaches are 80 while males reach their lowest at 70. Additionally, figure 
2.4 demonstrates that younger respondents tend to be more liberal than older individuals 
as the liberalism scores decrease as age increases. The results for education provide 
mixed results with the only notable difference illustrated in figure 2.5 being that the 
values on the liberalism index are higher among those with a minimum of a high school 
diploma than those with less than a high school education. Furthermore, nonwhites are 
more liberal than whites.10 
2.4.2 Party Differences 
 The summary statistics of the groups examined in calculating the party 
differences are presented in table 2.12. Overall party differences range from -.09 to a high 
of 31.93 for the 31 years observed. The largest range among groups is seen among 
individuals ages 65-74 with a low of -17.95 and a high of 57.33. It is important to note 
that positive values indicate that Democrats are more in favor of government spending 
than Republicans and negative values mean that Republicans were more in favor of 
spending than Democrats. Table 2.12 illustrates that in at least one of the years evaluated, 
Republicans were more liberal than Democrats on the issue of environmental spending 
overall and across each subset. More intuitively, the absolute values are of interest for 
determining the size of differences as the larger the absolute value the greater the 
differences between Republicans and Democrats.  
 
10 Figures 2.7-2.9 display the liberalism scores within groups by party identification for 
all years in which the issue was included in the GSS. 
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 I pivot towards an analysis of the absolute values of the summary statistics 
displayed in table 2.12. The largest group differences in liberalism scores between 
Democrats and Republicans are found when observing differences in educational 
attainment. The average party differences across education levels are 31.8. Moreover, the 
largest group differences in liberalism scores between the two parties for each group 
category is seen among those with a bachelor’s degree (47.8). However, the most 
variability within groups is found across age groups with the absolute value of 
differences ranging from 7.9 to 39.4. The smallest differences in liberalism scores 
between Democrats and Republicans within groups is seen among 18–24-year-old (7.9). 
The visual representation of these data displayed in table 2.12 is presented in 
figures 2.10- 2.13. The overall party differences do not rise above 32 indicating some 
notable differences between the two parties without being extreme. The initial trend in 
party difference, as presented in figure 2.10, is an increase from 1973 through 1980. 
Additional increases in party differences occur between 1990 and 2000 and then again 
from 2008 through 2012. While there is a decline in party differences following 2012 the 
levels have not returned to the levels seen prior to 2008. These results provide support for 
the hypothesis that party differences have increased over time indicating that partisans are 
increasingly adopting their party’s position on support for spending on improving and 
protecting the environment. 
The trends presented in figure 2.11 illustrate that while party differences are 
higher among men than women these within group differences are not large. Figure 2.12 
shows that those with more than a high school diploma experience greater party 
differences than those with less than a high school education. This raises the question of 
29 
whether those with less than a high school education rely less on party cues than those 
with at least a high school education? Generally, we would expect more vulnerability to 
party cues among lower levels of education rather than higher levels. Additionally, the 
differences in liberalism scores between Republicans and Democrats tend to increase 
with age, as illustrated in figure 2.13, and there are much larger party differences and 
erratic variation seen among those age 65 and older.  
2.4.3 Thermostatic model  
 In examining the individual level data on support for government spending on the 
environment I employ both an ordered logistic regression and an ordered probit 
regression model which are displayed in table 2.14.11 Coefficients of both an ordered 
logistic regression and ordered probit regression do not provide directly interpretable 
results. However, the coefficients do allow discussion of general findings. All of the 
variables (and their respective categories) with the exception of race achieve statistical 
significance in both models (p<0.001). Furthermore, environmental spending, age, and 
party identification have a positive relationship with “about right” or “too much” 
responses compared to their respective base categories. Meanwhile, gender (female), 
education, and race possess a negative relationship with “about right” or “too much” 
responses compared to their respective base categories. Interpretation of an ordered 
logistic regression is easier than interpretation of an ordered probit regression as the odds 
ratio can be examined in an ordered logistic regression model.  
The odds ratios discussed throughout this paper are where all other variables are 
held constant. Table 2.15 displays the odds ratio of the ordered logistic regression of 
 
11 The summary statistics are shown in table 2.13. 
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environmental spending, gender, age, party identification, education, and race on the 
dependent variable of support for environmental spending. I find that for a one unit 
increase in the amount of environmental spending as a percentage of GDP, the odds of a 
response of “too much” versus combined responses of “about right” and “too little” are 
1.530 times greater. Additionally, for a one unit increase in the amount of environmental 
spending as a percentage of GDP the odds of the combined responses “too much” and 
“about right” versus a response of “too little” are 1.530 times greater (p<0.001).  
To provide a more substantive and comprehensive analysis of the effects of 
gender, party identification, and education I examine the odds ratio evaluating the 
percentage change displayed in table 2.16. The odds of reporting about right or too much 
are 12.9% smaller for females rather than males (p<0.001). The odds of reporting “about 
right” or “too much” increase as age increases (p<0.001). At the beginning of the paper I 
hypothesized that younger individuals would be more likely to support government 
spending on improving and protecting the environment and these results support the 
claim. Further these data are reflective of the group differences across age groups 
explored in the discussion of liberalism and party differences. Table 2.16 presents a 
rather larger effect for party identification where the odds of reporting “about right” or 
“too much” are 113.8% greater for self-identified Republicans rather than Democrats. 
While the effect size grows as education levels increase it does not do so linearly as it did 
for age. The odds of reporting “about right” or “too much” are 41.1% smaller for those 
with a graduate degree rather than a less than high school education. These results are 
reflective of the group differences established in the liberalism index scores and party 
differences further strengthening the conclusions drawn from the findings.  
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Predicted probabilities and average marginal effects also provide a clearer way to 
interpret the results of an ordered logistic regression model. Using these additional 
methods provides for a thorough examination of thermostatic responsiveness which is a 
central contribution of this research. Table 2.17 provides the results of the marginal 
changes. These marginal changes of environmental spending are less than .06 and while 
the magnitude of the changes are small, they are all statistically significant (p<0.001). On 
average, a higher amount of spending as a percent of GDP decreases responses of “too 
little” while increasing the responses of “about right” or “too much.” Additionally, the 
average marginal effects tell us that on average, a standard deviation increase in spending 
on the environment as a percentage of GDP (~.34) is associated with a .040 decrease in 
the probability of responding “too little.” This is offset by an increase of .025 in the 
probability of responding “about right” and a .015 increase in the probability of 
responding “too much.” All of these effects are significant at the p<0.001 level. These 
results provide support for the hypothesis that the public is thermostatic as spending 
increases the public adjusts its preferences to indicate the government is spending “too 
much.”  
Figure 2.14 presents the predicted probabilities of the ordered logistic regression 
model. The figure illustrates a visible trend of high to low predicted probabilities. The 
“too little” responses exhibit higher predicted probabilities and those responding “too 
much” possess small predicted probabilities. Predicted probabilities of those responding 
“about right” are also small. In calculating the average predicted probabilities, I find the 
average predicted probabilities of someone responding “too little” is .612, “about right” is 
.30, and “too much” is .088. 
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While the major contribution of this research is the successful test and support of 
a thermostatically responsive public, I do look at both the public mood and the 
environmental spending separately in the aggregate and then together to test whether the 
trends support what I hypothesized. Figure 2.15 displays environmental spending, figure 
2.16 shows the public mood on environmental issues and figure 2.17 combines the visual 
representations.12 The trends behave as expected. When spending levels are high public 
mood is low and when spending levels plummet the public mood has a large uptick. 
Further when spending slightly increases the public mood adjusts. 
Together, the analysis of the liberalism index, party differences, and thermostatic 
responsiveness provide an extensive examination of public opinion on environmental 
spending preferences. Furthermore, the consistent findings highlight the strength of the 
data used in the analyses. While the results indicated some variability within certain 
groups (i.e., age) they did provide evidence that younger generations are more supportive 
of environmental spending than older generations. Additionally, women are more likely 
to support increased spending on protecting and improving the environment. Education 
attainment was expected to provide mixed results; however, I find individuals with more 
than a high school diploma to be more willing to support spending measures. 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
 I argued at the beginning of this article that proponents of environmental policy 
would benefit from this extensive study of preferences of government spending on the 
environment. Overall, party differences have increased over time and while it appears 
that the public has sorted on matters of the environment the polity is relatively liberal on 
 
12 Data for public mood was collected by The Policy Agendas Project. 
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the issue of government spending on the environment. That being said, self-identified 
Republicans and Democrats have properly sorted themselves on the issues and have more 
distinct views than they did thirty plus years ago. While this study does not offer a 
conclusive answer to the question of why party elites have opposing views on the 
environment it does examine groups that are less vulnerable to these party cues. The 
results indicate that women and individuals between the ages 18 and 34 are more 
supportive of the environment and potentially less reliant on party elites. 
This research is one of the first attempts to examine thermostatic responsiveness 
in the US at the individual level on environmental spending preferences. The findings in 
this paper are significant as they suggest that increased levels of spending lead to lower 
support for spending increases and decreased levels of spending lead to higher levels of 
support. That is, the more the government spends on the environment the less supportive 
the public is of more environmental spending, all things being equal. Evidence supporting 
a thermostatically responsive public is significant in discussing a functioning 
representative democracy. As previously mentioned, an effective representative 
democracy requires the public to be at least partly responsive to policy produced by their 
government.  
Overall, the public is and has been more in favor of spending on protecting and 
improving the environment over the last few decades. If policymakers supporting 
environmental policy were to consider the results of this study, they might find success in 
policy implementation by capitalizing on specific groups. With a new administration in 
the White House findings such as these can be used as opportunities to generate 
momentum. The younger generation is a key audience outside of the two parties. 
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However, the messaging for this population of interest should not be partisan as these 
findings indicate that they are less sorted on the issue of the environment. A partisan 
approach could create an undesirable effect. 
Additionally, as these findings suggest a thermostatic responsive public then the 
Biden administration should prepare for these effects. Support for spending on the 
environment is likely to decline once increased spending occurs. With that in mind, it 
may be more advisable to aim for drastic measures, such as substantial increases in 
spending, early to address the issue comprehensively.  
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College Bachelor's Graduate 
1973 83.99 90.42 93.75 96.97 94 
1974 83.76 89.25 100 96.12 91.38 
1975 83.67 83.54 96.15 90.2 83.33 
1976 79.54 86.93 90 92.23 93.18 
1977 77.13 83.33 91.3 77.08 85.71 
1978 80.99 85.48 84 86.73 89.47 
1980 70.61 78.31 72.41 75 77.27 
1982 75.31 83.12 84.62 90.57 93.33 
1983 81.28 88.32 81.4 91.79 88.46 
1984 86.3 96.41 90.91 94.12 95 
1985 80.18 91.6 88.24 85.71 84.85 
1986 88.71 91.46 100 95.31 100 
1987 93.02 93.13 100 93.22 100 
1988 87.62 93.94 96.67 95.45 100 
1989 94 95.24 95.45 93.83 100 
1990 90.63 94.21 93.55 94.94 97.5 
1991 83.51 95.41 100 93.75 93.94 
1993 71.26 89.43 77.5 91.86 87.5 
1994 84.66 87.5 90 88.34 88.75 
1996 85.51 83.54 86.76 84.14 88.89 
1998 86.92 89.24 89.29 85.38 93.94 
2000 85.61 89.14 89.87 89.54 84.85 
2002 88.33 90.3 92.42 87.01 92.75 
2004 87.16 89.39 85.39 94.25 93.68 
2006 88.06 90.94 95.96 93.16 94.02 
2008 85.39 87.53 90 92 93.75 
2010 75.79 81.61 85.11 83.48 87.84 
2012 86.52 85.49 81.67 79.13 84.42 
2014 81.82 85.68 90.7 84.71 89.69 
2016 82.42 87.35 90.91 91.1 92.31 




Table 2.3 Liberalism Index across Age Groups. 
Year 18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75-89+ 
1973 97.19 95.69 91.35 86.29 78.99 75.56 80 
1974 96.97 96.25 87.79 86.88 80.34 71.74 77.78 
1975 95.73 91.14 80.25 83.56 83.65 66.3 62.86 
1976 94.41 94.37 87.65 79.53 80.16 69.51 67.19 
1977 96.06 92.34 81.21 73.72 70.9 61.43 63.64 
1978 97.47 93.93 81.6 73.58 66.36 80.49 69.77 
1980 91.61 85.55 75 61.02 63.16 63.27 64.1 
1982 95.78 90.32 84.29 76.51 68.53 65.71 67.31 
1983 96.03 91.75 88.4 79.23 76.32 83.72 75 
1984 97.62 96.43 90.77 89.47 87.88 96.55 93.33 
1985 90.24 91.41 91.92 84.93 82.26 86.54 70.83 
1986 100 95.31 96.33 90.91 85.45 74.36 80.77 
1987 95.74 96.88 94.51 91.67 93.18 88.37 87.5 
1988 96.77 96 97.46 91.38 88.68 88.1 81.08 
1989 97.01 96.95 97.71 93.33 86.57 96.77 92.59 
1990 100 96.8 96.8 92.06 88.68 88.33 82.76 
1991 100 96.5 97.14 90.32 77.78 93.1 80 
1993 89.66 94.53 89.63 88.89 70.21 61.9 70.37 
1994 92.86 93.23 90.69 87.13 85.15 70.89 68.33 
1996 95.28 90.71 83.87 88.11 76.53 66.22 66.67 
1998 95.51 92.79 88.66 88.13 90 78.08 72.09 
2000 96.84 90.14 90.56 88.76 86.54 80 75 
2002 94.34 93.26 91.11 88.24 85.84 82.61 87.23 
2004 92.45 91.41 90.05 90.73 89.55 86.67 84.44 
2006 95.7 95.19 91.81 92 94.19 82.61 82.67 
2008 93.06 95.68 87.94 87.9 87.5 89.83 73.47 
2010 88.89 85.83 87.31 80.77 81.34 75.71 65.22 
2012 94.67 91.11 81.82 82.11 77.78 76.47 82.22 
2014 94.2 94.3 88.97 82.58 85.21 68.89 83.05 
2016 95.76 91.86 89.33 85.89 87.06 82.88 81.03 




Table 2.4 Liberalism Index across Party Identification. 
Year Democrat Independent Republican 
1973 91.51 92 84.28 
1974 89.81 87.64 85.61 
1975 87 83.8 80.38 
1976 86.94 87.1 81.23 
1977 85.52 78.18 74.31 
1978 87.45 91.03 76.57 
1980 80.08 78.48 65.68 
1982 85.19 85.61 74.28 
1983 89.24 88.89 81.05 
1984 94.89 91.43 90 
1985 91.18 78.57 85.64 
1986 92.13 90.74 91.72 
1987 96 97.78 87.18 
1988 94.16 92.86 92.27 
1989 96.63 94.29 93.86 
1990 93.33 98 93.42 
1991 95.26 86.76 92.69 
1993 89.02 82.09 81.72 
1994 92.71 88.19 78.81 
1996 90.19 93.46 73.56 
1998 95.72 92.64 77.5 
2000 93.89 90 79.28 
2002 94.97 89.94 82.86 
2004 94.41 91.45 83.33 
2006 95.8 92.09 85.17 
2008 94.5 86.07 81.02 
2010 92.51 86.32 65.55 
2012 94.71 87.7 62.78 
2014 94.54 91.57 68.64 
2016 96.61 90.8 72.76 




Table 2.5 Liberalism Index across Gender. 
Year Male Female 
1973 87.23 91.05 
1974 87.22 89.6 
1975 78.63 90.31 
1976 82.78 87.9 
1977 79.21 82.97 
1978 77.56 89.94 
1980 69.65 80.72 
1982 78.01 85.54 
1983 85.1 88.25 
1984 91.5 94.81 
1985 85.91 90 
1986 92.61 91.35 
1987 91.46 95.95 
1988 92.57 93.9 
1989 93.92 96.17 
1990 96.92 91.43 
1991 90.99 94.92 
1993 83.88 87.36 
1994 87.16 87.68 
1996 82.85 86.09 
1998 85.75 90.79 
2000 85.62 90.79 
2002 86.8 92.41 
2004 87.7 92.02 
2006 88.94 93.94 
2008 86.88 90.93 
2010 79.34 85.13 
2012 83.46 84.46 
2014 84.62 87.25 
2016 83.29 91.71 




Table 2.6 Liberalism Index across Race. 
Year Nonwhite White 
1973 90.15 89.04 
1974 90.91 88.04 
1975 87.16 84.34 
1976 84.95 85.53 
1977 85 80.57 
1978 96.52 82.93 
1980 87.62 74.12 
1982 86.23 80.2 
1983 88.33 86.64 
1984 93.33 93.13 
1985 96.23 86.45 
1986 90.36 92.23 
1987 97.14 92.17 
1988 95.45 92.91 
1989 95.89 95.03 
1990 88.89 94.71 
1991 91.01 93.68 
1993 89.41 85.02 
1994 95.65 85.63 
1996 88.52 83.57 
1998 92.06 87.75 
2000 91.24 87.76 
2002 93.62 88.78 
2004 91.35 89.72 
2006 90.78 92.13 
2008 89.47 88.93 
2010 86.05 80.67 
2012 94.01 80.72 
2014 89.71 84.83 
2016 92.13 87.17 
2018 92.58 89.75 
  
41 
Table 2.7 Overall Party Differences. 



































Table 2.8 Party Differences across Gender. 
Year Male  Female 
1973 5.41 8.8 
1974 4.24 4.42 
1975 14.94 0.81 
1976 7.47 3.84 
1977 18.2 5.59 
1978 17.47 6.3 
1980 16.47 13.2 
1982 16.46 4.8 
1983 14.39 3.31 
1984 5.66 3.5 
1985 10.3 -1.66 
1986 3.98 -2.23 
1987 16.42 1.33 
1988 3.18 0.97 
1989 3.23 1.92 
1990 -3.58 3.31 
1991 4.08 1.27 
1993 11.11 3.71 
1994 17.05 11.45 
1996 15.01 17.89 
1998 22.71 14.01 
2000 17.54 11.84 
2002 13.17 9.77 
2004 10.81 11.13 
2006 13.16 8.11 
2008 17.1 10.17 
2010 31.66 20.3 
2012 34.13 30.44 
2014 29.73 22.17 
2016 31.23 18.2 











College Bachelor's Graduate 
1973 10.58 8.16 16.67 5.88 2.55 
1974 8.4 5.84 0 -2.3 -6.17 
1975 -4.57 11.82 0 13.19 12.42 
1976 10.53 4.8 -18.18 11 9.17 
1977 18.94 4.8 4.81 14.85 27.08 
1978 0.61 11.53 42.86 24.34 14.74 
1980 13.33 6.96 30 40.63 16.67 
1982 8.99 13.83 2.38 7.51 28.57 
1983 7.94 5.78 35.65 10.34 20.61 
1984 -1.27 7.69 -16.67 8.33 -6.25 
1985 -7.74 4.56 25 11.8 29.41 
1986 3.46 2.22 0 -6.45 0 
1987 -2.77 10.41 0 17.39 0 
1988 9.08 -2.61 0 10.71 0 
1989 5.7 1.82 -1.01 7.32 0 
1990 2.7 1.3 -16.67 -2.76 6.25 
1991 1.38 1.12 0 11.63 11.11 
1993 -3.66 -0.47 44.44 15.56 29.76 
1994 4.86 13.21 9.52 16.78 33.33 
1996 0.5 16.09 7.93 26.51 31.16 
1998 10.12 18.64 24.42 18.17 20 
2000 10.83 9.54 21.77 22.7 27.91 
2002 10.75 10.31 8.88 16.21 19.78 
2004 10.2 9.3 11.94 12 21.43 
2006 -4.44 13.03 0.71 17.76 9.72 
2008 13.18 14.35 7.29 15.35 9.68 
2010 26.09 25.73 25.25 31.92 25.82 
2012 -4.29 31.38 22.86 54.29 44.12 
2014 23.86 18.75 15.89 43.14 36 
2016 21.71 24.98 16.67 25.4 19.16 




Table 2.10 Party Differences across Age Groups. 
Year 18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75-89 
1973 1.12 5.91 7.88 12.75 -5.3 10.3 36.11 
1974 4.65 0.28 4.89 -2.71 9.62 -10.83 23.21 
1975 -2.94 4.32 4.63 2.95 10.99 11.23 3.03 
1976 2.32 8.71 -5.57 5.14 10.65 8.86 -7.1 
1977 -6.15 1.05 12 13.81 22.19 18.42 -3.33 
1978 5.58 11.44 20.57 -1.31 4.11 0.49 17.37 
1980 4.76 14.98 20.51 4.74 15.74 12.54 41.35 
1982 3.98 6.91 17.46 3.11 24.49 10.9 23.06 
1983 0.72 5.62 12.91 12.36 4.63 -1.33 30.18 
1984 6.25 8.7 6.89 10.91 -20 11.11 -11.11 
1985 -12.09 6.48 15 -2.38 14.47 3.7 12.5 
1986 0 -0.77 7.45 8.89 2.78 -17.95 -6.82 
1987 14.29 2.27 -1.1 11.93 33.33 22.67 12.5 
1988 -4.35 -1.51 0.82 0.33 2.7 -10.42 44.74 
1989 -3.33 5.45 -4.76 -0.13 16.43 1.14 18.18 
1990 0 -3.45 0 -0.51 -2.81 14.75 -1.28 
1991 0 2.63 3.07 -9.17 4.35 11.72 10.71 
1993 9.52 7.32 15.24 4.87 -9.72 3.85 5 
1994 20 10.56 17.47 8.97 16.11 16.99 24.44 
1996 5.46 5.28 27.69 20.53 10.01 29.07 42.95 
1998 10.48 7.24 17.71 33.5 17.55 28.21 22.35 
2000 2.62 11.51 6.94 12.25 21.94 42.5 24.95 
2002 2.01 8.94 6.84 15.64 15.57 26.08 11.4 
2004 -0.65 9.38 11 8.97 10.81 25.02 26.7 
2006 1.63 5.5 9.49 9.42 5.27 37.5 4.29 
2008 0.84 7.89 1.68 17.82 24.33 9.34 38.67 
2010 5.86 11.94 22.8 30.64 15.96 52.43 50.48 
2012 12.95 25.14 30.51 35.46 34.8 47.14 37.5 
2014 11.26 11.01 12.99 18.5 31.69 57.33 40 
2016 -0.83 13.1 27.34 26.86 33.17 39.78 29.22 
2018 1.63 6.99 15.49 16.4 29.7 35.58 28.57 
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Table 2.11 Summary Statistics of the Liberalism Index 
Variable n Mean SD Min Max 
Education:      
Less Than High School 31 83.85275 5.643978 70.61224 94 
High School 31 88.64623 4.344058 78.31326 96.40719 
Junior College 31 90.12165 6.625309 72.4138 100 
Bachelor's 31 89.65639 5.621656 75 96.9697 
Graduate 31 91.20392 5.461815 77.27273 100 
Age:      
18-24 31 95.24872 2.751189 88.88889 100 
25-34 31 93.30606 2.96357 85.54688 96.94656 
35-44 31 89.20349 5.503452 75 97.70992 
45-54 31 85.38399 7.034599 61.01695 93.33334 
55-64 31 81.89453 7.794821 63.15789 94.19355 
65-74 31 78.5907 10.17987 61.42857 96.77419 
75-89+ 31 76.60886 8.749725 62.85714 93.33334 
Party Identification:      
Democrat 31 92.02466 4.091733 80.0813 96.8599 
Independent 31 89.00739 5.023783 78.18182 98 
Republican 31 80.69579 8.391885 62.77778 93.85965 
Gender:      
Male 31 85.71502 5.687148 69.64706 96.9163 
Female 31 89.88149 3.762628 80.71571 96.16614 
Race:      
NonWhite 31 91.02447 3.458909 84.94624 97.14286 
White 31 87.23107 4.931289 74.11908 95.02982 
      
Overall 31 87.96438 4.415739 75.64655 95.13889 
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Table 2.12 Summary Statistics of Party Differences 
Variable n Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Overall 31 11.32887 7.987742 -0.08772 31.9281 
Gender:      
Male 31 14.31517 9.167747 -3.582931 34.12853 
Female 31 8.567226 7.729949 -2.233782 30.44319 
Education:      
Less Than High School 31 6.547128 8.728428 -7.741935 26.08696 
High School 31 10.41838 8.010374 -2.61491 31.37989 
Junior College 31 11.08518 15.95009 -18.18182 44.44444 
Bachelor's 31 16.79866 12.96644 -6.451613 54.28571 
Graduate 31 16.76878 13.20266 -6.25 44.11765 
Age:      
18-24 31 3.148214 6.413762 -12.0915 20 
25-34 31 7.123809 5.540645 -3.454545 25.13993 
35-44 31 11.15615 9.37098 -5.572999 30.51213 
45-54 31 10.66249 10.87223 -9.166667 35.4558 
55-64 31 13.08325 13.08208 -20 34.80226 
65-74 31 17.68109 18.66224 -17.94872 57.32527 




Table 2.13 Summary Statistics of Thermostatic Model 
Variable n Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Improving and Protecting 
the Environment 35,416 1.476903 0.6529531 1 3 
Environmental Spending 57,240 0.4749411 0.342124 0.15 1.96 
Female 64,814 0.5585213 0.4965673 0 1 
Age Category 64,586 3.641145 1.751345 1 7 
Party Identification 63,324 1.850104 0.9063084 1 3 
DEGREE 64,641 2.35858 1.175289 1 5 




Table 2.14 Ordered Logistic and Ordered Probit Regression of gender, age, party 
identification, education, and race on my dependent variable of support for government 
spending on improving and protecting the environment. 
Independent Variable OLOGIT OPROBIT    
Environmental Spending 0.425*** (0.030) 0.252*** (0.017) 
Gender: Female -0.138*** (0.024) -0.090*** (0.014) 
Age: 25-34 0.333*** (0.051) 0.197*** (0.029) 
Age: 35-44 0.617*** (0.051) 0.365*** (0.029) 
Age: 45-54 0.849*** (0.052) 0.505*** (0.030) 
Age: 55-64 1.030*** (0.053) 0.611*** (0.031) 
Age: 65-74 1.197*** (0.056) 0.703*** (0.033) 
Age: 75-89+ 1.330*** (0.061) 0.775*** (0.036) 
Independent 0.275*** (0.037) 0.171*** (0.022) 
Republican 0.760*** (0.028) 0.460*** (0.016) 
High School -0.237*** (0.033) -0.138*** (0.019) 
Junior College -0.371*** (0.059) -0.211*** (0.034) 
Bachelor’s -0.362*** (0.043) -0.218*** (0.026) 
Graduate -0.529*** (0.054) -0.318*** (0.032) 
Race: White -0.061      (0.033) -0.042* (0.019) 
Cut points 1.364       (0.060) 0.817     (0.035)  
3.352       (0.063) 1.949     (0.036) 
2 0.000 0.000 
Log Likelihood -2,4325.091 -2,4313.686 
n 29,069 29,069 
*p<.05; ** p<.01; 







Table 2.15 Odds Ratio for the Ordered Logistic Regression of environmental spending, 
gender, age, party identification, education, and race on my dependent variable of 
support for government spending on improving and protecting the environment. 
Independent variable   Odds Ratio  Standard Error 
Environmental Spending   1.530***  .045 
Gender: Female   .871***  .021 
Age: 25-34   1.396***  .070 
Age: 35-44   1.853***  .094 
Age: 45-54   2.337***  .122 
Age: 55-64   2.800***  .149 
Age: 65-74   3.310***  .185 
Age: 75-89+   3.780***  .231 
Party Identification: Independent   1.317***  .048 
Party Identification: Republican   2.138***  .059 
Education: High School   .789***  .026 
Education: Junior College   .689***  .041 
Education: Bachelor’s   .696***  .030 
Education: Graduate   .589***  .032 
Race: White   .941  .031 
      
Cut points   1.364  .060 
   3.352  .063 
2   0.000   
Log Likelihood   -24325.091   
n   29,069   
*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; two tailed 
tests. 




Table 2.16 Percentage Change in odds of the Ordered Logistic Regression of 
environmental spending, gender, age, party identification, education, and race on my 
dependent variable of support for government spending on improving and protecting the 
environment. (odds of: >m vs <=m) 
Independent variable B z P>|z| % %StdX SDofX 
Environmental Spending 0.425 14.417 0.000 53.0 19.4 0.418 
Gender: Female -0.138 -5.642 0.000 -12.9 -6.6 0.497 
Age: 25-34 0.333 6.588 0.000 39.6 15.0 0.418 
Age: 35-44 0.617 12.091 0.000 85.3 28.0 0.401 
Age: 45-54 0.849 16.262 0.000 133.7 36.7 0.368 
Age: 55-64 1.030 19.327 0.000 180.0 42.6 0.345 
Age: 65-74 1.197 21.363 0.000 231.0 43.9 0.304 
Age: 75-89+ 1.330 21.719 0.000 278.0 40.0 0.253 
Independent 0.275 7.501 0.000 31.7 10.4 0.359 
Republican 0.760 27.568 0.000 113.8 43.7 0.478 
Education: High School -0.237 -7.299 0.000 -21.1 -11.2 0.500 
Education: Junior College -0.372 -6.310 0.000 -31.0 -8.5 0.240 
Education: Bachelor’s -0.363 -8.349 0.000 -30.4 -12.1 0.357 
Education: Graduate -0.529 -9.728 0.000 -41.1 -13.0 0.263 




Table 2.17 Average Marginal Effects of environmental spending, gender, age, party 
identification, education, and race on my dependent variable of support for government 
spending on improving and protecting the environment. 
  Too Little About Right Too Much 
Environmental Spending:               
+1  -0.097*** 0.058*** 0.039*** 
+SD  -0.04*** 0.025*** 0.015*** 
Marginal  -0.094*** 0.061*** 0.033*** 
Gender:                
Female vs Male 0.031*** -0.02*** -0.011*** 
Age Category:               
25-34 vs 18-24 -0.064*** 0.048*** 0.016*** 
35-44 vs 18-24 -0.125*** 0.091*** 0.034*** 
45-54 vs 18-24 -0.178*** 0.126*** 0.052*** 
55-64 vs 18-24 -0.221*** 0.153*** 0.068*** 
65-74 vs 18-24 -0.261*** 0.175*** 0.086*** 
75-89 vs 18-24 -0.293*** 0.192*** 0.101*** 
35-44 vs 25-34 -0.061*** 0.043*** 0.018*** 
45-54 vs 25-34 -0.114*** 0.078*** 0.036*** 
55-64 vs 25-34 -0.157*** 0.105*** 0.052*** 
65-74 vs 25-34 -0.197*** 0.127*** 0.07*** 
75-89 vs 25-34 -0.229*** 0.144*** 0.085*** 
45-54 vs 35-44 -0.053*** 0.035*** 0.018*** 
55-64 vs 35-44 -0.096*** 0.062*** 0.034*** 
65-74 vs 35-44 -0.136*** 0.084*** 0.052*** 
75-89 vs 35-44 -0.168*** 0.101*** 0.067*** 
55-64 vs 45-54 -0.043*** 0.026*** 0.016*** 
65-74 vs 45-54 -0.083*** 0.049*** 0.034*** 
75-89 vs 45-54 -0.115*** 0.066** 0.049** 
65-74 vs 55-64 -0.04*** 0.023*** 0.017*** 
75-89 vs 55-64 -0.072*** 0.039*** 0.033*** 
75-89 vs 65-74 -0.032* 0.016* 0.015* 
*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; 





















Figure 2.3 Liberalism Index Across Gender 
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Figure 2.14 Predicted Probabilities of support for government spending on protecting 












Figure 2.17 Trends of Environmental Spending and Public Mood of Environmental 
Spending. 
 
CHAPTER 3 : GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, HURRICANE HARVEY, 
AND OPINION CHANGE 
ABSTRACT 
General trends of public opinion on matters of the environment indicate that 
partisanship is the most influential predictor of Americans’ beliefs. However, scholarship 
also illustrates that these beliefs can be altered by experiencing an extreme weather event 
as it functions as a focusing event. The Sea Grant data on Texas communities provide a 
unique opportunity to observe residents’ opinions regarding resilience, preparedness, and 
climate change both before and after Hurricane Harvey devastated the state of Texas. 
This hurricane, the second most costly natural disaster in US history, provides a quasi-
natural experiment for examining individual attitudes. This research investigates the 
strength of partisanship as a predictor of beliefs on environmental issues to determine 
whether or not experiencing a hurricane of this magnitude weakens partisanship as a 
predictor and subsequently leads to increased issue salience on global climate change. 
Additionally, this paper examines opinions on global warming among individuals in 
Oklahoma participating in a panel to determine if these effects extend beyond the Texas 
borders into a neighboring state.  
Keywords: public opinion, extreme weather, climate change, focusing event
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Hurricane Harvey made landfall along the Texas coast on August 25th, 2017 and it 
ranks as the second costliest storm for all hurricanes on record in the US (Hurricane 
Costs n.d.; US Department of Commerce n.d.). Both local and national news headlines 
read “CATASTROPHE” in covering Harvey. There were at least sixty-eight deaths from 
the direct effect of the storm which was the largest the state had experienced since 1919 
(Blake and Zelinsky 2018). Evidence exists explaining that the unnatural effects of 
anthropogenic global climate change are making hurricanes both stronger and more 
destructive which is likely to continue as long as the climate continues to warm. 
Trenberth and colleagues (2018) argue that the intensity of Hurricane Harvey was linked 
to global climate change. These researchers support these claims as they discover record 
heat in the Gulf of Mexico prior to Hurricane Harvey and then subsequent evaporative 
cooling during the storm’s passage corresponding to the heavy rainfalls in Harvey 
(Trenberth et al. 2018). The storm’s devastation was visible, and the damage was obvious 
to residents of the state, especially those living in communities directly affected.  
This paper seeks to address the following questions: Will the experience of 
feeling the direct impact of Hurricane Harvey cause the residents of Brazoria and 
Galveston County (in Texas) to express greater concern that climate change will cause 
personal harm? Furthermore, will individuals who previously indicated that temperatures 
are not increasing respond that temperatures are increasing as a result of experiencing 
Hurricane Harvey? Will party identification remain the strongest predictor of climate 
change opinions both prior to the storm and after? Likewise, will opinion change occur 
within individuals in a neighboring state who, while not experiencing the effects of the 
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storm directly, became aware of its impact due to the extent of its devastation? In order to 
examine these claims, I utilize data collected in 2016 and 2017 (before and after Harvey 
made landfall) examining perceptions of residents in two Texas communities directly 
affected by this hurricane. In addition, I use panel data collected by the University of 
Oklahoma of a random sample of Oklahoma residents as they provide an opportunity to 
augment these analyses.   
3.2 BACKGROUND AND THEORY 
The impact of hurricane devastation is not a new topic in the field of political 
science. However, much of the existing literature, specifically on Hurricane Katrina, 
focuses on bureaucratic failure (see Gotham 2012; C. Johnson 2011; J. Johnson 2012; 
Koliba, Mills, and Zia 2011; Sakakeeny 2012; Schneider 2005; Simmons and Casper 
2012). Additionally, researchers examine hurricanes and tropical storms in evaluating 
community resilience and disaster preparedness (Goidel et al. 2019; Shao 2016; Shao, 
Xian, Lin, et al. 2017; Zhao et al. 2019). 13 While researchers have examined the effects 
of extreme weather events on global climate change attitudes (e.g. Konisky, Hughes, and 
Kaylor 2016; Ray et al. 2017) there has not been an opportunity to examine the effects 
both before and after such an event until now.  
In recent years individuals across the globe have been increasingly impacted by 
abnormal weather events.  Extreme or abnormal weather could create focusing events 
which Bishop (2014, 4) describes as “a sudden, unanticipated occurrences which portend 
continuing or worsening similar problems in the future and implicate potential 
 
13 Research using these same data (Sea Grant) is ongoing and this paper avoids analyses 
that would overlap with those actively examined by Goidel and colleagues. 
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government action.” In the United States events such as the publication of Silent Spring, 
Three Mile Island, and Love Canal are credited with increasing issue salience.   
The history of Love Canal provides an example of a focusing event. In 1975, an 
abandoned chemical dump known as Love Canal was determined to be a large health 
menace to the residents of the communities surrounding the site located near Niagara 
Falls (Gibbs 2011). The tragedy of Love Canal produced harmful health effects including 
birth defects, miscarriages, cancer, and led to the creation of the Superfund law, the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (US 
EPA 2015). This tragedy is a prime example of how environmental disasters generate 
concern among the polity.  
Floods, hurricanes, and fires can create a “cognitive spark that salience provides” 
(Guber 2003, 120). Although a portion of the American public holds fixed beliefs, there 
is a segment of the attentive public that will change its views in response to events. 
Researchers have shown that hurricanes and droughts are associated with individual 
recognition of climate change and increased salience of the issue (Borick and Rabe 
2010). Additionally, Birkland (1998) explains that focusing events can lead the public to 
identify new problems or pay greater attention to existing problems as there is obvious 
damage that is easy for the public to visualize. That is, a community struck by a 
devastating hurricane may look at the damage caused by the storm and have heightened 
concern for the harmful effects of climate change. Nonetheless, there is a possibility that 
individuals will not associate hurricanes with human faulting but instead perceive them as 
“acts of God” (Stone 1989). 
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Climate change is a complex issue in which the average citizen may not 
understand. When forming opinions on climate change and climate change policies 
individuals may turn to party elites as they can serve as a cognitive shortcut in forming 
opinions. Birkland (1998) suggests that partisanship should be less important after an 
event such as a powerful hurricane and such events may cause a visceral response among 
the directly impacted individuals. However, Zaller (1992, 121) warns of partisan 
resistance expressing that “individuals may refuse to internalize new dominant messages 
that they recognize as inconsistent with their underlying predispositions.” Moreover, 
Darmofal (2005) argues that science is often superseded by ideological constraints. So, 
while focusing events can lead to opinion change, some individuals’ beliefs may remain 
beholden to those reflective of their party if the ties are strong enough. There is scant 
prior research with access to data to test the effects of a powerful hurricane against 
ideological and partisan strengths.  
While it is fair to say that a hurricane can become a focusing event, the question 
may lie in how long the window of opportunity to increase salience lasts, as concerns are 
directly correlated with the duration of impact from the event. Researchers find that 
experiences of extreme weather are associated with an increase in support for climate 
adaptation policies but also find recent exposure to be more powerful in creating this 
relationship (Ray et al. 2017). Konisky, Hughes, and Kaylor illustrate substantively 
meaningful results by demonstrating that climate change concerns can be impacted by 
weather related events, but these effects are often short lived (2016).  They find that the 
more climate related extreme weather an individual experiences in the month prior to the 
survey the higher level of concern expressed on environmental issues.  
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Not only does exposure to extreme weather lead to some increase in concern for 
climate change but it also plays a role in individual’s risk perceptions related to natural 
disasters (Goidel et al. 2019; Shao, Xian, Lin, et al. 2017; Shao and Goidel 2016). This is 
supported in research finding that personal experience with extreme weather serves as a 
significant predictor of climate change risk perception (van der Linden 2014). These 
findings suggest that there should be a difference in the respondent’s attitudes post 
Harvey. Ballew et al. (2019) find relatively small effects when examining the personal 
experience on climate change opinions they believe that as extreme weather increases in 
frequency and severity the effects of personal experience may grow. The previously 
mentioned studies underscore the unique opportunity Hurricane Harvey provides as the 
severity of the hurricane was such that the effects of personal experience on climate 
change opinions and risk perceptions should intensify.  
3.3 DATA 
3.3.1 Sea Grant Data 
Survey data collected by the Public Policy Research Institute at Texas A&M 
University and funded by the Texas Sea Grant provides the basis for examining the 
impact of Hurricane Harvey with a panel of respondents. The study was conducted with a 
sample selected using Address Based Sampling. In the initial survey 1,578 interviews 
were completed through multiple modes (web, mail, and telephone components). Harvey 
made landfall on August 25th, 2017 and Brazoria County was surveyed months  before 
(September 9-December 21, 2016) and Galveston county (May 1 to July 31st, 2017) just 
weeks prior to landfall (Goidel et al. 2019). This provided the investigators (PPRI) of the 
original study a rare opportunity to collect data on post Harvey attitudes by conducting 
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follow-up data collection. Hurricane Harvey can be used and analyzed as a natural 
experiment. For the post-Harvey study households in the original survey were re-
contacted and asked similar questions. Three hundred and eight individuals from the 
original study responded to the panel study request. The analyses for the current study are 
based on 289 respondents from Brazoria and Galveston counties who could be matched 
back to a household in the original sample providing for an examination of how attitudes 
shifted after the storm (Zhao et al. 2019). 
3.3.1.1 Dependent Variables (Sea Grant) 
Researchers developed questions regarding climate change opinions. I use both 
their questions regarding temperatures increasing and climate change causing personal 
harm. The respondents are asked if they believe that the “temperature has probably been 
going up” or “temperature has probably not been going up.” This variable is coded where 
“temperature has probably not been going up” =0 and “temperature has probably been 
going up” =1. Respondents are also asked what their concern level is for the likelihood 
that climate change will cause personal harm. This variable is on a one to five scale 
where “not at all concerned” =1 and “very concerned” =5. Alternatively, the analyses 
including the response of “don’t know/not sure” are coded where “not going up” =1, 
“don’t know/not sure” =2, and “going up” =3 on the question regarding temperatures 
increasing. For the question examining concern of climate change causing personal harm 
“don’t know/not sure” = 1 and the original 5-point scale is shifted to 2 through 6 where 2 




3.3.2 CRCM Data 
I utilize the Oklahoma Meso-Scale Integrated Sociogeographic Network (M-
SISNet) consisting of the Oklahoma Weather, Society and Government survey to explore 
possible opinion change regarding global warming after Hurricane Harvey devastated the 
coast of the neighboring state Texas. The survey consists of twenty waves beginning in 
winter of 2014. At the end of each meteorological season from winter 2014 to summer 
2019 the University of Oklahoma’s Center for Risk and Crisis Management (CRCM) 
surveyed thousands of people across the state of Oklahoma.14 Participants were randomly 
selected from all mailing addresses in the state and then contacted by phone asking if the 
individual would like to be a survey respondent. The survey was designed to measure 
perceptions of weather as well as views on government policies and societal issues. The 
first wave consisted of 602 respondents and was collected from February 25th – April 6th, 
2014 (CRCM-EPSCoR n.d.). The final data collection for this survey occurred in summer 
2019 consisting of 2,488 respondents and was conducted from September 6th, 2019- 
October 19th, 2019 (CRCM-EPSCoR n.d.).15 The number of respondents in the waves 
ranged from 602 in the winter of 2014 (first wave) to 2,798 in the winter of 2015 (wave 
5). Data for wave 14 were collected from June 1st through July 24th, 2017 (CRCM-
EPSCoR n.d.). Hurricane Harvey made landfall on August 25th, 2017 and the data for 
wave 15 of the M-SISNet were collected from September 5th through October 21st, 2017. 
There were 2,314 respondents for wave 14 and 2,423 respondents in wave 15 of the 
survey. 1,202 of these respondents were matched as participating in both survey wave 14 
 
14 Data were collected by the University of Oklahoma with support from the National 
Science Foundation under Grant No. IIA-1301789 
15 Information regarding each of the 20 waves can be found in the appendix. 
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and survey wave 15 as well as responding to the question of whether global warming was 
the cause of weather patterns in Oklahoma to change. 
3.3.2.1 Dependent Variable (M-SISNet) 
 The dependent variable in this analysis evaluates opinions on the effects of global 
warming on weather patterns in Oklahoma. The question text reads “In your view, is 
global warming causing the weather patterns in Oklahoma to change?” (CRCM-EPSCoR 
n.d.). This variable is coded where “yes” =1 and “no” = 0.  
3.3.3 Independent and Control Variables in the study 
3.3.3.1 Independent Variables 
Harvey. For this research the explanatory variable of interest is Hurricane Harvey. 
As explained in the background and theory, there is reason to believe that a powerful 
storm would lead to a change in global climate change opinions. This variable is coded in 
the Sea Grant Data where the pre-Harvey responses = 0 and post Harvey = 1. For the 
analysis utilizing the CRCM data, WAVE ID represents Harvey’s occurrence. Wave id is 
coded representing their respective waves. That is wave id 14 = 14 and wave id 15 = 15. 
The additional survey waves have been dropped from the analysis as the focus of this 
paper is to examine the effect of Harvey.  
Party Identification. Research has demonstrated that party identification is among 
the most consistent predictors of environmental concern (Dunlap, Xiao, and McCright 
2001; Guber 2003; Konisky, Milyo, and Richardson 2008).The party identification 
variable using the Sea Grant data is measured by asking the respondent “with which 
political party do you most identify?” This variable is coded where “Republican” = 1, 
“Independent” = 2, and “Democrat” = 3. Similarly, in the analyses using the CRCM data 
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the party identification variable is measured by asking the respondent “with which 
political party do you most identify?” The variable is coded where “Republican party (or 
GOP)” = 1, “Independent” = 2, and “Democratic party” = 3. A three-point party 
identification scale is an optimal measurement. 
3.3.3.2 Control Variables 
Gender. It is likely that gender will influence climate change opinions as research 
has shown that women express higher levels of concern and belief on the issue (Brody et 
al. 2008; Egan and Mullin 2017; Leiserowitz 2006; McCright and Dunlap 2011; 
O’Connor, Bard, and Fisher 1999). Gender is coded as “female” =0 and “male” = 1 in the 
Sea Grant data.  Conversely, gender is coded as “male” =0 and “female” = 1 for the 
Oklahoma data.  
Education. Research findings examining the effects of education on global 
climate change are mixed. In the Sea Grant data education is measured as the highest 
level of school completed and coded where “High school diploma or less” = 1, “less than 
a 4-year degree” =2, and a “4-year degree or more” = 3. Education is measured as the 
highest level of education completed and coded more specifically in the CRCM dataset 
where “less than high school” = 1, “high school/GED” =2, and a “vocational or technical 
training” = 3; “some college—no degree” =4; “2-year college/associate’s degree” =5; 
“Bachelor’s degree” = 6; “Master’s degree” = 7; and “PhD/JD/Doctor” = 8.  
Age. Findings for the effects of age on climate change beliefs are mixed as some 
show a resistance among older segments of the population and other research fails to 
identify a difference (Egan and Mullin 2017). The age variable in the Sea Grant survey is 
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categorized where “18-24” = 1; “25-34” = 2; “35-44” = 3; “45-54” = 4; “55-64” = 5; 
“65+” = 6. Age is left on a continuous scale for the Oklahoma data. 
The Sea Grant data provide a unique opportunity to observe opinion change 
following a natural disaster. These data provide a case study analysis of Hurricane 
Harvey. However, the study was not created with any intention to capture opinions both 
before and after a massive hurricane and as a result the number of cases is limited. As 
researchers we are vulnerable to dismissing research capturing rare events due to small 
sample size. This becomes problematic as rare events are hard to capture and dismissal 
leads to a lack of acknowledgement of the effects. Nevertheless, I include analyses using 
the Oklahoma Weather, Society and Government survey data to determine if Harvey was 
powerful enough to lead to opinion change in a neighboring state. Together, the analyses 
provide greater insight regarding if and when opinion change occurs as well as 
highlighting significant predictors. 
3.4 HYPOTHESES AND METHODS 
Hypothesis 1: There will be an increase in the number of individuals responding that 
temperatures are increasing from the pre-Harvey to the post Harvey survey. 
Hypothesis 2: There will be an increase in the number of respondents expressing high 
levels of concern that climate change will cause personal harm in the post Harvey survey 
compared to the pre-Harvey survey. 
Hypothesis 3: Party identification will be the most important predictor of how an 
individual responds to whether they believe that temperatures are increasing or not with 
Democrats more likely to respond that they are than Republicans.  
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Hypothesis 4: Party identification will be the most important predictor in the level of 
concern a respondent has regarding climate change causing personal harm with 
Democrats more likely to express higher levels of concern than Republicans. 
Hypothesis 5: Party identification will have a weaker effect in the post Harvey survey 
than it does in the pre-Harvey survey for both the question of whether temperatures are 
increasing and the concern of whether climate change will cause personal harm. 
Hypothesis 6: There will be an increase in opinion change within survey respondents on 
the question of whether global warming is causing weather patterns in Oklahoma to shift 
from the survey wave employed prior to Harvey making landfall in Texas through the 
survey wave in the meteorological season following Harvey’s initial destruction. That is, 
some individuals who previously indicated that global warming was not causing the 
weather patterns in Oklahoma to shift will respond that global warming is causing the 
weather patterns in Oklahoma to shift after seeing the destruction from Hurricane 
Harvey in their neighboring state. 
3.4.1 The Models 
 When examining the dependent variable regarding temperatures increasing 
excluding “don’t know/not sure” responses, I apply a penalized likelihood approach 
(firthlogit) as the variable is binary.16 I use the penalized likelihood approach instead of a 
standard logistic regression because being a Democrat nearly perfectly predicts the 
outcome of a “going up” response to the question on temperatures increasing.17 A 
traditional logistic regression model omits the covariates associated with being a 
 
16 This model is only seen in the logits comparing the coefficients pre-Harvey to post 
Harvey. 
17 This will be seen clearly in the some of the figures to follow. 
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Democrat due to the strong relationship with the dependent variable. Zorn argues that 
omitting a covariate that bears a strong relationship to the phenomenon of interest is 
deliberate specification bias and suggests the penalized likelihood approach as superior to 
other alternatives (2005). I utilize an ordered logistic regression for evaluating levels of 
concern that climate change will cause personal harm as the variable is both ordered and 
categorical. In the analyses including “don’t know/not sure” responses for both dependent 
variables (temperatures increasing and personal harm) I employ ordered logistic 
regressions.  
 In examining the likelihood of an individual responding that global warming is 
causing shifts in Oklahoma’s weather pattern I employ a series of logistic regression 
models. I include a logistic regression of the surveys with a panel of respondents in 
survey waves 14 and 15. Additionally, I utilize two logistic regression models one which 
examines responses prior to the storm (wave 14), and one which examines responses after 
Harvey (wave 15) to provide a comparison of effect size. 
3.5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
3.5.1 Hurricane Harvey 
 Visualizing the data can help provide easily interpretable results for some of the 
hypotheses. As a first step of the analysis, I provide the marginals of the raw data.  For 
the logistic and ordered logistic models the “don’t know/not sure” responses are treated 
as missing values in some of the models however, sometimes these responses are 
meaningful and warrant inclusion. Upon reviewing the distribution of responses in figure 
3.1, the most notable differences are seen between the pre- and post-surveys among the 
“don’t know/not sure” category. The percent responding “don’t know/not sure” increases 
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by more than eight percentage points from the pre to post survey. This increase is more 
than double that of the initial responses which are less than seven percent. While I cannot 
make any definitive claims on why this occurs, I speculate that the impact of Harvey led 
to an increase in uncertainty of temperatures which deserves to be acknowledged. I 
hypothesized that the impact of Hurricane Harvey would cause an increase in liberal 
opinions regarding climate change and the results do not support this when examining the 
question of temperatures increasing. Conversely, upon reviewing the distribution of 
responses for the likelihood that climate change will cause personal harm in figure 3.2 
there is less than half a percentage point increase between the surveys. The differences 
are minor especially when compared to the question of increasing temperatures. Analyses 
to follow will examine this using more rigorous statistical techniques. 
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 provide mixed results. It is uncertain why there would be a 
substantial increase in the number of individuals responding “don’t know/not sure” for 
one of the questions of climate change and not the other. Possible explanations will be 
explored in the discussion section of this paper. Together the results from figures 3.1 and 
3.2 fail to provide support for my first hypothesis and provide some support for my 
second. 
Table 3.2 provides the results of an ordered logistic regression and odds ratio for 
the question on whether temperatures are increasing including “don’t know/not sure” 
responses for both the pre- and post-Harvey surveys. Often “don’t know/not sure” 
responses are treated as missing for analysis, however, figure 3.1 indicated that this 
response may have substantive meaning. The coefficients measure the change in log odds 
and are not directly interpretable. However, some conclusions can be drawn from the 
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coefficients. The results indicate a negative, but statistically insignificant effect of 
Hurricane Harvey for responding “don’t know/not sure” or “yes” for the question of 
temperatures increasing. The relationships between party identification, age, gender, and 
education are also not statistically significant. Being an Independent and being a 
Democrat are the only variables obtaining levels of statistical significance (p<0.01 and 
p<0.001 respectively). I turn to the odds ratio for further interpretation of these results. 
The discussion of odds ratio for this paper are done holding all other variables 
constant. In observing the effect that Harvey had on respondents for the question of 
whether temperatures were going up or not, the odds of reporting “don’t know/not sure” 
or “going up” after the hurricane compared to before are not statistically significant. 
However, the odds of reporting “don’t know/not sure” or “going up” are 1.844 times 
greater for Independents and 78.81 times greater for Democrats compared to Republicans 
(p<0.01 and p<0.001 respectively). 
Overall, these results fail to support the first hypothesis as the results show 
respondents are less likely to respond “don’t know/not sure” or “going up” after Harvey 
than prior to the storm. Nonetheless, table 3.2 provides support for the third hypothesis as 
party identification proves to be a powerful predictor of opinions where both 
Independents and Democrats are more likely than Republicans to suggest that 
temperatures are increasing. Neither age nor education produce results substantively 
meaningful in examining responses on whether temperatures are increasing. 
Table 3.3 provides the results of a logistic regression and odds ratio for the 
question on whether temperatures are increasing where “don’t know/not sure” responses 
are treated as missing for both the pre- and post-Harvey surveys. The results of table 3.3 
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are similar to table 3.2, which is to be expected. However, this provides the opportunity 
to further examine the effect Harvey has on the responses “going up” and “not going up” 
for the question of temperatures increasing. The direction of these findings suggest 
experiencing Harvey has a negative relationship with responding “yes” temperatures are 
probably increasing.  
 Table 3.4 displays the results of an ordered logistic regression and odds ratio for 
the question regarding concern of the likelihood that climate change will cause personal 
harm including “don’t know/not sure” responses. Recall, that the ordered logistic 
regression output does not provide directly interpretable results. The results indicate 
positive associations with higher levels of concern that climate change will cause 
personal harm for experiencing Harvey among Independents, Democrats, 25–34-year-
old, individuals with at least a 4-year degree, and females. However, individuals 35 and 
older and those with less than a 4-year degree exhibit a negative relationship with higher 
levels of concern. Moreover, Independents, Democrats, and females achieve levels of 
statistical significance (p<0.01, p<0.001, and p<0.05 respectively). 
An examination of the odds ratio displayed in table 3.4 offer more direct 
interpretations. I find the odds of reporting higher levels of concern that climate change 
will cause personal harm are 1.48 times greater for females than they were for males 
(p<0.05). Furthermore, the odds of reporting higher levels of concern that climate change 
will personally harm you are 1.693 times greater for Independents and 11.271 times 
greater for Democrats compared to Republicans (p<0.01 and p<0.001 respectively). 
The results in table 3.4 offer support for my fourth hypothesis and fail to provide 
support for my second. It was hypothesized that respondents would exhibit an increase in 
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levels of concern that climate change will personally harm them after experiencing the 
devastation of the storm and while the results move in this direction, they do not reach a 
level of statistical significance. Additionally, Independents and Democrats are more 
likely to express higher levels of concern compared to Republicans. The results further 
suggest that women show higher levels of concern regarding climate change than men.  
Table 3.5 presents the results of an ordered logistic regression and odds ratio for 
the question on concern of the likelihood that climate change would cause possible harm 
where “don’t know/not sure” responses are treated as missing. While the results between 
the ordered logistic regressions including and excluding “don’t know/not sure” responses 
are similar there are some changes worth discussing. The most notable differences are 
found among individuals in the 35-44 age group and those possessing more than a 4-year 
degree. When “don’t know/not sure” responses were included the 35-44 age group 
displayed a negative relationship with higher levels of concern that climate change will 
cause personal harm but when these responses are treated as missing, they are positively 
associated with increased levels of concern. Furthermore, those with a 4-year degree or 
more have a negative relationship with higher levels of concern when “don’t know/not 
sure” responses are missing compared to the positive relationship found when these 
responses were included in the model. This could indicate effects that are not 
substantively explainable via an ordered logistic regression.18  
Table 3.6 presents the output of a penalized logistic regression on the question of 
temperatures increasing both before and after Harvey and table 3.7 displays the odds 
 
18 However, both age and education were included as controls, thus I will explore these 
possible effects using categorical plots in the appendix. 
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ratio. Additionally, table 3.8 depicts the results of the ordered logistic regression of the 
model including “don’t know/not sure” responses while table 3.9 provides the odds ratio. 
The results highlight some differences among groups occurring in the direction of their 
relationship with the dependent variable following the storm. Prior to Harvey respondents 
age 45 and older exhibit a positive relationship with responding “yes” and after the 
hurricane the relationship turns negative. Moreover, both education categories of 
possessing at least a high school diploma switch from a positive association with the 
dependent variable to a negative one. I posited that party identification would have a 
weaker effect in the post Harvey surveys compared to the pre-Harvey surveys. The 
results do indicate a smaller effect after the hurricane for Independents and Democrats. 
While there is a large difference in effect size among Democrats compared to 
Republicans between the surveys this may be the result of the strong relationship between 
being a Democrat and responding that temperatures are probably going up. This is 
explained in a previous discussion of the use of a penalized likelihood approach. In sum, 
the results offer some support for the fifth hypothesis with the effect size of party 
identification lessening among Democrats. 
For a more intuitive substantive understanding I calculated the predicted 
probabilities before and after Harvey. The average predicted probability of responding 
not going up is .305 and .695 for going up prior to hurricane Harvey.19 Meanwhile, the 
average predicted probability of responding not going up is .279 and going up is .721 
after Harvey devastated the state of Texas. The results of the predicted probabilities show 
 
19 The predicted probabilities are calculated for the models excluding “don’t know/not 
sure” responses. 
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a slight increase in more liberal opinions regarding temperatures increasing following the 
hurricane. 
The results of the ordered logistic regressions comparing the pre- and post-Harvey 
responses for the question of concern for the likelihood that climate change will cause 
personal harm are displayed in table 3.10 and the odds ratio are provided in table 3.11. In 
addition, the results of the ordered logistic regressions including “don’t know/not sure” 
responses are presented in table 3.12 while the odds ratio for the model are found in table 
3.13. There are differences among groups upon comparing results before and after the 
hurricane. Individuals between the ages 25 and 44 exhibit a negative relationship with 
increased levels of concern regarding climate change causing personal harm prior to 
Harvey and possess a positive relationship following the storm. Unlike the results for the 
question of temperatures increasing there is an increase in the effect size of party 
identification following the storm on the question of climate change causing personal 
harm. 
A discussion of predicted probabilities can further confirm this or reveal that more 
is happening than the odds ratio provides. Additionally, predicted probabilities allow us 
to better interpret the model. These can be seen in figures 3.3 and 3.4. The average 
predicted probability of responding not at all concerned is .335, slightly concerned .186, 
somewhat concerned .146, fairly concerned .152, very concerned .182 prior to the 
devastation of hurricane Harvey. This indicates that the probability of responding “not at 
all concerned” is higher than any of the other categories. Furthermore, after Harvey 
devastated the state of Texas the average predicted probability of responding not at all 
concerned is .335, .111 slightly concerned, .169 somewhat concerned, .130 fairly 
88 
concerned, and .236 for very concerned. These probabilities demonstrate a small increase 
in average predicted probabilities for “very concerned” following the storm. The average 
predicted probability for the question of whether or not climate change will cause 
personal harm is greatest for the “not at all concerned” category in both surveys. 
3.5.2 Oklahoma 
 Table 3.15 displays the results of the logistic regression and odds ratio examining 
the question of whether global warming is the cause of weather patterns to change in 
Oklahoma. The output of the logistic regression shows that experiencing Harvey, 
possessing a PhD/JD/Doctor, being an Independent, and being a Democrat are positively 
associated with responding “yes” global warming is the cause of weather patterns in 
Oklahoma to shift. While age, being a male, and all education categories below 
PhD/JD/Doctor exhibit a negative relationship with responding yes to the question of 
global warming. Moreover, age, gender, being an Independent, and being a Democrat all 
obtain levels of statistical significance (p<0.001).  
Although the logistic regression output provided broad conclusions a look at the 
odds ratio provides a more comprehensive analysis. After Harvey devastated the state of 
Texas the odds of responding that global warming is responsible for weather patterns in 
Oklahoma do not shift significantly. The odds of responding “yes” to the question of 
global warming in Oklahoma decrease with age. That is, for a one unit increase in age the 
odds of responding yes decrease by a factor of .985 (p<0.001). Moreover, for men the 
odds of responding yes are .686 times smaller than they are for women (p<0.001). 
Conversely, being an Independent increases the odds of responding yes by a factor of 
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5.726 and being a Democrat increases the odds of responding yes by a factor of 42.864 
compared with being a Republican (p<0.001). 
The results of the logistic regression models comparing wave 14 and wave 15 are 
presented in table 3.16. Again, the coefficients of a logistic regression model only allow 
for general conclusions as the change in log odds are not directly interpretable. Here we 
see negative relationships between responding yes and the age and gender (male) 
variables (p<0.05). Conversely, there is a positive relationship between responding yes 
and being a Democrat or an Independent (p<0.001). However, there are differences 
within groups between the survey waves. Each educational level above high school/GED 
and below PhD/JD/Doctor experiences a change in their relationship with the dependent 
variable of whether global warming is causing weather patterns in Oklahoma to change 
following Hurricane Harvey. Prior to the storm those with vocational or technical training 
through a master’s degree are negatively associated with responding yes and after they 
possess a positive relationship with the dependent variable. Given the general description 
of the findings the model presents I turn to examining the odds ratio.  
The odds ratio for the logistic regressions displayed in table 3.16 are found in 
table 3.17. Notable variation of effect size between the two survey waves is seen with 
education and among Democrats. While these changes within education attainment may 
be due to completion of education between the survey waves these individuals had 
smaller odds of responding yes compared to those with less than a high school diploma 
before the hurricane and following Harvey they exhibit greater odds of responding yes 
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compared to those with less than a high school diploma.20 Democrats exhibit slightly 
greater odds of responding yes after the storm undermining the effect I expected at the 
beginning of this paper. 
I calculated the predicted probabilities for the logistic regressions displayed in 
table 3.15 and table 3.16. The average predicted probabilities for the question on whether 
global warming is causing weather patterns in Oklahoma to change do not vary across the 
models. The average predicted probability of responding no is .443 and the average 
predicted probability responding yes is .557. The visual representations of the predicted 
probabilities for the outcome of responding “yes, global warming is causing weather 
patterns in Oklahoma to change” are provided in figures 3.5-3.7. These graphs indicate a 
wide range in the predictions as the predicted probabilities span almost the entire range 0 
to 1.  
3.6 CONCLUSION 
 At the beginning of this paper I argued that Hurricane Harvey would serve as a 
focusing event increasing issue salience on the harmful effects of climate change both to 
individuals residing in areas directly impacted by the storm’s devastation and among 
those in a neighboring state. In addition, I posited that partisanship would be a significant 
predictor in all of the survey question involving global climate change opinions. 
However, I suggested that the effect of partisanship would lessen in the post Harvey (Sea 
Grant data) survey since individuals would be able to access opinions of real-life events 
instead of relying on party cues. The results for this paper offer mixed conclusions. While 
 
20 Recall, the individuals being referenced are those with at least a technical or vocational 
training but nothing exceeding a master’s degree. 
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Harvey did move in the direction of increasing concern that climate change would cause 
personal harm it simultaneously moved in the direction of a decrease in beliefs that 
temperatures are increasing. In fact, there is a rise in the number of individuals 
responding “don’t know/not sure” in the wake of the storm. Nonetheless, the results did 
provide support for the idea that partisanship is an important predictor in individuals’ 
opinions regarding issues of global climate change. Conversely, the impact of 
partisanship does not lessen following the hurricane for each model. 
The results from the Oklahoma surveys fail to find Harvey causing a potential 
shift in more liberal opinions following Harvey. The results move in the direction similar 
to the findings from examining the likelihood of concern that climate change will cause 
personal harm. Similarly, the Oklahoma surveys further deliver evidence that partisanship 
is arguably the most important predictor in individuals’ opinions on global climate 
change. However, the findings suggest an increase in effect size among Democrats, albeit 
small, following the storm. Together the results from CRCM fail to achieve statistical 
significance for Harvey but move in the direction suggesting that the hurricane was large 
enough to affect residents in a neighboring state, but partisanship remains a strong 
predictor of beliefs.   
This paper sought to identify times in which issue salience would increase and 
result in opinions indicative of more concern regarding the state of the environment. 
Instead, the results fail to sufficiently support the contention that Hurricane Harvey was a 
powerful enough focusing event leading to more environmental awareness. This could be 
for several reasons. Are opinions so short lived that once a month has passed, researchers 
lose the ability to capture opinion change linked to the event itself? If so what can we do, 
92 
ethically, in examining opinions post disaster? That is, as survey researchers we must 
determine a length of time considerate of the potential devastation experienced by the 
respondent. Is the topic of global climate change simply too complex for individuals 
directly affected by the storm that the result is more uncertainty? Or does the lack of 
organization at the federal level prevent hurricanes from serving as true focusing events 
where opinion change could occur as a result of the event? 
 This research raises as many questions as it answers. I identify various avenues of 
scholarship that need to be further explored and will likely require many separate 
projects. First and foremost, scholars studying the impact of extreme weather events on 
individuals need to stop dismissing small sample sizes. Extreme weather events are rare 
and thus smaller samples are to be expected. Small sample sizes provide little room for 
generalizability but in the area of disaster research these studies can be informative. 
Additionally, there needs to be a collective effort to establish panel surveys in coastal 
communities that are generally affected by Hurricanes (Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Florida, South Carolina). This would provide researchers with more than enough 
evidence to give to those seeking policy regarding disaster prevention. Scholars have 
long argued that the decentralization of environmental policy is detrimental to pursuing 
effective environmental policy (Woods 2006). The results found in this paper may be a 
reflection of an individual’s inability to have increased salience simply because there is 
not a single coherent policy community devoted solely to policy regarding disaster 
prevention. Instead, we have multiple actors at various levels of government only seeking 
disaster relief, leaving us with postmortem policy. Hurricanes are not going away and if 
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sea water temperatures continue to rise and change, we can expect more intense storms in 
the future.   
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Table 3.1 Summary Statistics for Sea Grant Data 
Variable n Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
CLIMATE_TEMP 505 .7366337 .4408962 0 1 
CLIMATE_CONCERN 549 2.710383 1.570108 1 5 
Age Category 530 4.664151 1.231455 1 6 
Education 556 2.514388 0.6164193 1 3 
Party Identification 554 1.779783 0.7205754 1 3 
GENDER 566 0.459364 0.4987868 0 1 
Temp 564 2.423759 0.8468116 1 3 
CCHARM 564 3.638298 1.609371 1 6 




Table 3.2 Ordered logistic regression and odds ratio of Harvey, party identification, age, 
education, and gender on the dependent variable of temperatures increasing (including 
don't know/not sure responses). 
Climate Change Opinion: Temperatures Increasing Coefficients Odds Ratio 
Harvey: post -0.254 0.776 
  (0.196) (0.152) 
Party Identification: Independent 0.612** 1.844** 
  (0.199) (.367) 
Party Identification: Democrat 4.367*** 78.810*** 
  (1.016) (80.109) 
Age: 25-34 1.625 5.078 
  (1.016) (5.157) 
Age: 35-44 1.168 3.217 
  (.850) (2.734) 
Age: 45-54 .214 1.239 
  (.808) (1.001) 
Age: 55-64 .475 1.607 
  (.813) (1.306) 
Age: 65+ .416 1.516 
  (.807) (1.223) 
Education: Less Than a 4-year degree .060 1.062 
  (.406) (.431) 
Education: 4-year degree or more .157 1.170 
  (.399) (.466) 
Gender: Female .253 1.288 
  (.204) (.263) 
Cutpoints -.103 -.103 
  (.874) (.874) 
  .505 .505 
  (.874) (.874) 
    
 0.000 0.000 
Log Likelihood -387.446  -387.446  
n 515 515 




Table 3.3 Logistic regression and odds ratio of Harvey, party identification, age, 
education, and gender on the dependent variable of temperatures increasing. 
Climate Change Opinion: Temperatures Increasing coefficients odds ratio 
Harvey: post -.131 .878   
  (.230) (.202) 
Party Identification: Independent .745**     2.107**     
  (.235) (.495) 
Party Identification: Democrat 4.032***    56.385***    
  (1.019) (57.473) 
Age: 25-34 2.522 12.448 
  (1.409) (17.537) 
Age: 35-44 1.359 3.894    
  (1.016) (3.958) 
Age: 45-54 .422   1.525    
  (.972) (1.482) 
Age: 55-64 .700    2.015  
  (.973) (1.960) 
Age: 65+ .630     1.878   
  (.966) (1.815) 
Education: Less Than a 4-year degree .262     1.300   
  (.479) (.623) 
Education: 4-year degree or more .241    1.272   
  (.473) (.601) 
Gender: Female .330    1.391 
  (.244) (.339) 
constant -.615   .541     
  (1.024) (.554) 
 0.000 0.000 
Log Likelihood -223.828 -223.828 
n 460 460 




Table 3.4 Ordered logistic regression and odds ratio of Harvey, party identification, age, 
education, and gender on the dependent variable of concern climate change will cause 
personal harm (including don't know/not sure responses). 
Concern Climate Change Will Cause Personal 
Harm Coefficients Odds Ratio 
Harvey: post 0.136 1.146 
  (.161) (.185) 
Party Identification: Independent .526** 1.693** 
  (.179) (.303) 
Party Identification: Democrat 2.422*** 11.271*** 
  (.257) (2.901) 
Age: 25-34 .309 1.362 
  (.874) (1.190) 
Age: 35-44 -.213 .808 
  (.783) (.632) 
Age: 45-54 -.935 .393 
  (.768) (.302) 
Age: 55-64 -.891 .410 
  (.771) (.316) 
Age: 65+ -.891 .410 
  (.765) (.314) 
Education: Less Than a 4 year degree -.066 .936 
  (.364) (.341) 
Education: 4-year degree or more .210 1.234 
  (.361) (.445) 
Gender: Female .392* 1.50* 
  (.168) (.249) 
Cutpoints -3.599 -3.599 
  (.830) (.830) 
  -.498 -.498 
  (.793) (.793) 
  .192 .192 
  (.794) (.794) 
  .965 .965 
  (.796) (.796) 
  1.838 1.838 
  (.798) (.798) 
 0.000 0.000 
Log Likelihood -775.448  -775.448  
n 515 515 
*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; two tailed tests.   
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Table 3.5 Ordered logistic regression and odds ratio of Harvey, party identification, age, 
education, and gender on the dependent variable of concern climate change will cause 
personal harm. 
Concern Climate Change Will Cause Personal 
Harm Coefficients Odds Ratio 
Harvey: post 0.149 1.160 
  (.165) (.192) 
Party Identification: Independent .690*** 1.993*** 
  (.184) (.367) 
Party Identification: Democrat 2.583*** 13.238*** 
  (.263) (3.481) 
Age: 25-34 .465  1.592   
  (.877) (1.396) 
Age: 35-44 .034 1.035    
  (.784) (.811) 
Age: 45-54 -.719 .487   
  (.769)  (.375) 
Age: 55-64 -.670 .512    
  (.772) (.395) 
Age: 65+ -.736 .479  
  (.766) (.367) 
Education: Less Than a 4 year degree -.297 .743    
  (.370) (.275) 
Education: 4-year degree or more -.105 .900 
  (.366) (.329) 
Gender: Female .437* 1.548* 
  (.172) (.267) 
Cutpoints -.535 -.535 
  (.798) (.798) 
  .190   .190   
  (.798) (.798) 
  .992 .992 
  (.800) (.800) 
  1.886    1.886    
  (.803) (.803) 
    
 0.000 0.000 
Log Likelihood -702.733 -702.733 
n 500 500 
*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; two tailed tests.   
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Table 3.6 Penalized logistic regression of party identification, age, education, and 
gender on the dependent variable of temperatures increasing both before and after 
Hurricane Harvey. 





Party Identification: Independent .727*    .647     
  (0.321) (.332) 
Party Identification: Democrat 3.878**      3.036***    
  (1.438) (.863) 
Age: 25-34 2.186 1.618  
  (1.418) (2.162) 
Age: 35-44 1.976*    .324   
  (1.182) (1.672) 
Age: 45-54 .979    -.350 
  (1.118) (1.624) 
Age: 55-64  1.749   -.633  
  (1.133) (1.615) 
Age: 65+ 1.639   -.689    
  (1.118) (1.611) 
Education: Less Than a 4 year degree .842    -.385    
  (.629) (.702) 
Education: 4-year degree or more .703   -.258    
  (.616) (.695) 
Gender: Female .459   .173 
  (.339) (.340) 
constant -1.981  .973 
  (1.228) (1.683) 
 0.020 0.022 
Penalized Log Likelihood -105.238  -99.991  
n 241 219 




Table 3.7 Odds ratio of the penalized logistic regression of party identification, age, 
education, and gender on the dependent variable of temperatures increasing both before 
and after Hurricane Harvey. 
Odds ratio of Climate Change Opinion: Temperatures 
Increasing Pre Harvey 
Post 
Harvey 
Party Identification: Independent 2.069*     1.910    
  (.663) (.635) 
Party Identification: Democrat 48.298**    20.825***    
  (69.460) (17.970) 
Age: 25-34 8.898    5.0416     
  (12.613) (10.901) 
Age: 35-44 7.211    1.382 
  (8.521) (2.311) 
Age: 45-54 2.662    .704   
  (2.977) (1.144) 
Age: 55-64 5.750 .531 
  (6.516) (.858) 
Age: 65+ 5.148   .502 
  (5.756) (.809) 
Education: Less Than a 4 year degree 2.322 .681 
  (1.460) (.478) 
Education: 4-year degree or more 2.019 .773  
  (1.243) (.537) 
Gender: Female 1.582 1.189  
  (.536) (.404) 
constant .138 2.646   
  (.169) (4.453) 
 0.0197 0.0221 
Penalized Log Likelihood -105.238 -99.991  
n 241 219 
*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; two tailed tests.   
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Table 3.8 Ordered logistic regression of party identification, age, education, and gender 
on the dependent variable of temperatures increasing both before and after Hurricane 
Harvey. 
Climate Change Opinion: Temperatures 
Increasing Pre Harvey Post Harvey 
Party Identification: Independent 0.716* .575 *    
  (.297) (.275) 
Party Identification: Democrat 15.879    3.945*** 
  (495.551) (1.035) 
Age: 25-34 2.282    1.228   
  (1.492) (1.592) 
Age: 35-44 2.440*    .059 
  (1.347) (1.251) 
Age: 45-54 1.165 -.616 
  (1.276) (1.206) 
Age: 55-64 1.868    -.757    
  (1.283) (1.213) 
Age: 65+ 1.892    -.876 
  (1.279) (1.204) 
Education: Less Than a 4 year degree .664 -.480    
  (.598) (.570) 
Education: 4-year degree or more .636    -.281    
  (.586) (.561) 
Gender: Female .416    .110    
  (.306) (.279) 
Cutpoints 1.890     -1.611  
  (1.348) (1.297) 
  2.288 -.786 
  (1.351) (1.294) 
    
 0.000 0.000 
Log Likelihood -170.843  -207.413  
n 258 257 
*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; two tailed tests.   
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Table 3.9 Odds ratio from the ordered logistic regression of party identification, age, 
education, and gender on the dependent variable of temperatures increasing both before 
and after Hurricane Harvey. 






Party Identification: Independent  2.047*    1.777*    
  (.607) (.488) 
Party Identification: Democrat 7871208  51.692***     
  (3.90e+09) (53.484) 
Age: 25-34 9.800    3.414  
  (14.620) (5.436) 
Age: 35-44 11.474    1.061  
  (15.453) (1.328) 
Age: 45-54 3.205  .540 
  (4.089) (.651) 
Age: 55-64 6.478   .469 
  (8.315) (.569) 
Age: 65+ 6.630  .416 
  (8.477) (.501) 
Education: Less Than a 4 year degree 1.943    .619 
  (1.162) (.353) 
Education: 4-year degree or more 1.889   .755 
  (1.107) (.423) 
Gender: Female 1.516 1.116 
  (.464) (.311) 
Cutpoints 1.890    -1.611 
  (1.348) (1.297) 
  2.288   -.786 
  (1.351) (1.294) 
    
 0.000 0.000 
Log Likelihood -170.843  -207.413  
n 258 257 




Table 3.10 Ordered logistic regression of party identification, age, education, and gender 
on the dependent variable of concern that climate change will cause personal harm both 
before and after Hurricane Harvey excluding don’t know/not sure responses. 
Concern Climate Change will Cause Personal Harm Pre Harvey Post Harvey 
Party Identification: Independent .548*      .857*    
  (.258) (.266) 
Party Identification: Democrat 2.339***     2.965***   
  (.3589) (.395) 
Age: 25-34 -.055  .941  
  (1.216) (1.263) 
Age: 35-44 -.338     .492  
  (1.067) (1.145) 
Age: 45-54 -.708 -.729 
  (1.048) (1.121) 
Age: 55-64 -.756    -.587  
  (1.053) (1.122) 
Age: 65+ -.571     -.919   
  (1.044) (1.115) 
Education: Less Than a 4 year degree -.114    -.484 
  (.542) (.506) 
Education: 4-year degree or more -.026   -.172  
  (.535) (.502) 
Gender: Female .324   .562*    
  (.242) (.249) 
Cutpoints -.692  -.501    
  (1.099) (1.138) 
  .179    .078 
  (1.099) (1.138) 
  .900  .990 
  (1.103) (1.138) 
  1.872 1.838  
  (1.109) (1.140) 
 0.000 0.000 
Log Likelihood -361.297  -333.936 
n 250 250 
^p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.001   
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Table 3.11 Odds ratio from the ordered logistic regression party identification, age, 
education, and gender on the dependent variable of concern that climate change will 
cause personal harm both before and after Hurricane Harvey excluding don’t know/not 
sure responses. 
Odds Ratio for Concern Climate Change Will Cause 
Personal Harm Pre Harvey 
Post 
Harvey 
Party Identification: Independent 1.730*   2.355*    
  (.446) (.627) 
Party Identification: Democrat 10.374***    19.400***      
  (3.724) (7.668) 
Age: 25-34 .946 2.561 
  (1.150) (3.235) 
Age: 35-44 .713 1.636   
  (.761) (1.872) 
Age: 45-54 .492 .482 
  (.516) (.541) 
Age: 55-64 .470 .556 
  (.495) (.624) 
Age: 65+ .565 .399 
  (.590) (.445) 
Education: Less Than a 4 year degree .892 .616 
  (.484) (.312) 
Education: 4-year degree or more .974 .842 
  (.521) (.423) 
Gender: Female 1.383 1.755*   
  (.335) (.437) 
Cutpoints -.692 -.501    
  (1.099) (1.138) 
  .179 .078 
  (1.099) (1.138) 
  .900 .990 
  (1.103) (1.138) 
  1.872 1.838  
  (1.109) (1.140) 
 0.000 0.000 
Log Likelihood -361.297  -333.936 
n 250 250 




Table 3.12 Ordered logistic regression of party identification, age, education, and gender 
on the dependent variable of concern that climate change will cause personal harm both 
before and after Hurricane Harvey including don’t know/not sure responses. 
Concern Climate Change will Cause Personal 
Harm Pre Harvey 
Post 
Harvey 
Party Identification: Independent .380    .681**    
  (.252) (.257) 
Party Identification: Democrat  2.200***   2.745***    
  (.353) (.383) 
Age: 25-34 -.119 .678    
  (1.206) (1.264) 
Age: 35-44  -.405    .014   
  (1.063) (1.146) 
Age: 45-54 -.863    -1.027   
  (1.045) (1.123) 
Age: 55-64 -.939    -.862   
  (1.049) (1.126) 
Age: 65+ -.690    -1.119 
  (1.040) (1.117) 
Education: Less Than a 4 year degree -.0146   -.132   
  (.531) (.500) 
Education: 4-year degree or more .154    .270 
  (.524) (.496) 
Gender: Female .267    .531*     
  (.237) (.241) 
Cutpoints -3.802 -3.578    
  (1.147) (1.184) 
  -.717   -.428   
  (1.087) (1.139) 
  .119 .117   
  (1.088) (1.139) 
  .820   .985   
  (1.092) (1.139) 
  1.775    1.804    
  (1.097) (1.141) 
 0.000 0.000 
Log Likelihood -394.943  -373.868  
n 257 258 




Table 3.13 Odds ratio of the ordered logistic regression of party identification, age, 
education, and gender on the dependent variable of concern that climate change will 
cause personal harm both before and after Hurricane Harvey including don’t know/not 
sure responses. 
Odds ratio for Concern Climate Change will Cause 
Personal Harm Pre Harvey 
Post 
Harvey 
Party Identification: Independent 1.462 1.975**    
  (.368) (.507) 
Party Identification: Democrat 9.020***   15.560***  
  (3.184) (5.954) 
Age: 25-34 .888 1.969 
  (1.071) (2.490) 
Age: 35-44 .667    1.014 
  (.709) (1.162) 
Age: 45-54 .422    .358 
  (.441) (.402) 
Age: 55-64 .391      .422 
  (.410) (.475) 
Age: 65+ .502     .327    
  (.522) (.365) 
Education: Less Than a 4 year degree .986   .876 
  (.523) (.438) 
Education: 4-year degree or more 1.167   1.310 
  (.612) (.650) 
Gender: Female  1.306 1.701*    
  (.309) (.410) 
Cutpoints -3.802   -3.578 
  (1.147) (1.184) 
  -.717 -.428  
  (1.087) (1.139) 
  .119   .117 
  (1.088) (1.139) 
  .820    .985 
  (1.092) (1.139) 
  1.775 1.804 
  (1.097) (1.141) 
 0.000 0.000 
Log Likelihood -394.943  -373.868 
n 257 258 
*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; two tailed tests.   
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Table 3.14 Summary Statistics for M-SISNet data. 
Variable n Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GLBWRMOK 2,404 0.5565724 0.4968926 0 1 
AGE 2,404 61.17138 13.74231 18 94 
GENDER 2,404 0.4301165 0.4951952 0 1 
EDUCATION 2,404 5.169717 1.804737 1 8 
Party Identification 2,404 1.892679 0.9164677 1 3 




Table 3.15 Logistic regression and odds ratio of age, gender, education, and party 
identification on my dependent variable of global warming causing weather patterns in 
Oklahoma to change. 
Global Warming Coefficient Odds Ratio 
Wave 15 (post Harvey) .004    1.004  
  (.108) (.108) 
Age -.016*** .984***    
  (.004) (.004) 
Male -.451***    .637***   
  (.111) (.071) 
Education: High School/GED -.512  .599  
  (.523) (.314) 
Education: Vocational or Technical Training -.045 .956 
  (.555) (.531) 
Education: Some College--NO degree -.289 .749     
  (.515) (.385) 
Education: 2-year college/associate's degree -.272 .762 
  (.536) (.408) 
Education: Bachelor's Degree -.033 .968 
  (.511) (.495) 
Education: Master's degree -.128 .880 
  (.516) (.455) 
Education: PhD/JD/Doctor .637  1.890 
  (.550) (1.039) 
Party Identification: Independent  1.764***   5.837***    
  (.135) (.790) 
Party Identification: Democrat 3.706***    40.687***   
  (.148) (6.032) 
Constant .132 1.142 
  (.573) (.654) 
 0.000 0.000 
Log Likelihood -1,079.829  -1,079.829  
n 2,404 2,404 






Table 3.16 Logistic Regression of age, gender, education and party identification on the 
dependent variable of global warming causing weather patterns in Oklahoma to shift pre 






Age -.016**    -.015**    
  (.006) (.006) 
Male -.527**     -.377*    
  (.158) (.157) 
Education: High School/GED -.990   -.028     
  (.749) (.733) 
Education: Vocational or Technical Training -.614    .529 
  (.794) (.778) 
Education: Some College--NO degree  -.678    .104 
  (.737) (.720) 
Education: 2-year college/associate degree -.633  .094 
  (.765) (.753) 
Education: Bachelor's Degree -.488    .430  
  (.731) (.716) 
Education: Master's degree  -.669   .420 
  (.740) (.723) 
Education: PhD/JD/Doctor .210 1.070 
  (.785) (.771) 
Party Identification: Independent 1.791***    1.745**   
  (.193) (.191) 
Party Identification: Democrat 3.667***    3.758**    
  (.207) (.213) 
constant .655   -.396 
  (.812) (.804) 
 0.000 0.000 
Log Likelihood -541.720  -536.732 
n 1,202 1,202 
*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; two tailed 




Table 3.17 Odds ratio of logistic regression of age, gender, education, and party 
identification on the dependent variable of whether global warming is causing weather 
patterns in Oklahoma to change. 




Age .984**    .985**    
  (.006) (.006) 
Male .590**    .686*    
  (.093) (.108) 
Education: High School/GED .372  .972  
  (.279) (.713) 
Education: Vocational or Technical Training .541  1.698    
  (.430) (1.321) 
Education: Some College--NO degree .508    1.109 
  (.374) (.799) 
Education: 2 year college/associate's degree .531 1.099    
  (.406) (.827) 
Education: Bachelor's Degree .614  1.537  
  (.449) (1.100) 
Education: Master's degree .512  1.522 
  (.379) (1.101) 
Education: PhD/JD/Doctor 1.234  2.916 
  (.969) (2.249) 
Party Identification: Independent 5.999***    5.726***     
  (1.154) (1.094) 
Party Identification: Democrat 39.121***    42.864***    
  (8.109) (9.127) 
constant 1.924  .673   
  (1.562) (.541) 
 0.000 0.000 
Log Likelihood -541.720  -536.732  
n 1,202 1,202 








Figure 3.1 Frequency graph of the categories of the dependent variable of temperatures 




Figure 3.2 Frequency graph of the categories of the dependent variable of concern that 




Figure 3.3 Predicted probabilities for concern of the likelihood that climate change will 





Figure 3.4 Predicted probabilities for concern of the likelihood that climate change will 




Figure 3.5 Predicted Probabilities of responding "yes, global warming is causing 




Figure 3.6 Predicted Probabilities of responding "yes, global warming is causing 




Figure 3.7 Predicted Probabilities of responding "yes, global warming is causing 
weather patterns in Oklahoma to change" for wave 15 (post Harvey).
118 
CHAPTER 4 : BRING ON THE HEAT! ATTITUDES TOWARDS 
GLOBAL WARMING 
ABSTRACT 
Over the last few decades the world, including the United States, has been 
experiencing an increase in yearly average temperatures. The nation as a whole is 
experiencing an increase in temperature of about 1.5 degrees Fahrenheit above the 
average for the twentieth century. Climate scientists not only expect this increase to 
continue, but they also predict some areas of the world will feel this more severely. 
Previous literature has provided some indication of possible warming effects in surveys 
of opinions on global warming. This leaves us to question whether individuals’ opinions 
on this issue are a product of attitude attribution from their local weather conditions. 
However, much of the aforementioned research relies on subjective accounts, small 
samples, or controlled settings. I utilize Gallup’s Annual Environmental data for the years 
2001-2017 and local weather data obtained from the National Center for Environmental 
Information to advance our understanding in this area by examining objective conditions 
using a larger sample size and including rigorous meteorological measurements.  
Keywords: global warming, question wording, weather, public opinion.     
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4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 On a warm summer day in 1988 James Hansen, a NASA scientist, testified in 
front a Senate committee to express concerns of the state of the environment. In his 
testimony he explained that “global warming is now large enough that we can ascribe 
with a high degree of confidence a cause and effect relationship to the greenhouse effect 
(Hansen Senate Testimony, June 23, 1988).” While we can now look back and see that 
most of the predictions he presented almost 35 years ago were accurate, his testimony 
was controversial at the time. Discussions of global warming had been underway in the 
scientific community, however there was fear that these predictions were too extreme for 
the public as the scientific community was reluctant to speak out unless there was 
certainty that there was no possibility of being wrong (James Hansen 2017).  
There are limited investigations that enable us to examine objective conditions on 
attitudes over an extended period of time. Additionally, many of the previous studies are 
limited in that they were conducted under conditions that do not reflect objective 
situations. This research provides an advance over previous literature in that it is based on 
scientific measures of local weather conditions rather than subjective self-reports. 
Excluding personal experience allows analyses without bias and errors developing from 
self-reports and under conditions free of selection effects. Moreover, “studies suggest 
ordinary citizens rely on heuristics rather than analytic reasoning” (Kahan et al. 2012). 
Therefore, we expect the average American to rely on local conditions of warm weather 
unknowingly when they are asked about global warming.  
Global warming is a complex concept and the easiest way for an individual with 
little to no scientific knowledge on the issue to answer a question about it is to rely either 
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on party cues or local conditions (Zaval et al. 2014). They may not know if global 
warming is happening, but they are likely to use attitude attribution and substitution as a 
response. Certainly, if individuals had been exposed to news coverage of abnormal 
warmth then this effect would intensify. While this would add an interesting component 
to this research, it is not possible to analyze due to data limitations and is beyond the 
scope of the current research. Further, if we asked individuals whether they had watched 
the Weather Channel it could change the way they respond to the questions of interest. 
Psychology literature tells us that people respond differently when exposed to different 
temperatures. People were found more likely to say that global warming is a proven fact 
while experiencing heat in lab experiments (Joireman, Barnes Truelove, and Duell 2010; 
Risen and Critcher 2011). The difference here is that I am observing exogenous factors 
by using the local weather data versus controlling the temperature in a laboratory setting. 
4.2 BACKGROUND AND THEORY  
A great deal of examination in public opinion has centered around question 
wording in surveys (see Bishop, Tuchfarber, and Oldendick 1978; Schuman and Duncan 
1973; Schuman and Presser 1977) and scholars have speculated that phrasing as “global 
warming” is a primer to heat related conditions. Previous research has shown that 
variations in question wording and format significantly affect responses on a range of 
issues. However, there are some conflicting results across studies on the question 
wording effects of the terms “global warming” and “climate change.” Whitmarsh (2009) 
explains that global warming elicits associations of human causation while climate 
change elicits thoughts of natural causation. These differences are relevant in American 
politics as conservatives generally express skepticism about an anthropogenic cause 
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(McCright and Dunlap 2000). When examining question wording effects Schuldt, 
Konrath, and Schwarz (2011) found that Republicans are affected by the use of global 
warming and less likely to endorse it while Zaval et al. (2014) did not find a statistically 
significant difference between asking about climate change and global warming. Schuldt, 
Konrath, and Schwarz (2011) find an overall wording effect of 6.3 percentage points 
driven by Republicans with a wording effect of 16.2 percentage points when the 
phenomenon was referred to as “global warming” rather than “climate change.” 
Conversely, they find Democrats to be unaffected by the framing manipulation and small 
insignificant effects among Independents. Their results show a decline in the partisan 
divide on global climate change as it decreases from 42.9 percentage points when framed 
as global warming to 26.2 percentage points when framed as climate change (Schuldt, 
Konrath, and Schwarz 2011). They further suggest Democrats may have crystalized 
beliefs about global climate change and thus were unaffected by the framing 
manipulation which is consistent with research showing stronger attitudes to be more 
resistant to change (Krosnick and Smith 1994;  Schuldt, Konrath, and Schwarz 2011). 
The authors express some concern over the choice of terms in surveys as their results 
indicate this choice strongly affects the responses and could contribute to different levels 
of partisan divide seen in surveys (Schuldt, Konrath, and Schwarz 2011). However, it is 
important to recognize that survey researchers tend to use the same question wording in 
time series surveys in order for the results to be interpreted consistently over time. 
Changes to question wording in these surveys would present challenges to time series 
analyses (Bishop, Tuchfarber, and Oldendick 1978). Thus, it would not be advisable for a 
survey organization such as Gallup to change their question wording based on these 
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effects, since any changes could be an artifact of question wording. Instead, as 
researchers we need to consider these effects when utilizing these data.21 
Several researchers have found that perceived and actual temperature increases 
are factors influencing the belief that global climate change is real (Joireman, Barnes 
Truelove, and Duell 2010; Krosnick et al. 2006; Weber 2006). Moreover, when 
examining the effect of warmth on belief in global warming, Zaval et al. (2014) find that 
an increase in concern and belief for global warming occurs when temperature 
abnormalities are present. This further supports the theory that imminent experience with 
abnormal temperature affects judgements of global warming (Zaval et al. 2014). 
Additionally, Bergquist and Warshaw (2019) find a substantial relationship between 
changes in temperature and the mass public’s climate concern at the national level. 
However, at the state level they find the public responds to changes in the annual 
temperature but as a small effect size (Bergquist and Warshaw 2019). 
Scholars, especially in the field of psychology, do not deny that local conditions 
influence belief in global warming; they instead explore various cognitive processes 
which explain this behavior (e.g. Joireman, Barnes Truelove, and Duell 2010; Li, 
Johnson, and Zaval 2011; Risen and Critcher 2011; Schuldt and Schwarz 2008; Zaval et 
al. 2014). Risen and Critcher (2011) find that visceral states can influence beliefs through 
visceral fit under various conditions including naturalistic and experimental lab settings 
when observing the influence of warmth on global warming beliefs. Their results indicate 
that visceral states can affect one’s beliefs about global warming by making similar states 
of the world easier to simulate and consequently appear more probable (Risen and 
 
21 Gallup was used as an example since it is the data source for the present research. 
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Critcher 2011).22 Moreover, the authors argue that a world plagued by global warming is 
easier to simulate when an individual is currently hot. Furthermore, Joireman, Barnes 
Truelove, and Duell (2010) find a significant positive correlation between outdoor 
temperatures and beliefs in global warming. Their findings suggest that heuristics and 
available schemas influence beliefs about global warming.23 Likewise, researchers argue 
that it is critical to identify elements that may affect belief in global warming as 
individuals are more likely to take action to mitigate global warming when they believe it 
is occurring (Heath and Gifford 2006; Joireman, Barnes Truelove, and Duell 2010; 
Lubell, Zahran, and Vedlitz 2007). For example, Joireman, Barnes Truelove, and Duell 
state that it is imperative for researchers to recognize how the public “gathers, receives, 
and processes” information associated with global warming if knowledge is 
interconnected to belief in it (2010). Additionally, Li, Johnson, and Zaval (2011) find that 
respondents not only believed more in global warming but had more concern about it 
when they thought the day was warmer than usual. This is argued to occur through a 
process known as attribute substitution. The process occurs when the intended attribute is 
“relatively inaccessible; and… a semantically and associatively related candidate 
attribute is highly accessible” (Kahneman and Frederick 2002, 54). In the case of 
responses to global warming, it is easier for a respondent to rely on the current 
temperature than to make an informed judgment as the current temperature is more 
 
22 The authors refer to a visceral state as phenomenologically consuming bodily states 
(warmth and thirst for their studies). 
23 The authors define heuristics as “cognitive short cuts or quick decision rules that 
people use to guide their decisions when evaluating overwhelming risks or difficult 
problems”, and “cognitive primes are stimuli that activate associated networks or related 
concepts to influence perception and behavior.” 
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salient even though less relevant. The authors use the example of an individual looking at 
the amount of money in his or her wallet when asked about the state of the national 
economy (Li, Johnson, and Zaval 2011). Zaval et al. (2014) find further support of 
attribute substitution when individuals make judgements on global warming. Ultimately 
these findings underscore the possible undue weight given by weather abnormalities 
increasing belief and concern for global warming. Thus, findings such as these and those 
that I hypothesize in the following section could raise questions concerning the 
impending role of a local warming bias in survey results. Moreover, their results indicate 
that recency and salience of warming constructs are tools of promoting increased concern 
about climate change among those lacking established beliefs or disbeliefs. Weather 
variability may lead to an increase in the public’s confusion on global warming and 
climate change. 
 Additionally, much of the previously mentioned research suggests that 
individuals will rely on heuristics and cognitive primes to guide their responses to 
questions regarding complex (scientific) issues. There is significant scholarship 
indicating that many characteristics of global warming make it likely for respondents to 
rely on heuristics or to be vulnerable to cognitive primes when answering questions of 
global warming (Bostrom et al. 1994; Dunlap 2016; Joireman, Barnes Truelove, and 
Duell 2010; Nisbet and Myers 2007; Winter et al. 2011). In sum, it is so difficult for 
individuals to process such material that both the average citizen and policymakers may 
base their decisions about global warming on cognitive primes or heuristics (Joireman, 
Barnes Truelove, and Duell 2010). These implications from psychology resemble much 
of what political scientists have discovered regarding political knowledge (Carpini and 
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Keeter 1996; Lupia and McCubbins 1998).  While taking issue with the idea, Carpini and 
Keeter (1996, 269) acknowledge that “we all take advantage of heuristics that reduce the 
amount of information necessary for making political decisions.” Additionally, Lupia and 
McCubbins posit that connectivity is in play for the public to make decisions (1998). 
Using their theory, one could argue that individuals would connect feeling warmth with 
the occurrence of global warming. Thus, the combination of work regarding question 
wording and heuristics provide a foundation for the arguments that follow. 
It is important to recognize that other studies find that perceptions of local 
weather conditions are influenced more by partisan affiliation than by objectively 
measured conditions (Shao 2016; Shao, Xian, Keim, et al. 2017; Shao, Xian, Lin, et al. 
2017; Shao and Goidel 2016). Political predispositions play an extremely powerful role 
in determining local weather perceptions. Republicans are less likely to believe global 
warming exists and they are less likely to believe global warming is anthropogenic 
(Borick and Rabe 2010; Hamilton 2011; Hamilton and Keim 2009; McCright and Dunlap 
2011; Shao 2016; Shao et al. 2014; Shao, Xian, Keim, et al. 2017; Shao, Xian, Lin, et al. 
2017; Shao and Goidel 2016). However, studies on partisan effects have not been 
completely established in regard to Independents and party leaners as Borick and Rabe 
(2014) find Independents to be more vulnerable to attribute current (or prior day) weather 
within their perceptions of global warming. Egan and Mullin (2012) find individuals who 
lean Democratic/Republican to have higher effects with weather.  
The model specifications for this paper contain components that are derived from 
the work of Egan and Mullin (2012) who conclude by expressing the need for new 
studies to include political attitude change with exogenous variation in personal 
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experiences. However, the measurements I utilize are adjusted to produce more accurate 
results. Moreover, the present study contains a much larger sample size providing the 
opportunity to discuss generalizability. An additional distinction is that the research to 
follow examines the end of winter versus the summer months in which the outside 
temperatures are warm even if they are not experiencing abnormalities.  
4.3 HYPOTHESES, DATA AND METHODS 
4.3.1 Hypotheses 
1. Global Warming Threat:  
a. Individuals experiencing temperatures that have risen above normal in the 
past week will be more likely to view global warming as a threat. 
b. Individuals experiencing “extreme heat” will be more likely to view global 
warming as threat. 
2. Global Warming Cause:  
a. Individuals experiencing temperatures that have risen above normal in the 
past week are more likely to believe the effects of pollution from human 
activity are the cause for global warming. 
b. Individuals experiencing “extreme heat” are less likely to believe that 
natural changes in the environment are the cause of global warming. 
3. Government Protection of the Environment: 
a. Individuals experiencing temperatures that have risen above normal in the 
past week are more likely to say the US government is not doing enough in 
terms of protecting the environment. 
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b. Individuals experiencing “extreme heat” are less likely to respond that the 
US government is doing enough or more than enough in terms of 
protecting the environment. 
4. Global Warming Happening 
a. Individuals experiencing temperatures that have risen above normal in the 
past week are more likely to believe that global warming has already 
begun. 
b. Individuals experiencing “extreme heat” are more likely to believe that 
global warming has already begun. 
4.3.2 Data 
The sources of data for this analysis are the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) and the Gallup Poll’s Annual March Environmental Survey, 
which is part of The Gallup Poll Social Series (GPSS). The data utilized on local weather 
conditions from NOAA originate from the National Centers for Environmental 
Information (NCEI)—formerly referenced as the National Climatic Data Center 
(NCDC).24 In order to generate climatic profiles of locations or regions, the NCEI 
compiles meteorological data over time from weather stations worldwide.  
While Gallup first polled Americans on environmental concerns in 1989 and 
began tracking regularly in 1999 the GPSS was not introduced until 2001 (Gallup 2017). 
To avoid question order bias and seasonal effects, Gallup administers these surveys 
during the same month every year thus further providing an extensive examination of 
changes in trend data (Gallup 2017). The seventeen surveys reporting from 2001 to 2017 
 
24 This data collection will be discussed in further detail in sections to follow. 
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are based on telephone interviews with nationally representative samples in the United 
States. These samples range from 1,000 to 1,600 adults (age 18 years or older). This 
provides the research with 18,306 cases for this period. 
 For the analyses to follow I employ a series of logistic regression models and an 
ordinal logistic regression as three of the dependent variables are binary and one of the 
dependent variables is ordered and categorical. Additionally, I cluster the standard errors 
around the Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) codes to account for 
possible geographic dependency. The FIPS codes serve as ID tags for various geographic 
entities as they are place codes used to “facilitate the storage, processing, exchange, and 
retrieval of geographic information” (Tips on FIPS 2012). Clustering the standard errors 
around the FIPS provides a robustness check to the model specification. 
4.3.2.1 Dependent Variables 
 While Gallup Poll’s Annual March Environmental Survey contains a variety of 
questions measuring global warming beliefs, I selected questions identifying the cause, 
threat, and occurrence of global warming. Additionally, I examine the question regarding 
how much the US is doing to protect the environment. In order to measure global 
warming as a threat, Gallup asks the following: “Do you think that global warming will 
pose a serious threat to you or your way of life in your lifetime?” This variable is coded 
where “yes, will” = 0 and “no, will not” =1. Moreover, Gallup asks the following to 
examine individuals’ beliefs on the cause of global warming: “And from what you have 
heard or read, do you believe increases in the Earth’s temperature over the last century 
are due more to – [ROTATED: the effects of pollution from human activities (or) natural 
changes in the environment that are not due to human activities]?” I code this variable 
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where “effects of pollution from human activities” = 0 and “natural changes in the 
environment” = 1. In examining beliefs regarding how much the government is doing 
Gallup asks: “Do you think the U.S. government is doing too much, too little, or about 
the right amount in terms of protecting the environment?” This variable is coded where 
“too little” = 1, “about right” = 2, and “too much” = 3 so that less than sufficient levels of 
protection serve as the reference category for the analysis. To evaluate beliefs regarding 
if and when individuals believe global warming is occurring Gallup asks “which of the 
following statements reflects your view of when the effects of global warming will begin 
to happen– [ROTATED: they have already begun to happen, they will start happening 
within a few years, they will not happen in your lifetime but will affect future 
generations, (or) they will never happen]?” I take their measurement and dichotomize it 
where responses “already begun to happen” = 1 and “have not happened” = 0 (Marquart-
Pyatt et al. 2014). To create this variable, I combine the alternative responses to “already 
begun to happen” as the question of interest is whether or not they believe global 
warming is currently happening. 
4.3.2.2 Independent and Control Variables 
Local weather/departure from normal. To measure the departure from normal, I 
utilize Egan and Mullin’s local weather measurement “where ddt_weekit is the local 
temperature variation experienced by respondent i in the week prior to being interviewed 
on day t, tempid is respondent i’s local temperature (the average of the minimum and 
maximum temperature recorded that day) on the day occurring d days before interview, 









This variable represents the departure from normal temperatures. I will explain the steps 
in greater detail and then use simplified terms throughout the paper to reduce the use of 
jargon.  
In calculating the departure from normal temperatures, I used the nClimGrid 
Daily product through the NCDC.25 It is a daily gridded dataset going back to 1951. This 
dataset contains data averaged into county FIPS regions. While this product is still in beta 
form, it is publicly available and is used by researchers working with meteorological 
data. I determined the daily average temperature for every date of interview for each 
respondent (based on the respective FIPS) as well as the seven days prior to the date of 
interview. I then calculated the climatological normals by averaging the daily average 
temperature for the thirty years prior to the survey for that specific day.  
Generally scientists define a climatological normal as an average over a thirty 
year period of a weather variable for a given time of year (Livezey et al. 2007). Currently 
there is not an official climatology respective of the interview dates for these data, so they 
needed to be computed. The official set of climatological normals, provided by the World 
Meteorological Organization, covers the period of 1991-2020 (WMO Climatological 
Normals 2017). However, this time period would provide the climatological normal for 
the present day and not the dates observed through this research. Thus, I obtained the data 
for the time period for each of the years examined and calculated a simple thirty-year 
average of the daily average temperatures. This provides a climatological normal for 
every date of interview. For example, if the date of interview was March 2nd, 2001, then I 
collected the daily average temperature on March 2nd for the years 1971-2000 associated 
 
25 (Index of /pub/data/daily-grids/beta/by-month n.d.) 
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with the recorded FIPS and if the date of interview was March 15th, 2017, then I 
calculated the daily average temperature on March 15th for the years 1986-2016.26 
The variation of weather patterns during this period ranges from a low of -24.521 
to a high of 20.80.27 This means that during the period of the analysis temperatures 
dropped nearly 25F below the normal and rose almost 21F above it. The mean value of 
the variable in the dataset for the respondents is -.813F with a standard deviation of 
7.068F. Additionally, the 5th and 95th percentiles of this variable are -13.647F and 
9.773F. 
Extreme Heat. I create a variable to serve as a proxy for extreme heat. Since each 
of the surveys, with the exception of the 2001, were conducted towards the end of winter 
it is not likely to see actual heat waves. However, an indicator of abnormally warm 
weather provides an opportunity to examine warming effects. While there is no standard 
definition for a warm spell or heat wave, a common index appears to be when the 
temperatures are above the 90th percentile for six consecutive days (Alexander and 
Tebaldi 2012). Conversely, others claim it to be an increase of 9F from the normal and 
some find it to be temperatures reflecting above the 95th percentile (Frich et al. 2002). I 
take these accounts into consideration and choose a 9F increase in the departure from 
normal to measure extreme heat. 9F is a value between the 90th and 95th percentile. If the 
departure from normal is greater than or equal to 9 then I code it as extreme heat. For this 
 
26 The NCEI uses a quasi-FIPS. Their data uses an arbitrary, archaic state code system. 
Using a crosswalk table, I was able to match the accurate FIPS codes to the quasi-FIPS 
codes. 
27 These values are shown in the summary statistics for variables in the study presented in 
table 1. 
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variable extreme is coded where 1= extreme and 0= not. This provides further inspection 
of the effects of warmth on global warming beliefs. 
 Party Identification. Partisanship is one of the most studied aspects of political 
belief formation. Party identification has been found to affect opinions on global 
warming with Democrats more likely to believe in anthropogenic global warming and 
Republicans more likely to view it as a hoax (Borick and Rabe 2010; Dunlap and 
McCright 2008; Krosnick, Holbrook, and Visser 2000). The importance of this variable 
was discussed in the previous section. Gallup measures party identification by asking “In 
politics, as of today, do you consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, or an 
Independent?” For those who respond “Independent” they are further asked if they lean 
towards one of the two parties. This creates a five-point party identification scale. I 
condense their five-point scale to a three-point scale as research indicates that party 
leaners are just as partisan as non-leaners. The party identification variable is coded 
where “Democrat/lean Democratic” = 1, “Independent” = 2, and “Republican/lean 
Republican” = 3.  
 Gender. There is consistent evidence suggesting a “gender gap” in environmental 
attitudes (Brody et al. 2008; Davidson and Freudenburg 1996; Egan and Mullin 2017; 
Leiserowitz 2006; McCright and Dunlap 2011; O’Connor, Bard, and Fisher 1999). 
Women are more likely to express greater concern about global warming than men as 
scholars contend that women have been socialized as caretakers and nurturers (Chodorow 
1974; Gilligan 1993; Stoper and Johnson 1977). Given the findings of previous research, 
I control for gender as it is expected to influence opinions regarding global warming. 
Gender is coded where male = 0 and female = 1. 
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 Education. In previous research educational attainment is found to have mixed 
effects on global warming beliefs; some scholars have found education to have no effect 
with the cause of global warming (McCright and Dunlap 2011), while others have found 
education to be negatively associated with global warming concern (Malka, Krosnick, 
and Langer 2009; McCright and Dunlap 2011; O’Connor, Bard, and Fisher 1999; Wood 
and Vedlitz 2007). Meanwhile, there is research providing evidence of a positive 
relationship with global warming concern (Hamilton 2008, 2011). We tend to assume that 
more knowledge would lead to greater concern regarding global warming and the 
environment; however, more education does not equate to more knowledge on issues 
concerning the environment. I control for education and code it where “high school or 
less” = 1, “some college” = 2, “college grad only” = 3, and “post-grad” = 4.  
 Age. Studies suggest that age will predict some variation in views on global 
warming (Dunlap 2016; Krosnick et al. 2006; Wood and Vedlitz 2007). Younger adults 
have been found to recognize the threats of global warming more than older segments of 
the population. In this paper age is observed in age categories where “18-29” = 1, “30-
49” = 2, “50-64” = 3, and “65+” = 4. 
 Presidential and Congressional Approval. Whether a person approves or 
disapproves of the job the president and/or Congress is doing can influence their beliefs 
on a variety of social issues. However, I include presidential and Congressional approval 
as controls to show that weather is exogenous on political attitudes. Some researchers 
argue that the approval of the president can be more favorable because warm weather 
provides a sense of happiness (Cohen 2011). Consequently, I ran tests for endogeneity for 
all variables in the model and endogeneity was not detected. Gallup asks the following: 
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“Do you approve or disapprove of the way […] is handling its job as president? When 
measuring Congressional approval Gallup similarly asks: “Do you approve or disapprove 
of the way Congress is handling its job?” For these variables “approve” = 1 and 
“disapprove” = 2.28 
4.4 RESULTS 
4.4.1 Predicted Probabilities 
I calculated the predicted probabilities for each of the dependent variables. The 
predicted probabilities provide insight of the distribution of responses for the sample for 
each dependent variable. The average predicted probabilities for responding “yes” global 
warming will pose a serious threat to you or your way of life in your lifetime are .327 
while the predicted probabilities for responding “no” are .673. Moreover, the predicted 
probabilities of responding that natural changes in the environment are not due to human 
activities are .408 and the predicted probabilities of citing effects of pollution from 
human activities as the cause for global warming are .592. The average predicted 
probabilities of responding that the government is doing “too little” in terms of protecting 
the environment are .509, “about right” are .330, and “too much” are .160. The visual 
presentation of the predicted probabilities for the question of protecting the environment 
are illustrated in figure 4.1. Lastly, the predicted probabilities of responding that global 
warming is “not happening” are .346 and “already begun” are .654. 
 
 
28 The following categories represent the base outcomes for their respective variable for 
the analysis to follow: those not experiencing “extreme” heat; self-identified Democrats; 
males; those with a high school diploma or less; 18–29-year-old; approval of the 
president; and approval of Congress. 
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4.4.2 Local Temperature  
Coefficients of a logistic regression model do not provide directly interpretable 
results. However, they do offer general conclusions on the relationship between the 
variables. Table 4.2 displays the results of the logistic regression of local temperatures, 
gender, party identification, education, age, presidential approval, and Congressional 
approval on the dependent variable of global warming as a threat. The results presented 
in table 4.2 indicate that the relationship between local temperatures and responding that 
global warming would not be a threat is not statistically significant, although this 
relationship is in the expected direction. Being a female also presents a negative 
statistically significant relationship with beliefs that global warming is not a threat 
(p<0.001). However, both being a Republican and being an Independent are positively 
associated with not viewing global warming as a threat (p<0.001). I turn to the percentage 
change in odds displayed in table 4.3 to draw more specific conclusions.29 
 The percentage change in odds as presented in table 4.3 show that for a standard 
deviation (~7 Fahrenheit) increase in the local temperatures in the past week, the odds of 
reporting that global warming will not pose a serious threat in their lifetime decrease by 
4.2%. That is, individuals experiencing temperatures warmer than normal exhibit a small 
insignificant effect size that is not substantively important. Moreover, the small effect 
size is overshadowed by the effects of other predictors in the model which is further 
illustrated in the visual representation of the odds ratio provided in figure 4.2. The odds 
of responding that global warming will not pose a threat is greater among Republicans 
and Independents (p<0.001) than Democrats as the odds increase by 329.9% for 
 
29 The discussion of odds in this paper are done holding all other variables constant. 
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Republicans and 61.5% for Independents compared to Democrats. Moreover, the odds 
ratios increase with age indicating that respondents under the age of 30 are more likely to 
view global warming as a threat than respondents over the age of 30. I find the odds of 
reporting that global warming will not pose a serious threat increase by 21.7% among 
those 30-49 years of age (p<0.01) and increase by 290.5% for individuals 65 and older 
(p<0.001). The results also show that those with more than a high school diploma have 
greater odds of reporting that global warming will not pose a threat compared to those 
with a high school diploma or less. 
Table 4.4 displays the results of the logistic regression model of local 
temperatures, gender, party identification, education, age, presidential approval, and 
Congressional approval on the dependent variable of the cause of global warming. As 
previously mentioned, the output of a logistic regression is not directly interpretable and 
only allows for generalizations. Local temperature fails to obtain statistical significance; 
however, the direction of these results indicate a negative effect with beliefs that global 
warming is caused by natural changes in the environment. The results for education find 
statistical significance among individuals with a college degree (p<0.01) or post graduate 
degree (p<0.001) with a negative relationship with beliefs that global warming is the 
result of natural changes in the environment. Conversely, both categories for party 
identification and age obtain statistical significance as well as illustrate a positive 
association with beliefs that natural changes in the environment cause global warming.30 
 The percentage change in odds for the logistic regression of the cause of global 
warming are shown in table 4.5. I find that for a standard deviation (~7 Fahrenheit) 
 
30 p<0.001 for each category with the exception of the 30-49 age group where p<0.01. 
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increase in local temperatures in the past week, the odds of believing that global warming 
is caused by natural changes in the environment decrease by .3%. Therefore, the increase 
in local temperatures has almost a null effect on the question of the cause of global 
warming as illustrated in figure 4.3. Further, the odds of reporting that natural changes in 
the environment are the cause of global warming are smaller for females than males as 
the odds decrease by 34.4%. Individuals with more than a high school diploma are more 
likely to acknowledge the effects of pollutions from human activity to be the cause of 
global warming than those with less than a high school diploma. Meanwhile, self-
identified Independents and Republicans present greater odds of believing that global 
warming is the result of natural changes in the environment where Republicans express a 
464.4% increase and Independents show a 141.7% increase compared to self-identified 
Democrats.  
 The results of the ordered logistic regression of local weather, gender, party 
identification, age, presidential approval, and Congressional approval on the dependent 
variable of government protection of the environment and subsequent odds ratio are 
provided in table 4.6. The ordered logistic regression indicates a negative statistically 
significant relationship between responding “about right” or “too much” and local 
temperatures (p<0.01). Furthermore, there is a negative and statistically significant 
relationship between being a female and “about right” or “too much” responses 
(p<0.001). Conversely, being a Republican or being an Independent illustrates a positive 
and statistically significant (p<0.001) relationship with responding “about right” or “too 
much” to the question regarding how much the government is doing in terms of 
protecting the environment. Individuals age 30 and older exhibit a positive and 
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statistically significant relationship with “about right” or “too much” responses 
(p<0.001). 
 While obtaining a level of statistical significance the local weather variable 
appears substantively less important when evaluating the odds ratio. For a 1 Fahrenheit 
that local temperatures in the past week have risen above normal the odds of reporting 
“about right” or “too much” decrease by less than one percent.31 Compare that effect with 
the odds ratio of party identification where the odds of responding “about right” or “too 
much” are 420.4% greater for Republicans than for Democrats. Additionally, the odds of 
responses indicating that the government does not need to do more in terms of protecting 
the environment are 1.728 times greater among self-identified Independents rather than 
Democrats which is a 72.8% increase. The effect size of the odds ratio among age group 
increases with age where 30–49-year-old exhibits odds of responding “about right” or 
“too much” at a 29.4% increase and those 65 and older have odds that increase by 92.3% 
compared to 18–29-year-olds. 
The results of the logistic regression model and odds ratio of local temperatures, 
gender, party identification, education, age, presidential approval, and Congressional 
approval on the dependent variable of the occurrence of global warming are displayed in 
table 4.8. The logistic regression coefficients achieve statistical significance for each 
variable (and/or respective category) with the exception of the main explanatory variable 
(local weather), individuals ages 30-49, and Congressional approval.32 Nevertheless, the 
local weather variable, being a female, education attainment greater than a high school 
 
31 The percentage change in odds for the model represented in table 4.6 are provided in 
table 4.7. 
32 Each variable except the three identified achieve statistical significance where p<0.001. 
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diploma, and disapproving of Congress are all positively associated with believing that 
global warming has begun. Meanwhile, Republicans, Independents, individuals 30 and 
up, and those disapproving of the president possess a negative relationship with believing 
global warming has already begun. 
Table 4.9 depicts the percentage change in odds for the logistic regression of the 
occurrence of global warming. The results suggest that for ~7 F increase in local 
temperatures above normal in the past week the odds of reporting that global warming 
has already begun to happen increase by 3%. The effect size is the smallest between the 
dependent variable and the local weather variable and the largest among individuals with 
a post-graduate education as clearly illustrated in figure 4.4. Individuals possessing the 
highest measured level of education express a 114.3% increase in the odds of responding 
that global warming has begun compared to those with a high school diploma or less. 
Moreover, the results indicate that as education levels increase the effect size increase as 
well. That is, with more education the odds of responding that global warming has 
already begun are greater. However, the odds of reporting that global warming has 
already begun decreases by 75.9% among self-identified Republicans compared to 
Democrats. 
4.4.3 Extreme Heat 
 The results of the logistic regression of extreme heat, gender, party identification, 
education, age, presidential approval, and Congressional approval on the dependent 
variable of global warming as a threat as well its odds ratio are displayed in table 4.10. 
The only variable that will be discussed is the extreme heat variable. This variable shows 
a negative relationship with believing that global warming will pose a threat while failing 
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to achieve statistical significance.33  The findings move in a direction suggesting that the 
odds of reporting that global warming will not pose a threat decrease by 7.3% among 
those experiencing extreme heat compared to those who are not as depicted in table 4.11.  
Table 4.12 shows the results of the logistic regression of extreme heat, gender, 
party identification, education, age, presidential approval, and Congressional approval on 
the dependent variable of the cause of global warming and the odds ratio. Similar to the 
results of table 4.10, we see that the extreme heat variable is negative and fails to reach a 
level of statistical significance. Because the output of a logistic regression is not directly 
interpretable, I once again turn to the odds ratio presented next to the coefficients of the 
model. The direction of these findings suggest that the odds of reporting that natural 
changes in the environment are the cause of global warming are .983 times smaller (or 
1.7%) for those experiencing extreme heat compared to those who are not.34  
The results of the ordered logistic regression of extreme heat, gender, party 
identification, education, age, presidential approval, and Congressional approval on the 
dependent variable of government protection in terms of the environment are displayed in 
table 4.14 along with the odds ratio. As was seen in the models with the other dependent 
variables, the extreme heat variable fails to achieve a level of statistical significance 
while maintaining a negative relationship with responding “about right” or “too much.” I 
find the odds of reporting “about right” or “too much” decrease by 12.7% compared to 
those not experiencing abnormally warm weather.35 
 
33 The other variables have been discussed in the previous models and thus are excluded 
from the current discussion. 
34 The percentage change in odds is provided in table 4.13. 
35 The percentage change in odds is provided in table 4.15. 
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Table 4.16 presents the results of the logistic regression and odds ratio of extreme 
heat, gender, party identification, education, age, presidential approval, and 
Congressional approval on the dependent variable of the occurrence of global warming. 
Additionally, the percentage change in odds for this model are displayed in table 4.17. 
Once again, the extreme heat variable fails to obtain a level of statistical significance 
while possessing a positive relationship with believing that global warming has already 
begun. I find that the odds of reporting that global warming has already begun increase 
by 12% when individuals are experiencing “extreme” heat. 
Overall, the results fail to support my hypotheses as I do not find increasing 
temperatures or extreme heat to be a significant predictor on beliefs towards global 
warming or protecting the environment. Table 4.18 provides a summary of these 
conclusions. While the local temperature variable achieves statistical significance when 
regressed on the dependent variable of government protection of the environment further 
examination of the effect revealed small to almost no effect. Nonetheless, I find 
significant effects among some of the other predictors included in the model 
specifications. The results suggest women express views indicative of more concern 
regarding the protection of the environment. Additionally, women are more likely to 
believe global warming has begun, view global warming as a threat, and cite effects of 
pollution from human activity as the cause of global warming. Party identification is 
found to be the strongest predictor of global warming beliefs and concern of government 
protection of the environment. Republicans and Independents are less likely to suggest 
the US government should do more in terms of protecting the environment. Further, they 
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are more likely to cite natural changes in the environment as the cause for global 
warming and less likely to view global warming as a personal threat or having begun. 
Education attainment provides an unexpected finding. The logistic regression on 
global warming as a threat presented mixed results as seen in previous studies of attitudes 
on global warming. However, the logistic regression on the cause of global warming 
illustrates a trend in which the effect size decreases with education levels while increases 
in education levels lead to increased odds of responding that global warming has already 
begun. This indicates that individuals become less likely to believe that global warming is 
the result of natural changes in the environment as the levels of education increase 
suggesting that knowledge has an effect (albeit small) on the cause of global warming as 
one would expect more exposure to accurate information with increased levels of 
education. Conversely, the effect size of education on beliefs that global warming has 
begun is large indicating that education may be an influential predictor in holding this 
belief (p<0.001).  
4.5 CONCLUSION 
 At the beginning of this paper, I argued that the results of surveys using questions 
on global warming were possibly receiving undue weight as a product of weather 
abnormalities. This was suggested as global warming is complex in nature causing 
individuals to rely on any available cognitive shortcuts. The results from this paper fail to 
provide support for a warming effect. While scholars have suggested a possible warming 
effect when examining the relationship between local conditions in both controlled and 
uncontrolled settings, the results of this study do not support previous findings of a local 
warming effect. While weather can provide a warming effect as respondents may present 
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attitude attribution from their local conditions when answering questions on global 
warming this effect is not found through the examination using data covering a large time 
frame and consistent question wording. 
The methods presented in this paper contribute to our understanding of public 
opinion on global warming as many political scientists may not be aware of the extensive 
weather data available or consider the potential for using these data in research. I use the 
most accurate accounts available in calculating each weather measurement in the study. 
For example, previous research has relied on climatological normal reports instead of 
calculating the actual climatological normal as defined by the World Meteorological 
Organization. Whereas steps such as this may seem minor, they can greatly alter the 
results as the results presented in this paper fail to support conclusions from previous 
research. While management of these data can be complex if incorporated properly in 
future research the outcome should be beneficial. Additional explanations for the 
differences in findings include the source of obtaining the daily averages as well as the 
months in which respondents are interviewed. 
 The methodological contribution is secondary to the intent of this research. I set 
out to examine the potential effect that weather conditions play on attitudes on global 
warming. Given what we know about the complexity of global warming and the power in 
question wording there is reason to believe that warm conditions provide a cognitive 
shortcut to respondents when answering questions regarding the cause of global warming 
as well as viewing it as a threat. However, the findings presented here fail to support prior 
research indicating that heuristics and available schema influence beliefs about global 
warming. The global annual temperature has increased by .32 Fahrenheit per decade 
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since 1981 (Lindsey and Dahlman 2020).  It is possible that because this seems like a 
small increase in the Earth’s average yearly surface temperature that individuals are 
unaware that this means a significant increase in accumulated heat has occurred driving 
regional and seasonal temperature extremes. This suggests the need to better inform the 
public on the issue of global warming and climate change. The more we learn regarding 
when Americans will have favorable beliefs about fighting the harmful effects of global 
warming, the better the chances of creating initiatives to take on this problem. 
 While I did not find a meaningful effect of local weather on global warming 
beliefs it may be worth researchers controlling for weather variability when conducting 
surveys on global warming. There is power in including exogenous factors in our 
research. Moreover, there is still the potential to see an effect in future research as 
extreme weather variability becomes more frequent as global warming poses a variety of 
threats to humans and their livelihoods. As glaciers melt and severe droughts become 
more frequent, the West is likely to see (and has already experienced) water shortages 
and increased risks of wildfires. The Eastern seaboard has also begun to see the harmful 
effects of global warming with the rising sea levels creating more coastal flooding 
(Mousavi et al. 2011). Additionally, the increased growth of pollen producing ragweed, 
high levels of air pollution, and the spread of conditions favorable to pathogens and 
mosquitoes has serious effects on allergies, asthma, and infectious disease outbreaks 
(Barne et al. 2013; Khasnis and Nettleman 2005). 
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Table 4.1 Summary Statistics. 
Variable n Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
GW_THREAT 12,068 0.6726881 0.4692516 0 1 
GW_CAUSE 12,637 0.4044473 0.4908042 0 1 
GOVPROTECT 12,000 1.62575 0.7283986 1 3 
GW_WHEN 16,836 0.6568068 0.4747894 0 1 
Extreme Heat 18,306 0.0681744 0.2520518 0 1 
Local Temperatures 18,224 -0.8134837 7.067718 -24.52089 20.79994 
Gender 18,306 0.497651 0.5000081 0 1 
Party Identification 18,075 1.986169 0.9524649 1 3 
Education 18,179 2.340283 1.115485 1 4 
Age Range 18,065 2.687683 0.9971702 1 4 
Presidential Approval 16,449 1.490121 0.4999176 1 2 
Congressional Approval 16,193 1.711974 0.4528571 1 2 
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Table 4.2 Logistic regression of local temperatures, gender, party identification, 
education, age, presidential approval, and Congressional approval on the dependent 
variable of global warming as a threat and the odds ratio. 
Global Warming Threat Coefficient Odds Ratio 
Local Temperatures  -0.006 0.994 
  (0.003) (0.003) 
Female -0.422*** 0.656*** 
  (0.048) (0.031) 
Party Identification: Independent 0.479*** 1.615*** 
  (0.081) (0.130) 
Party Identification: Republican 1.458*** 4.299*** 
  (0.052) (0.224) 
Education: Some College 0.213*** 1.237*** 
  (0.059) (0.073) 
Education: College Grad only 0.189** 1.208** 
  (0.065) (0.078) 
Education: Post Grad 0.074 1.077 
  (0.066) (0.071) 
Age Category: 30-49 0.196** 1.217** 
  (0.075) (0.091) 
Age Category: 50-64 0.565*** 1.759*** 
  (0.073) (0.129) 
Age Category: 65+ 1.362*** 3.905*** 
  (0.081) (0.315) 
Presidential Approval (disapprove) 0.143** 1.154** 
  (0.047) (0.054) 
Congressional Approval (disapprove) -0.042 0.959 
  (0.053) (0.051) 
constant -0.409*** 0.664*** 
  (0.081) (0.053) 
 0.000 0.000 
Log pseudo-likelihood -5,907.126     -5,907.126     
n 10,645 10,645 
*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; two tailed tests. 
  
Standard Error adjusted for 1,976 clusters in FIPS 
  




Table 4.3 Logit (n=10,645): Percentage change in odds. Odds of No, will not vs Yes, will. 
Global Warming Threat b % %StdX SDofX 
Local Temperatures -0.006 -0.6 -4.2 7.487 
Female -0.422 -34.4 -19 0.5 
Independent 0.479 61.5 13.9 0.272 
Republican 1.458 329.9 106.8 0.498 
Some College 0.213 23.7 10.2 0.455 
College Grad Only 0.189 20.8 8 0.408 
Post-grad 0.074 7.7 3.1 0.417 
30-49 0.196 21.7 9.3 0.455 
50-64 0.565 75.9 29.7 0.46 
65+ 1.362 290.5 84 0.448 
Presidential Approval (Disapprove) 0.144 15.4 7.4 0.5 
Congressional Approval (Disapprove) -0.042 -4.1 -1.8 0.437 






Table 4.4 Logistic regression of local temperatures, gender, party identification, 
education, age, presidential approval, and Congressional approval on the dependent 
variable of the cause of global warming and the odds ratio. 
Global Warming Cause Coefficient Odds Ratio 
Local Temperatures -0.0004 0.999 
  (0.003) (0.003) 
Female -0.370*** 0.691*** 
  (0.043) (0.030) 
Party Identification: Independent 0.882*** 2.417*** 
  (0.079) (0.191) 
Party Identification: Republican/Lean Republican 1.731*** 5.644*** 
  (0.049) (0.279) 
Education: Some College -0.100 0.905 
  (0.058) (0.052) 
Education: College Grad only -0.202** 0.817** 
  (0.061) (0.050) 
Education: Post Grad -0.345*** 0.708*** 
  (0.061) (0.044) 
Age Category: 30-49 0.258** 1.294** 
  (0.078) (0.100) 
Age Category: 50-64 0.465*** 1.593*** 
  (0.079) (0.125) 
Age Category: 65+ 0.701*** 2.015*** 
  (0.078) (0.157) 
Presidential Approval Rating (disapprove) 0.211*** 1.235*** 
  (0.045) (0.056) 
Congressional Approval Rating (disapprove) -0.025 0.975 
  (0.054) (0.053) 
constant -1.499*** 0.223*** 
  (0.091) (0.020) 
 0.000 0.000 
Log pseudo-likelihood -6578.431  -6578.431  
n 11,244 11,244 
*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; two tailed tests. 
  
Standard Error adjusted for 1,992 clusters in FIPs 
  




Table 4.5 Global Warming Cause logit (n=11,244): Percentage change in odds. Odds of 
natural changes in the environment vs effects of pollution from human activity. 
 Global Warming Cause b % %StdX SDofX 
Local Temperatures -0.001 0.000 -0.3 7.338 
Female -0.370 -30.9 -16.9 0.500 
Independent 0.882 141.7 26.5 0.266 
Republican 1.731 464.4 136.9 0.498 
Some College -0.100 -9.5 -4.5 0.455 
College Grad Only -0.202 -18.3 -7.9 0.407 
Post-grad -0.345 -29.2 -13.4 0.418 
30-49 0.258 29.4 12.4 0.454 
50-64 0.466 59.3 24 0.463 
65+ 0.701 101.5 36.8 0.448 
Presidential Approval (Disapprove) 0.211 23.5 11.1 0.499 
Congressional Approval (Disapprove) -0.025 -2.5 -1.1 0.422 




Table 4.6 Ordered logistic regression of local temperatures, gender, party identification, 
education, age, presidential approval, and Congressional approval on the dependent 
variable of government protection of the environment and the odds ratio. 
Government Protection Coefficient Odds Ratio 
Local Temperatures -0.009** 0.991** 
  (0.003) (0.003) 
Female -0.523*** 0.592*** 
  (0.041) (0.024) 
Party Identification: Independent 0.547*** 1.728*** 
  (0.085) (0.147) 
Party Identification: Republican 1.649*** 5.204*** 
  (0.045) (0.234) 
Education: Some College 0.064 1.066 
  (0.055) (0.059) 
Education: College Grad only 0.137* 1.147* 
  (0.058) (0.067) 
Education: Post Grad -0.018 0.982 
  (0.062) (0.061) 
Age Category: 30-49 0.258*** 1.294*** 
  (0.073) (0.095) 
Age Category: 50-64 0.473*** 1.604*** 
  (0.072) (0.116) 
Age Category: 65+ 0.654*** 1.923*** 
  (0.073) (0.141) 
Presidential Approval (disapprove) 0.146*** 1.157*** 
  (0.042) (0.048) 
Congressional Approval (disapprove) -0.310*** 0.734*** 
  (0.051) (0.037) 
Cutpoints 0.900 0.900 
  (0.084) (0.084) 
  2.798 2.798 
  (0.086) (0.086) 
 0.000 0.000 
Log pseudo-likelihood -8,727.129 -8,727.129 
n 9,758 9,758 
*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; two tailed tests. 
  





Table 4.7 GOVPROTECT ordered logit (n=9,758): Percentage change in odds. Odds of 
>m vs <=m. 
 Government Protection b % %StdX SDofX 
Local Temperatures -0.009 -0.9 -6.3 7.412 
Female -0.523 -40.8 -23 0.5 
Independent 0.547 72.8 15.7 0.267 
Republican 1.649 420.4 127.8 0.499 
Some College 0.064 6.6 3 0.454 
College Grad Only 0.137 14.7 5.8 0.41 
Post-grad -0.018 -1.8 -0.8 0.416 
30-49 0.258 29.4 12.4 0.453 
50-64 0.473 60.4 24.3 0.46 
65+ 0.654 92.3 34.3 0.45 
Presidential Approval (Disapprove) 0.146 15.7 7.6 0.5 




Table 4.8 Logistic regression and odds ratio of local temperatures, gender, party 
identification, education, age, presidential approval, and Congressional approval on the 
dependent variable of the occurrence of global warming. 
Global Warming When Coefficient Odds Ratio 
Local Temperatures 0.004 1.004 
  (0.003) (0.003) 
Female 0.423*** 1.526*** 
  (0.037) (0.056) 
Party Identification: Independent -0.679*** 0.507*** 
  (0.080) (0.040) 
Party Identification: Republican -1.423*** 0.241*** 
  (0.043) (0.010) 
Education: Some College 0.341*** 1.407*** 
  (0.048) (0.068) 
Education: College Grad only 0.473*** 1.605*** 
  (0.057) (0.092) 
Education: Post Grad 0.762*** 2.143*** 
  (0.057) (0.122) 
Age Category: 30-49 -0.093 0.911 
  (0.062) (0.056) 
Age Category: 50-64 -0.331*** 0.718*** 
  (0.066) (0.047) 
Age Category: 65+ -0.887*** 0.412*** 
  (0.068) (0.028) 
Presidential Approval (disapprove) -0.266*** 0.766*** 
  (0.038) (0.029) 
Congressional Approval (disapprove) 0.078 1.081 
  (0.046) (0.049) 
constant 1.317*** 3.731*** 
  (0.073) (0.272) 
 0.000 0.000 
Log pseudo-likelihood -8,512.783 -8,512.783 
n 14,909 14,909 
*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; two tailed 
tests. 
  




Table 4.9 Logit (n =14,909): Percentage Change in Odds. Odds of Already Begun to 
Happen v Not Happening. 
Global Warming When b % %StdX SDofX 
Local Temperatures 0.004 0.400 3.000 7.182 
Female 0.423 52.600 23.500 0.500 
Independent -0.679 -49.300 -16.600 0.267 
Republican -1.423 -75.900 -50.800 0.498 
Some College 0.341 40.700 16.700 0.453 
College Grad Only 0.473 60.500 21.200 0.405 
Post-grad 0.762 114.300 37.500 0.418 
30-49 -0.093 -8.900 -4.200 0.463 
50-64 -0.331 -28.200 -14.200 0.461 
65+ -0.887 -58.800 -32.200 0.438 
Presidential Approval (Disapprove) -0.266 -23.400 -12.500 0.500 
Congressional Approval (Disapprove) 0.078 8.100 3.600 0.453 
constant 1.317 - - - 
  
154 
Table 4.10 Logistic regression of extreme heat, gender, party identification, education, 
age, presidential approval, and Congressional approval on the dependent variable of 
global warming as a threat and the odds ratio. 
Global Warming Threat Coefficient Odds Ratio 
Extreme Heat -0.075 0.927 
  (0.086) (0.080) 
Female -0.422*** 0.656*** 
  (0.048) (0.031) 
Party Identification: Independent 0.482*** 1.620*** 
  (0.080) (0.130) 
Party Identification: Republican/Lean Republican 1.460*** 4.308*** 
  (0.052) (0.224) 
Education: Some College 0.210*** 1.234*** 
  (0.059) (0.072) 
Education: College Grad only 0.183** 1.201** 
  (0.064) (0.077) 
Education: Post Grad 0.070 1.072 
  (0.066) (0.070) 
Age Category: 30-49 0.197** 1.217** 
  (0.075) (0.091) 
Age Category: 50-64 0.563*** 1.756*** 
  (0.073) (0.129) 
Age Category: 65+ 1.359*** 3.892*** 
  (0.080) (0.313) 
Presidential Approval Rating (disapprove) 0.141** 1.152** 
  (0.047) (0.054) 
Congressional Approval Rating (disapprove) -0.043 0.957 
  (0.053) (0.051) 
constant -0.390*** 0.677*** 
  (0.081) (0.055) 
 0.000 0.000 
Log pseudo-likelihood -5,909.2679 -5,909.2679 
n 10,646 10,646 
*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; two tailed tests. 
 
 






Table 4.11 Logit (n=10,646): Percentage change in odds. Odds of No, will not vs Yes, 
will. 
Global Warming Threat b % %StdX SDofX 
extreme -0.076 -7.3 -2 0.264 
Female -0.422 -34.4 -19 0.5 
Independent 0.482 62 14 0.271 
Republican 1.461 330.8 107 0.498 
Some College 0.210 23.4 10 0.455 
College Grad Only 0.183 20.1 7.8 0.408 
Post-grad 0.070 7.2 2.9 0.417 
30-49 0.197 21.7 9.4 0.455 
50-64 0.563 75.6 29.6 0.46 
65+ 1.359 289.2 83.8 0.448 
Presidential Approval (Disapprove) 0.141 15.2 7.3 0.5 
Congressional Approval (Disapprove) -0.043 -4.3 -1.9 0.437 




Table 4.12 Logistic regression of extreme heat, gender, party identification, education, 
age, presidential approval, and Congressional approval on the dependent variable of the 
cause of global warming and the odds ratio. 
Global Warming Cause Coefficient Odds Ratio 
Extreme Heat -0.017 0.983 
  (0.086) (0.085) 
Female -0.370*** 0.691*** 
  (0.043) (0.030) 
Party Identification: Independent 0.882*** 2.417*** 
  (0.079) (0.191) 
Party Identification: Republican/Lean Republican 1.731*** 5.644*** 
  (0.049) (0.279) 
Education: Some College -0.100 0.905 
  (0.058) (0.052) 
Education: College Grad only -0.202** 0.817** 
  (0.061) (0.050) 
Education: Post Grad -0.345*** 0.708*** 
  (0.061) (0.043) 
Age Category: 30-49 0.258** 1.294** 
  (0.078) (0.100) 
Age Category: 50-64 0.456*** 1.593*** 
  (0.079) (0.125) 
Age Category: 65+ 0.701*** 2.015*** 
  (0.078) (0.157) 
Presidential Approval Rating (disapprove) 0.211*** 1.235*** 
  (0.045) (0.056) 
Congressional Approval Rating (disapprove) -0.026 0.975 
  (0.054) (0.053) 
constant -1.497*** 0.224*** 
  (0.081) (0.020) 
 0.000 0.000 
Log pseudo-likelihood -6,578.4226 -6,578.4226 
n 11,244 11,244 
*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; two tailed tests. 
 
 






Table 4.13 Logit (n =11,244): Percentage Change in Odds. Odds of Natural Changes in 
the Environment vs. Effects of Pollution from Human Activity. 
 Global Warming Cause b % %StdX SDofX 
extreme -0.017 -1.7 -0.4 0.259 
Female -0.370 -30.9 -16.9 0.500 
Independent 0.883 141.7 26.5 0.266 
Republican 1.731 464.4 137 0.498 
Some College -0.100 -9.5 -4.4 0.455 
College Grad Only -0.202 -18.3 -7.9 0.407 
Post-grad -0.345 -29.2 -13.4 0.418 
30-49 0.258 29.4 12.4 0.454 
50-64 0.465 59.3 24 0.463 
65+ 0.701 101.5 36.8 0.448 
Presidential (Disapprove) 0.211 23.5 11.1 0.499 
Congressional (Disapprove) -0.026 -2.5 -1.1 0.422 




Table 4.14 Ordered logistic regression of extreme heat, gender, party identification, 
education, age, presidential approval, and Congressional approval on the dependent 
variable of government protection of the environment and the odds ratio. 
Government Protection Coefficient Odds Ratio 
extreme -0.136 0.873 
  (0.093) (0.081) 
Female -0.524*** 0.592*** 
  (0.041) (0.024) 
Party Identification: Independent 0.552*** 1.737*** 
  (0.086) (0.149) 
Party Identification: Republican 1.651*** 5.210*** 
  (0.045) (0.235) 
Education: Some College 0.060 1.062 
  (0.055) (0.058) 
Education: College Grad only 0.130* 1.139* 
  (0.058) (0.066) 
Education: Post Grad -0.024 0.976 
  (0.062) (0.060) 
Age Category: 30-49 0.256*** 1.292*** 
  (0.073) (0.095) 
Age Category: 50-64 0.470*** 1.601*** 
  (0.072) (0.115) 
Age Category: 65+ 0.652*** 1.919*** 
  (0.073) (0.141) 
Presidential Approval (disapprove) 0.148*** 1.159*** 
  (0.042) (0.049) 
Congressional Approval (disapprove) -0.310*** 0.733*** 
  (0.051) (0.037) 
Cutpoints 0.875 0.875 
  (0.084) (0.084) 
  2.773 2.773 
  (0.086) (0.086) 
 0.000 0.000 
Log pseudo-likelihood -8,730.832    -8,730.832    
n 9,758 9,758 
*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; two tailed tests. 
  





Table 4.15 Ordered logit (n=9,758): Percentage change in odds. Odds of >m vs<=m. 
Government Protection b % %StdX SDofX 
extreme -0.136 -12.7 -3.4 0.253 
Female -0.524 -40.8 -23 0.5 
Independent 0.552 73.7 15.9 0.267 
Republican 1.651 421 127.9 0.499 
Some College 0.061 6.2 2.8 0.454 
College Grad Only 0.130 13.9 5.5 0.41 
Post-grad -0.024 -2.4 -1 0.416 
30-49 0.256 29.2 12.3 0.453 
50-64 0.471 60.1 24.2 0.46 
65+ 0.652 91.9 34.1 0.45 
Presidential Approval (Disapprove) 0.148 15.9 7.7 0.5 




Table 4.16 Logistic regression and odds ratio of extreme heat, gender, party 
identification, education, age, presidential approval, and Congressional approval on the 
dependent variable of the occurrence of global warming. 
Global Warming When Coefficient Odds Ratio 
extreme 0.113 1.120 
  (0.076) (0.085) 
Female 0.423*** 1.526*** 
  (0.037) (0.056) 
Party Identification: Independent -0.681*** 0.506*** 
  (0.080) (0.040) 
Party Identification: Republican -1.424*** 0.241*** 
  (0.043) (0.010) 
Education: Some College 0.340*** 1.405*** 
  (0.048) (0.067) 
Education: College Grad only 0.474*** 1.607*** 
  (0.057) (0.092) 
Education: Post Grad 0.763*** 2.145*** 
  (0.057) (0.122) 
Age Category: 30-49 -0.092 0.912 
  (0.062) (0.056) 
Age Category: 50-64 -0.330*** 0.719*** 
  (0.066) (0.047) 
Age Category: 65+ -0.886*** 0.413*** 
  (0.068) (0.028) 
Presidential Approval (disapprove) -0.266*** 0.767*** 
  (0.038) (0.029) 
Congressional Approval (disapprove) 0.079 1.083 
  (0.046) (0.049) 
constant 1.303*** 3.682*** 
  (0.073) (0.270) 
 0.000 0.000 
Log pseudo-likelihood -8,513.253 -8,513.253 
n 14,910 14,910 
*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; two 
tailed tests. 
  




Table 4.17 Logit (n =14,910): Percentage Change in Odds. Odds of Already Begun to 
Happen v Not Happening. 
Global Warming When b % %StdX SDofX 
extreme 0.114 12 2.9 0.249 
Female 0.423 52.6 23.5 0.5 
Independent -0.682 -49.4 -16.6 0.267 
Republican -1.424 -75.9 -50.8 0.498 
Some College 0.340 40.5 16.7 0.453 
College Grad Only 0.474 60.7 21.2 0.405 
Post-grad 0.763 114.5 37.5 0.418 
30-49 -0.092 -8.8 -4.2 0.463 
50-64 -0.330 -28.1 -14.1 0.461 
65+ -0.886 -58.7 -32.2 0.438 
Presidential Approval (Disapprove) -0.266 -23.3 -12.4 0.5 
Congressional Approval (Disapprove) 0.079 8.3 3.7 0.453 




Table 4.18 Significance Levels. 
  THREAT CAUSE WHEN PROTECT 
ddt_week NS NS NS p<0.01 
extreme NS NS  NS NS 
Female p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001 
Independent p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001 
Republican p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001 
Some College p<0.01 NS p<0.001 NS 
College Grad Only NS p<0.01 p<0.001 p<0.05 
Post-grad p<0.01 p<0.001 p<0.001 NS 
30-49 p<0.001 p<0.01 p<0.001 p<0.001 
50-64 p<0.001 p<0.001 NS p<0.001 
65+ p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001 
Presidential Approval  p<0.01 p<0.001 p<0.001 p<0.001 










Figure 4.2 Odds ratio output of the logistic regression of local temperatures, gender, 
party identification, education, age, presidential approval, and Congressional approval 




Figure 4.3 Odds ratio output of the logistic regression of local temperatures, gender, 
party identification, education, age, presidential approval, and Congressional approval 




Figure 4.4 Odds ratio output of the logistic regression of local temperatures, gender, 
party identification, education, age, presidential approval, and Congressional approval 
on the dependent variable of the occurrence of global warming. 
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CHAPTER 5 : CONCLUSION 
In the preceding chapters I evaluated various components of public opinion on 
global climate change. Chapter 1 reviewed broad trends in public opinion on Americans’ 
attitudes on the issues of the environment. I further highlighted the history of major 
environmental policy in the US leading up to the current state of gridlock. Chapter 2 
examined the preferences on government spending. In Chapter 2, I argue that the public 
should be thermostatically responsive on environmental spending. That is the public will 
desire less (more) spending on the environment when spending (or perceived spending) is 
high (low). In Chapter 3 I suggest that individuals will exhibit more concern regarding 
climate change after experiencing the effects of a large natural disasters such as 
Hurricane Harvey. Moreover, given the devastation of this hurricane these effects would 
be seen in the neighboring state of Oklahoma as the threat of danger was close in 
proximity. Finally, in Chapter 4 I posit a warming effect when questions of global 
warming are asked when respondents are experiencing warmer than normal temperatures. 
This warming effect can be problematic as it would raise uncertainty surrounding studies 
in which this is occurring without controlling for weather. I caution researchers and 
suggest more inclusion of weather variables in research in which the weather can be used 
for attitude attribution due to question wording. 
Empirically, I find support for some of what I hypothesized. In Chapter 2 I find a 
thermostatically responsive public. The more the government spends on the environment 
the less supportive the public is of government spending. Analyses in Chapter 3 present 
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mixed results. Experiencing Hurricane Harvey did not lead to statistically significant 
changes. Nonetheless, the direction of the results was suggestive of a shift in increased 
concern on the likelihood of climate change causing personal harm in both the areas 
directly affected by Hurricane Harvey and the neighboring state. But for the question on 
whether temperatures are increasing experiencing the storm leads to an increase in 
uncertainty as well as a decrease in beliefs that temperatures are increasing. Chapter 4 
explored warming effects on the perceptions of global warming posing a threat, the cause 
of global warming, government protection of the environment, and the occurrence of 
global warming. The results of these analyses suggest that warmer temperatures may play 
a role in forming opinions, but the size of this effect is small especially when compared 
to other predictors. 
To summarize, the complexity of attitudes towards the environment should not be 
underestimated. While party identification appears to be the most influential factor in 
determining public opinion on global climate change, the public does behave 
thermostatically on attitudes towards spending on the environment. Although neither 
Hurricane Harvey nor local temperatures played a pivotal role in influencing global 
climate change beliefs it is possible that these effects will be seen in the years to come. 
This could happen if the occurrence of extreme weather events continues to increase 
and/or if the severity of such storms increase. 
The findings presented in the preceding chapters make important contributions to 
the study of public opinion on the environment. First, my results include one of the first 
attempts to examine thermostatic responsiveness at the individual level on environmental 
spending preferences in the US. Second, this research includes a rare opportunity to 
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examine opinions on climate change both before and after a devastating storm. Third, I 
provide an advancement to the literature using rigorous meteorological measurements 
concluding that weather as an exogenous factor may not be a powerful predictor 
influencing beliefs on global warming. 
 A common theme emerging from many discussions of these topics is the power of 
party identification and the politicization of global climate change beliefs. The public 
may not be knowledgeable of issues of the environment; however, they do look for party 
cues in forming these opinions. This can be problematic as many Americans are 
experiencing harmful effects associated with global climate change. While party leaders 
should bear the burden of informing their constituents of these matters this is unlikely to 
occur across the two parties. As scholars of politics, political scientists must discover 
additional methods of informing the public and provide them to those concerned with 
environmental matters to break the barriers created by the parties. This dissertation 
provides a foundation for that study as it highlights various factors believed to influence 
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APPENDIX A: SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS FOR CHAPTER 2 
This section presents alternative model specifications for the analysis using the 
individual level data and provides additional figures relating to the aggregate level data. 
These are not crucial to the focus of the paper, but they do provide information relevant 
to the study. While these models are not necessarily appropriate for these data, they can 
serve as additional robustness checks to show that the results hold across several model 
specifications.
Table A.1 displays items listed on the GSS spending lists and the years asked. A 
visual representation the cross-time trends of the percent responding about right, too 
much, or too little on the question of improving and protecting the environment is seen in 
figure A.1 and the values for this figure are displayed in table A.2. The aggregate data 
analysis did not require an examination of the middle approach (about right responses). 
However, the figure illustrates that the highest percentage of responses are “about right” 
and the lowest are “too little.” Tables A.3 – A.6 provide the bivariate ordered logistical 
regressions of the individual subfunctions that comprise the environmental spending 
measure. 
Additionally, table A.7 depicts the results of a generalized least squares model. A 
GLM model works for what I was trying to measure but it is not a common approach in 
political science and is more likely to be found in economics. For this model specification 
the dependent variable had to be transformed where “too much” = -1; “about right” = 0; 
and “too little” =1. The results lead to the same conclusions. The more the government 
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spends on the environment the less supportive the public is of government spending, 
ceteris paribus. This indicates a thermostatically responsive public. Table A.8 presents 
the random effects model of the GLM and Table A.9 provides the random effects of the 
ordered logistic regression used in the main analysis of the paper. The results do not 
change and thus a random effects approach (as Soroka and Wlezien use) is not 
appropriate for these data. 
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Table A.1 GSS spending items. 
Item  Years asked 
Space Exploration Program  1973-2018 
Improving and Protecting the Environment 1973-2018 
Improving and Protecting the Nation’s Health  1973-2018 
Solving the Problems of Big Cities 1973-2018 
Halting the Rising Crime Rate  1973-2018 
Dealing with Drug Addiction  1973-2018 
Improving the Nation’s Education System  1973-2018 
Improving Conditions of Blacks 1973-2018 
The Military, Armaments, and Defense 1973-2018 
Foreign Aid  1973-2018 
Welfare  1973-2018 
Highways and Bridges  1984-2018 
Mass Transportation  1984-2018 
Space Exploration 1984-2018 
The Environment  1984-2018 
Health  1984-2018 
Assistance to Big Cities 1984-2018 
Law Enforcement 1984-2018 
Drug Rehabilitation  1984-2018 
Education  1984-2018 
Assistance to Blacks  1984-2018 
National Defense 1984-2018 
Assistance to Other Countries 1984-2018 
Assistance to the Poor  1984-2018 
Social Security  1984-2018 
Parks and Recreation 1984-2018 
Assistance for Child Care 2000-2018 




Table A.2 Responses for the Question of Improving and Protecting the Environment 
1973-2018. 
Year Too Little About Right Too Much N 
1973 915 387 111 1,413 
1974 871 393 114 1,378 
1975 795 459 144 1,398 
1976 818 468 139 1,425 
1977 724 522 168 1,414 
1978 801 501 146 1,448 
1980 702 454 226 1,382 
1982 964 559 209 1,732 
1983 865 498 131 1,494 
1984 286 159 21 466 
1985 421 236 60 717 
1986 431 213 38 682 
1987 395 148 26 569 
1988 464 188 33 685 
1989 548 155 28 731 
1990 476 127 31 634 
1991 511 180 37 728 
1993 445 239 74 758 
1994 885 443 127 1,455 
1996 836 391 152 1,379 
1998 826 386 106 1,318 
2000 858 385 112 1,355 
2002 793 439 90 1,322 
2004 862 405 95 1,362 
2006 992 365 89 1,446 
2008 659 236 81 976 
2010 557 297 122 976 
2012 559 306 106 971 
2014 731 394 119 1,244 
2016 878 409 114 1,401 
2018 790 284 83 1,157 
Total 21,658 10,626 3,132 35,416 
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Table A.3 Bivariate ordinal logistic regression of pollution control and abatement 
spending on the dependent variable of support for government spending on improving 
and protecting the environment. 
  Coefficients Standard Error 
Pollution Control and Abatement 0.792 0.071 
Cut points 0.612 0.018 
  2.497 0.025 
2 0.000  
Log Likelihood -26,020  
n 29,802   
*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; 




Table A.4 Bivariate ordinal logistic regression of water resources spending on the 
dependent variable of support for government spending on improving and protecting the 
environment. 
  Coefficients Standard Error 
Water Resources 0.736*** 0.055 
Cut points 0.616 0.017 
  2.503 0.024 
2 0.000  
Log Likelihood -25,993  
n 29,802   
*p<.05; ** p<.01; 




Table A.5 Bivariate ordinal logistic regression of conservation and land management 
spending on the dependent variable of support for government spending on improving 
and protecting the environment. 
  Coefficients Standard Error 
Conservation and Land Management 2.936*** 0.300 
Cut points 0.816 0.039 
  2.699 0.043 
2 0.000  
Log Likelihood -26,033  
n 29,802   
*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; two 




Table A.6 Bivariate ordinal logistic regression of energy information, policy and 
regulation spending on the dependent variable of support for government spending on 
improving and protecting the environment. 
 
  Coefficients Standard Error 
Energy Information, Policy and Regulation 3.145*** 0.232 
Cut points 0.574 0.015 
  2.461 0.023 
2 0.000  
Log Likelihood -25,990  
n 29,802   
*p<.05; ** p<.01; ***p<.001; two tailed 




Table A.7 Generalized least squares of environmental spending, gender, age, party 
identification, education, and race on the dependent variable of support for government 
spending on improving and protecting the environment. 
Rnatenvir Coef. Std. 
Err. 




Percentage of GDP -0.135 0.009 -14.730 0.000 -0.152 -0.117 
Gender: Female 0.050 0.007 6.770 0.000 0.036 0.065 
Age Range: 25-34 -0.088 0.014 -6.280 0.000 -0.116 -0.061 
Age Range: 35-44 -0.171 0.014 -11.910 0.000 -0.199 -0.143 
Age Range: 45-54 -0.245 0.015 -16.430 0.000 -0.274 -0.215 
Age Range: 55-64 -0.305 0.015 -19.820 0.000 -0.335 -0.275 
Age Range: 65-74 -0.358 0.017 -21.710 0.000 -0.391 -0.326 
Age Range: 75-89 -0.400 0.019 -21.580 0.000 -0.436 -0.364 
Independent -0.082 0.011 -7.540 0.000 -0.104 -0.061 
Republican -0.241 0.008 -28.600 0.000 -0.257 -0.224 
HIGH SCHOOL 0.072 0.010 7.060 0.000 0.052 0.092 
JUNIOR COLLEGE 0.105 0.018 5.980 0.000 0.071 0.140 
BACHELOR 0.108 0.013 8.130 0.000 0.082 0.134 
GRADUATE 0.157 0.016 9.650 0.000 0.125 0.189 
Race: White 0.019 0.010 1.910 0.056 0.000 0.038 
Constant 0.784 0.017 45.320 0.000 0.750 0.817 
log likelihood -27668.068      
n 29,069      
AIC= 1.904714       
BIC= -287,169.6       
Residual df= 29,053      
Deviance= 
11420.484 
     
Pearson = 
11420.484 
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Table A.8 Random effects of generalized least squares of environmental spending, 
gender, age, party identification, education, and race on the dependent variable of 
support for government spending on improving and protecting the environment. 
Rnatenvir Coef. 
Std. 
Err. z P>z 
[95% 
Conf. Interval] 
Percentage of GDP -0.135 0.009 -14.790 0.000 -0.153 -0.117 
Female 0.050 0.007 6.770 0.000 0.036 0.065 
25-34 -0.088 0.014 -6.280 0.000 -0.116 -0.061 
35-44 -0.171 0.014 -11.910 0.000 -0.199 -0.143 
45-54 -0.245 0.015 -16.430 0.000 -0.274 -0.215 
55-64 -0.305 0.015 -19.830 0.000 -0.335 -0.275 
65-74 -0.358 0.017 -21.710 0.000 -0.391 -0.326 
75-89 -0.400 0.019 -21.560 0.000 -0.436 -0.363 
Independent -0.082 0.011 -7.520 0.000 -0.104 -0.061 
Republican -0.240 0.008 -28.570 0.000 -0.257 -0.224 
HIGH SCHOOL 0.072 0.010 7.060 0.000 0.052 0.092 
JUNIOR COLLEGE 0.105 0.018 5.980 0.000 0.071 0.140 
BACHELOR 0.108 0.013 8.080 0.000 0.082 0.134 
GRADUATE 0.157 0.016 9.610 0.000 0.125 0.189 
White 0.019 0.010 1.920 0.055 0.000 0.038 
_cons 0.784 0.017 45.280 0.000 0.750 0.817 
sigma_u 0.039      
sigma_e 0.625      
rho 0.004      
 0.000      




Table A.9 Random effects of ordinal logistic regression of environmental spending, 
gender, age, party identification, education, and race on the dependent variable of 
support for government spending on improving and protecting the environment. 
natenvir Coef. 
Std. 
Err. z P>z 
[95% 
Conf. Interval] 
Percentage of GDP 0.430 0.030 14.470 0.000 0.372 0.488 
Female -0.139 0.025 -5.650 0.000 -0.187 -0.091 
25-34 0.335 0.051 6.590 0.000 0.235 0.435 
35-44 0.620 0.051 12.090 0.000 0.519 0.720 
45-54 0.853 0.052 16.250 0.000 0.750 0.956 
55-64 1.035 0.054 19.320 0.000 0.930 1.141 
65-74 1.203 0.056 21.340 0.000 1.092 1.313 
75-89 1.335 0.062 21.680 0.000 1.214 1.455 
Independent 0.276 0.037 7.480 0.000 0.203 0.348 
Republican 0.763 0.028 27.510 0.000 0.708 0.817 
HIGH SCHOOL -0.238 0.033 -7.280 0.000 -0.302 -0.174 
JUNIOR COLLEGE -0.373 0.059 -6.300 0.000 -0.489 -0.257 
BACHELOR -0.361 0.044 -8.280 0.000 -0.447 -0.276 
GRADUATE -0.528 0.055 -9.660 0.000 -0.635 -0.421 
White -0.061 0.033 -1.850 0.064 -0.126 0.004 
/cut1 1.372 0.060 22.750 0.000 1.254 1.490 
/cut2 3.368 0.064 52.680 0.000 3.243 3.493 
/sigma2_u 0.025 0.012   0.010 0.063 
Log Likelihood -24322.504      
 0.000      









APPENDIX B: SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS FOR CHAPTER 3 
This section provides alternative model specifications. Recall that the data from 
the Sea Grant and MSIS-Net were used to create panel data analyses. This section 
includes analyses where the Sea Grant data are not in panel form and the Oklahoma data 
cover all survey waves instead of the ones immediately before and after Hurricane 
Harvey. The analysis to follow provide insight of these data but they do not allow for 
examination of the direct effects of Harvey on specific individuals. 
Figure B.1 illustrates that for the question regarding increasing temperatures there 
is a decrease in those responding temperatures are going up, not going up, and refused. 
However, the number of respondents that say they “don’t know/not sure” more than 
double from the pre-Harvey to post Harvey survey. Figure B.2 provides a visualization of 
the division of opinions on increasing temperatures both pre and post Harvey by party 
identification.  The figure indicates that self-identified Democrats have relatively stable 
opinions which is not the case for self-identified Republicans or self-identified 
Independents. In the post Harvey survey 6.92 percent of individuals respond “don’t 
know/not sure” compared to 3.46 percent in the pre-Harvey survey. About 13 percent of 
self-identified Independents exhibit opinion change where 7.95 percent of respondents 
suggesting “don’t know/not sure” in the post Harvey (that are Independents) survey 
compared to 2.76 percent in the pre-Harvey wave. Among Democrats the percentage 
responding not going up increases to .69 percent compared to .34 percent in the pre-
Harvey survey.  
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Figure B.3 demonstrates that for the question of the level of concern regarding the 
likelihood climate change will personally cause harm there is an increase of 5.19 
percentage points saying they are very concerned, an increase of 3.12 percentage points 
responding somewhat concerned, and an increase of .69 percentage points responding not 
at all concerned. However, there is a decrease of 5.53 percentage points responding 
slightly concerned and a decrease of 2.77 percentage points responding moderately 
concerned. While there is some increase in the highest level of concern in the post 
Harvey survey from the pre-Harvey survey, the results do not indicate a large shift in 
opinions in a more liberal direction. 
Figure B.4 illustrates that among Republicans, Independents, and Democrats there 
is an increase in the number of individuals responding with the highest level of concern 
for the question of climate change causing personal harm. The results indicate a shift in 
more liberal opinions among Independents and Democrats while the results for 
Republicans are somewhat mixed. Republicans experience a larger increase in the lowest 
level of concern than they do in any other level. Figures B.5- B.19 provide additional 
visual representations of the distribution of responses across different groups.  
B.1 PRE-HARVEY 
Table B.3 provides the results of the logistic regression for the question of 
whether temperatures are increasing and for the question of concern that climate change 
will cause personal harm in both the pre and post Harvey surveys. However, I use the 
odds ratio displayed in table B.4 to analyze the findings. Being an independent compared 
with being a Republican increases the odds of responding that temperatures are 
increasing by a factor of 1.823, holding all other variables constant. Being a Democrat 
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compared with being a Republican increases the odds of responding that temperatures are 
increasing by a factor of 41.596, holding all other variables constant. The odds of 
reporting higher levels of concern of climate change harm are 1.598 times greater for 
independents than they were for Republicans holding all other variables constant. The 
odds of reporting higher levels of concern of climate change harm are 9.602 times greater 
for democrats than they were for Republicans holding all other variables constant. The 
odds of reporting higher levels of concern of climate change harm are 5.543 times greater 
for blacks than they were for whites holding all other variables constant. 
B.2 POST HARVEY 
Being an independent compared with being a Republican increases the odds of 
responding that temperatures are increasing by a factor of 1.804, holding all other 
variables constant. While being a Democrat compared with being a Republican increases 
the odds of responding temperatures are increasing by a factor of 18.032, holding all 
other variables constant. The odds of reporting higher levels of concern that climate 
change will personally harm you are 1.82 times greater for females than they were for 
males holding all other variables constant. The odds of reporting higher levels of concern 
that climate change will personally harm you are 4.248 times greater for Blacks than they 
were for whites holding all other variables constant. 
The odds ratio is the same for Independents compared to Republicans pre and 
post Harvey however there is a decrease in the odds ratio of being a Democrat compared 
with being a Republican from pre to post for the question of temperatures increasing. For 
the question regarding the likelihood of climate change causing personal harm there is an 
increase in the odds ratio from pre to post for Democrats compared to Republicans. The 
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only significant trend is that party identification has a strong influence. Among the 
statistically significant variables, there is notable opinion change for Democrats 
compared to Republicans for temperatures increasing and climate change causing 
personal harm. 
B.3 OKLAHOMA 
 Fixed effects capture less than one fourth of the sample. To some this would 
indicate that the fixed effects model is inappropriate for an overall analysis of these data. 
However, it is appropriate in examining opinion change. Fixed effects models are looking 
at the determinants of within subject variability and if there is no variability within a 
subject then there is nothing to examine. Decades of research illustrate that opinions are 
relatively stable especially if it is a strong opinion. Nonetheless, about twenty-two 
percent of the respondents exhibited some change in the way they responded to the 
question of whether they believed that global warming was causing a shift in the weather 
patterns in Oklahoma. 3,829 respondents (24,254 observations) either responded yes for 
each wave they participated in or no for each wave and thus were dropped from the 
model as there is no within subject variation. 820 respondents (6,947 observations) did 
exhibit a change in their response to the question of whether global warming is causing 
weather patterns in Oklahoma to shift at some point in the survey.  
The results of the fixed effects model, as well as the logistic regression and 
random effects model, can be seen in table B.5. From these results we see that one of the 
education categories, both party identification categories, and the wave are all statistically 
significant when alpha is .05. Table B.6 displays the odds ratio for all models. The results 
indicate that if someone switches from less than a high school education to having some 
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college (no degree) then the odds of responding that global warming is causing weather 
patterns in Oklahoma to shift are multiplied by .163. While this is statistically significant 
it is a small effect. If an individual goes from being a Republican to an Independent the 
odds of responding that global warming is causing weather patterns in Oklahoma to shift 
are multiplied by 1.796. Furthermore, if a respondent goes from being a Republican to a 
Democrat then the odds of responding that global warming is causing weather patterns in 
Oklahoma to shift are multiplied by 3.025. The results also show that overtime (as each 
survey wave passes) the odds of responding that global warming is causing weather 
patterns in Oklahoma to shift increases. Given traditional party views, it is logical that the 
odds of responding yes increase if a respondent changes party affiliation to where they 
are no longer a self-identified Republican as Democrats (and Independents) are more 
likely to believe in global warming than Republicans.  
 As previously mentioned, the results of the logistic regression model are 
displayed in table B.3 and table B.4 presents the odds ratio. The odds ratio for responding 
yes declines with age. Being an independent compared with being a Republican increases 
the odds of responding that global warming is causing shifts in Oklahoma’s weather 
pattern by a factor of 4.237, holding all other variables constant. While being a Democrat 
compared with being a Republican increases the odds of responding that global warming 
is causing shifts in Oklahoma’s weather pattern by a factor of 20.240, holding all other 
variables constant. Being a female rather than a male, increases the odds of reporting that 
global warming is causing shifts in Oklahoma’s weather pattern by a factor of 1.419, 
holding all other variables constant. Education effects are slightly inconsistent as they do 
not follow a pattern where having a high school education/GED rather than less than a 
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high school education decreases the odds of reporting that global warming is causing 
shifts in Oklahoma’s weather pattern by a factor of 0.637, holding all other variables 
constant. Conversely, having a PhD/JD/MD increases the odds of reporting that global 
warming is causing shifts in Oklahoma’s weather pattern by a factor of 1.458, holding all 
other variables constant. The odds ratio of responding that global warming is causing 
shifts in Oklahoma’s weather pattern increases as the survey waves go on. 
B.4 OKLAHOMA MSIS-NET SURVEY DATA 
 This section is used to provide a more detailed overview of the survey 
methodology for the MSIS-Net data. The University of Oklahoma (OU) and Oklahoma 
State University (OSU) began a panel survey (sequential mode panel) of a random 
sample of Oklahoma households in 2014. They collect a base sample of approximately 
1,500 households in each survey wave. Management and implementation teams consists 
of researchers at OU Center for Risk and Crisis Management (CRCM) and the OU Public 
Opinion Learning Library (OU POLL). These teams collect research quality geolocated 
survey data from a random sample of households using Address Based Sampling. The 
process began with a list of households drawn from a random sample of known addresses 
in Oklahoma. Recruitment of these households were conducted by phone or mail. 
Moreover, the retention rates are considered high with modest attrition. In order to make 
up for any lost respondents they recruit a small set of new participants in between survey 
waves. This creates some difficulty when trying to use these data for panel analysis. 
Response rates are calculated by OU POLL based on the formula for response rate 4 
(RR4) as defined by the American Association of Public Opinion Research (AAPOR 
2016; Smith 2009). Respondents complete the survey through a web-based portal or 
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CATI (computer assisted telephone interviewing) with appropriate reminders sent by 
email and phone. 
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Table B.1 Table of responses before and after Hurricane Harvey. 
Concern Climate 












1 - Not at all concerned 71 10 5 4 5 2 97 
2 13 13 14 5 3 3 51 
3 8 5 12 7 5 1 38 
4 2 5 6 14 14 1 42 
5 - Very Concerned 2 2 4 4 39 0 51 
DK / NOT SURE 3 0 4 0 0 1 8 
REFUSED 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 
Total (Post) 99 35 47 34 66 8 289 
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Table B.2 Table of responses before and after Hurricane Harvey. 
Temperatures 





going up 163 9 27 1 200 
going down 10 51 8 0 69 
DK/NOT SURE 4 6 8 0 18 
REFUSED 1 1 0 0 2 




Table B.3 Ordered logistic regression of party identification, age, education, and gender 
on the dependent variable of concern that climate change will cause personal harm both 
before and after Hurricane Harvey excluding don’t know/not sure responses. 
 
 CC (pre)  CC (post) 
Independent 0.47* (0.26) 0.78** (0.27) 
Democrat 2.26** (0.36) 2.89** (0.40) 
Age: 25-34 0.15 (1.21) 0.49 (1.28) 
Age: 35-44 -0.53 (1.09) 0.08 (1.18) 
Age: 45-54 -0.72 (1.07) -1.09 (1.16) 
Age: 55-64 -0.86 (1.07) -0.96 (1.16) 
Age: 65+ -0.62 (1.07) -1.29 (1.16) 
Less than a 4-year degree -0.17 (0.54) -0.56 (0.51) 
4-year degree or more -0.11 (0.54) -0.27 (0.51) 
Gender: Female 0.31 (0.24) 0.60* (0.25) 
Race: Black 1.71** (0.60) 1.47* (0.67) 
Race: Other -0.01 (0.47) -0.68 (0.50) 
Cutpoints -0.84 (1.13) -1.00 (1.20) 
  0.08 (1.13) -0.39 (1.20) 
  0.82 (1.13) 0.57 (1.19) 
  1.84 (1.14) 1.44 (1.19) 
 0.00** 0.00** 
Log Likelihood -362.20 -338.44 
n 254 255 




Table B.4 Logistic regression of party identification, age, education, and gender on the 
dependent variable of temperatures increasing both before and after Hurricane Harvey 
excluding don’t know/not sure responses. 
 Temp (pre) Temp (post) 
Independent 0.60 (0.32) 0.59 (0.33) 
Democrat 3.73* (1.44) 2.89* (0.86) 
Age: 25-34 2.30 (1.40) 1.77 (2.16) 
Age: 35-44 1.85 (1.18) 0.25 (1.68) 
Age: 45-54 0.95 (1.11) -0.31 (1.62) 
Age: 55-64 1.56 (1.12) -0.69 (1.62) 
Age: 65+ 1.64 (1.12) -0.63 (1.63) 
Less than a 4-year degree 0.79 (0.62) -0.40 (0.70) 
4-year degree or more 0.67 (0.61) -0.30 (0.70) 
Gender: Female 0.45 (0.33) 0.21 (0.34) 
Race: Black 1.58 (1.50) 1.73 (1.49) 
Race: Other 0.08 (0.58) 0.08 (0.70) 
Constant -1.87 (1.23) 0.95 (1.72) 
 0.06 0.04* 
Log Likelihood -106.50 -99.36 
n 245 222 
*p<.05, **p<.001   
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Table B.5 Odds ratio of the ordered logistic regression of party identification, age, 
education, and gender on the dependent variable of concern that climate change will 
cause personal harm both before and after Hurricane Harvey excluding don’t know/not 
sure responses. 
Odds ratio Pre  CC Post  CC 
Independent 1.60*(0.41) 2.18* (0.58) 
Democrat 9.60**(3.49) 18.01** (7.13) 
25-34 1.16 (1.41) 1.64 (2.09) 
35-44 0.59 (0.64) 1.09 (1.29) 
45-54 0.49 (0.52) 0.34 (0.39) 
55-64 0.42 (0.45) 0.38 (0.45) 
65+ 0.54 (0.58) 0.27 (0.32) 
Less than a 4-year degree 0.85 (0.46) 0.57 (0.29) 
4-year degree or more 0.90 (0.48) 0.77 (0.39) 
Female 1.37 (0.33) 1.83* (0.45) 
Black 5.54 (3.31) 4.35* (2.92) 
Other 0.99 (0.47) 0.51 (0.25) 
Cutpoints -0.84 (1.13) -1.00 (1.20) 
  0.08 (1.13) -0.39 (1.20) 
  0.82 (1.13) 0.57 (1.19) 
  1.84 (1.14) 1.44 (1.19) 
 0.00** 0.00** 
Log Likelihood -362.20 -338.44 






Table B.6 Odds ratio of the logistic regression of party identification, age, education, and 
gender on the dependent variable of temperatures increasing both before and after 
Hurricane Harvey excluding don’t know/not sure responses. 
Odds ratio Pre temp  Post temp 
Independent 1.82 (0.58) 1.80 (0.60) 
Democrat 41.60* (59.82) 18.03* (15.56) 
25-34 9.99 (14.04) 5.87 (12.70) 
35-44 6.38 (7.50) 1.29 (2.17) 
45-54 2.59 (2.86) 0.74 (1.20) 
55-64 4.78 (5.37) 0.50 (0.81) 
65+ 5.16 (5.76) 0.53 (0.86) 
Less than a 4-year degree 2.20 (1.36) 0.67 (0.47) 
4-year degree or more 1.96 (1.20) 0.74 (0.52) 
Female 1.57 (0.52) 1.24 (0.42) 
Black 4.84 (7.27) 5.64 (8.43) 
Other 1.08 (0.63) 1.08 (0.76) 
Constant 0.15 (0.19) 2.59 (4.46) 
 0.06 0.04* 
Log Likelihood -106.50 -99.36 
n 245 222 
*p<.05, **p<.001   
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Table B.7 Logistic, random effects logistic, fixed effects logistic, and conditional logistic 
regression of age, gender, education, and party identification on my dependent variable 






AGE -0.014** -0.049** -0.07 -0.07 
  (0.001) (0.005) (0.057) (0.057) 
Female 0.35** 1.224**   
  (0.029) (0.179)   
High School/GED -0.451* -1.807* -0.965 -0.965 
  (0.138) (0.58) (0.839) (0.839) 
Vocational or Technical Training -0.191 -2.036* -1.748 -1.748 
  (0.146) (0.626) (0.912) (0.912) 
Some College--NO degree -0.294* -1.758* -1.816* -1.816* 
  (0.135) (0.571) (0.833) (0.833) 
2-year college/associate's degree -0.282* -1.219* -0.355 -0.355 
  (0.14) (0.601) (0.93) (0.93) 
Bachelor's Degree -0.233 -1.754* -1.03 -1.03 
  (0.134) (0.577) (1.034) (1.034) 
Master's degree -0.179 -0.964 0.444 0.444 
  (0.136) (0.591) (1.544) (1.544) 
PhD/JD/Doctor 0.377* 0.575 0 0 
  (0.146) (0.67) (omitted) (omitted) 
Independent 1.444** 2.693** 0.585* 0.585* 
  (0.036) (0.175) (0.19) (0.19) 
Democratic Party 3.008** 5.794** 1.179** 1.179** 
  (0.036) (0.171) (0.205) (0.205) 
WAVEID 0.029** 0.075** 0.07** 0.07** 
  (0.003) (0.006) (0.016) (0.016) 
Constant -0.33* 1.603*   
  (0.15) (0.671)   
 ln(σν2)  3.353   
   (0.054)   
  u  5.347   
   (0.145)   
   0.897   
   (0.005)   
  0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
Log Likelihood -15748.26 -7659.712 -2330.371 -2330.371 
n 31,201 31,201 6,947 6,947 
*p<.05, **p<.001     
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Table B.8 Odds ratio of the logistic, random effects logistic, fixed effects logistic, and 
conditional logistic regression of age, gender, education, and party identification on my 
dependent variable of global warming causing weather patterns in Oklahoma to change. 





AGE 0.987** 0.952** 0.932 0.932 
  (0.001) (0.005) (0.053) (0.053) 
Female 1.419** 3.402** 
  
  (0.041) (0.61) 
  
High School/GED 0.637* 0.164* 0.381 0.381 
  (0.088) (0.095) (0.32) (0.32) 
Vocational/Technical Training 0.826 0.131* 0.174 0.174 
  (0.12) (0.082) (0.159) (0.159) 
Some College--NO degree 0.745* 0.172* 0.163* 0.163* 
  (0.101) (0.099) (0.136) (0.136) 
2-year college/associate's degree 0.754* 0.296* 0.701 0.701 
  (0.106) (0.178) (0.652) (0.652) 
Bachelor's Degree 0.792 0.173* 0.357 0.357 
  (0.107) (0.1) (0.369) (0.369) 
Master's degree 0.836 0.381 1.559 1.559 
  (0.114) (0.225) (2.407) (2.407) 
PhD/JD/Doctor 1.458* 1.777 1 1 
  (0.212) (1.191) (omitted) (omitted) 
Independent 4.237** 14.77** 1.796* 1.796* 
  (0.151) (2.585) (0.342) (0.342) 
Democratic Party 20.24** 328.367** 3.25** 3.25** 
  (0.729) (55.998) (0.668) (0.668) 
WAVEID 1.029** 1.078** 1.072** 1.072** 
  (0.003) (0.007) (0.018) (0.018) 
Constant 0.719* 4.97* 
  


























  0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
Log Likelihood -15748.26 -7659.712 -2330.371 -2330.371 
n 31,201 31,201 6,947 6,947 
*p<.05, **p<.001 




Figure B.1 Frequency graph of the categories of the dependent variable of temperatures 
increasing including don’t know/not sure responses and refusals.  
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Figure B.2 Frequency graph of the categories of the dependent variable of temperatures 
increasing including don’t know/not sure responses and refusals by party identification.  
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Figure B.3 Frequency graph of the categories of the dependent variable of concern that 




Figure B.4 Frequency graph of the categories of the dependent variable of concern 
climate change will cause personal harm including don’t know/not sure responses and 




Figure B.5 Frequency graph of the categories of the dependent variable of temperatures 
increasing including don’t know/not sure responses by education   
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Figure B.6 Frequency graph of the categories of the dependent variable of concern 






Figure B.7 Frequency graph of the categories of the dependent variable of temperatures 
increasing including don’t know/not sure responses by education 
215 
 
Figure B.8 Frequency graph of the categories of the dependent variable of temperatures 
increasing including don’t know/not sure responses by party identification.
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Figure B.9 Frequency graph of the categories of the dependent variable of temperatures 





Figure B.10 Frequency graph of the categories of the dependent variable of concern 





Figure B.11 Frequency graph of the categories of the dependent variable of concern 





Figure B.12 Frequency graph of the categories of the dependent variable of temperatures 
increasing by education.  
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Figure B.13 Frequency graph of the categories of the dependent variable of concern 
climate change will cause personal harm by gender.  
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Figure B.14 Frequency graph of the categories of the dependent variable of concern 




Figure B.15 Frequency graph of the categories of the dependent variable of temperatures 




Figure B.16 Frequency graph of the categories of the dependent variable of temperatures 
increasing by party identification.  
224 
 
Figure B.17 Frequency graph of the categories of the dependent variable of temperatures 




Figure B.18 Frequency graph of the categories of the dependent variable of concern 
climate change will cause personal harm by party identification.  
226 
 
Figure B.19 Frequency graph of the categories of the dependent variable of concern 
climate change will cause personal harm by gender. 
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APPENDIX C: SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS FOR CHAPTER 4 
 This section provides additional model specifications. In my research I clustered 
the standard errors around the respective FIPs code. The following tables display these 
models without the clustered standard errors. The results of these models do not warrant 
analysis as they serve as a comparison to the models that did account for geographic 
dependency. 
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Table C.1 Logistic regression of local temperatures, gender, party identification, 
education, age, presidential approval, and Congressional approval on the dependent 
variable of the cause of global warming. 
GW_CAUSE Coef. 
Std. 
Err. z P>z 
[95% 
Conf. Interval] 
ddt_week 0.000 0.003 -0.160 0.869 -0.006 0.005 
Female -0.370 0.043 -8.650 0.000 -0.454 -0.286 
Independent 0.882 0.079 11.220 0.000 0.728 1.037 
Republican 1.731 0.046 37.940 0.000 1.641 1.820 
Some College -0.100 0.056 -1.790 0.073 -0.210 0.009 
College Grad Only -0.202 0.062 -3.270 0.001 -0.323 -0.081 
Post-grad -0.345 0.061 -5.630 0.000 -0.465 -0.225 
30-49 0.258 0.076 3.410 0.001 0.110 0.406 
50-64 0.465 0.075 6.200 0.000 0.318 0.613 
65+ 0.701 0.076 9.180 0.000 0.551 0.850 
PRESAPP Disapprove 0.211 0.044 4.750 0.000 0.124 0.298 
CONGAPP Disapprove -0.025 0.053 -0.480 0.631 -0.129 0.078 
_cons -1.499 0.085 -17.720 0.000 -1.665 -1.333 
 0.000      
Log Likelihood -6578.431      




Table C.2 Odds ratio of the logistic regression of local temperatures, gender, party 
identification, education, age, presidential approval, and Congressional approval on the 





Err. z P>z 
[95% 
Conf. Interval] 
ddt_week 1.000 0.003 -0.160 0.869 0.994 1.005 
Female 0.691 0.030 -8.650 0.000 0.635 0.751 
Independent 2.417 0.190 11.220 0.000 2.071 2.819 
Republican 5.644 0.257 37.940 0.000 5.161 6.172 
Some College 0.905 0.051 -1.790 0.073 0.811 1.009 
College Grad Only 0.817 0.051 -3.270 0.001 0.724 0.922 
Post-grad 0.708 0.043 -5.630 0.000 0.628 0.799 
30-49 1.294 0.098 3.410 0.001 1.116 1.501 
50-64 1.593 0.120 6.200 0.000 1.375 1.845 
65+ 2.015 0.154 9.180 0.000 1.735 2.341 
PRESAPP Disapprove 1.235 0.055 4.750 0.000 1.132 1.347 
CONGAPP Disapprove 0.975 0.051 -0.480 0.631 0.879 1.081 
_cons 0.223 0.019 -17.720 0.000 0.189 0.264 
 0.000      
Log Likelihood -6578.431      




Table C.3 Logistic regression of local temperatures, gender, party identification, 
education, age, presidential approval, and Congressional approval on the dependent 
variable of global warming as a threat. 
GW_THREAT Coef. 
Std. 
Err. z P>z 
[95% 
Conf. Interval] 
ddt_week -0.006 0.003 -1.900 0.058 -0.012 0.000 
Female -0.422 0.045 -9.300 0.000 -0.511 -0.333 
Independent 0.479 0.080 5.980 0.000 0.322 0.637 
Republican 1.458 0.050 29.140 0.000 1.360 1.556 
Some College 0.213 0.060 3.540 0.000 0.095 0.331 
College Grad Only 0.189 0.066 2.880 0.004 0.060 0.318 
Post-grad 0.074 0.064 1.160 0.247 -0.051 0.200 
30-49 0.196 0.071 2.760 0.006 0.057 0.336 
50-64 0.565 0.072 7.850 0.000 0.424 0.706 
65+ 1.362 0.078 17.490 0.000 1.210 1.515 
PRESAPP Disapprove 0.143 0.048 2.990 0.003 0.049 0.238 
CONGAPP Disapprove -0.042 0.055 -0.770 0.442 -0.149 0.065 
_cons -0.409 0.080 -5.150 0.000 -0.565 -0.254 
n 10,645      
 0.000      




Table C.4 Odds ratio of the Logistic regression of local temperatures, gender, party 
identification, education, age, presidential approval, and Congressional approval on the 





Err. z P>z 
[95% 
Conf. Interval] 
ddt_week 0.994 0.003 -1.900 0.058 0.988 1.000 
Female 0.656 0.030 -9.300 0.000 0.600 0.717 
Independent 1.615 0.130 5.980 0.000 1.380 1.890 
Republican 4.299 0.215 29.140 0.000 3.897 4.741 
Some College 1.237 0.074 3.540 0.000 1.100 1.392 
College Grad Only 1.208 0.079 2.880 0.004 1.062 1.374 
Post-grad 1.077 0.069 1.160 0.247 0.950 1.221 
30-49 1.217 0.087 2.760 0.006 1.059 1.399 
50-64 1.759 0.126 7.850 0.000 1.528 2.025 
65+ 3.905 0.304 17.490 0.000 3.352 4.549 
PRESAPP Disapprove 1.154 0.055 2.990 0.003 1.051 1.268 
CONGAPP Disapprove 0.959 0.052 -0.770 0.442 0.861 1.067 
_cons 0.664 0.053 -5.150 0.000 0.568 0.776 
n 10,645      
 0.000      




Table C.5 Ordered logistic regression of local temperatures, gender, party identification, 
education, age, presidential approval, and Congressional approval on the dependent 
variable of government protection of the environment. 
Govprotect Coef. 
Std. 
Err. z P>z 
[95% 
Conf. Interval] 
ddt_week -0.009 0.003 -3.190 0.001 -0.014 -0.003 
Female -0.523 0.042 -12.590 0.000 -0.605 -0.442 
Independent 0.547 0.082 6.700 0.000 0.387 0.707 
Republican 1.649 0.047 35.460 0.000 1.558 1.741 
Some College 0.064 0.055 1.170 0.240 -0.043 0.171 
College Grad Only 0.137 0.059 2.310 0.021 0.021 0.253 
Post-grad -0.018 0.059 -0.310 0.758 -0.134 0.098 
30-49 0.258 0.072 3.560 0.000 0.116 0.400 
50-64 0.473 0.072 6.550 0.000 0.331 0.614 
65+ 0.654 0.073 8.950 0.000 0.511 0.797 
PRESAPP Disapprove 0.146 0.045 3.260 0.001 0.058 0.234 
CONGAPP Disapprove) -0.310 0.051 -6.090 0.000 -0.409 -0.210 
/cut1 0.900 0.080   0.743 1.056 
/cut2 2.798 0.085   2.632 2.965 




Table C.6 Odds ratio of the ordered logistic regression of local temperatures, gender, 
party identification, education, age, presidential approval, and Congressional approval 





Err. z P>z 
[95% 
Conf. Interval] 
ddt_week 0.991 0.003 -3.190 0.001 0.986 0.997 
Female 0.592 0.025 -12.590 0.000 0.546 0.643 
Independent 1.728 0.141 6.700 0.000 1.472 2.027 
Republican 5.204 0.242 35.460 0.000 4.750 5.700 
Some College 1.066 0.058 1.170 0.240 0.958 1.187 
College Grad Only 1.147 0.068 2.310 0.021 1.021 1.288 
Post-grad 0.982 0.058 -0.310 0.758 0.874 1.103 
30-49 1.294 0.094 3.560 0.000 1.123 1.491 
50-64 1.604 0.116 6.550 0.000 1.393 1.848 
65+ 1.923 0.141 8.950 0.000 1.666 2.219 
PRESAPP 1.157 0.052 3.260 0.001 1.060 1.263 
CONGAPP 0.734 0.037 -6.090 0.000 0.664 0.811 
/cut1 0.900 0.080   0.743 1.056 




Table C.7 Logistic regression of local temperatures, gender, party identification, 
education, age, presidential approval, and Congressional approval on the dependent 
variable of the occurrence of global. 
gwbegin Coef. 
Std. 
Err. z P>z 
[95% 
Conf. Interval] 
ddt_week 0.004 0.003 1.610 0.107 -0.001 0.009 
Female 0.423 0.038 11.180 0.000 0.349 0.497 
Independent -0.679 0.071 -9.510 0.000 -0.819 -0.539 
Republican -1.423 0.040 -35.290 0.000 -1.502 -1.344 
Some College 0.341 0.048 7.070 0.000 0.247 0.436 
College Grad Only 0.473 0.054 8.770 0.000 0.367 0.579 
Post-grad 0.762 0.054 14.020 0.000 0.656 0.869 
30-49 -0.093 0.066 -1.410 0.158 -0.222 0.036 
50-64 -0.331 0.066 -5.030 0.000 -0.460 -0.202 
65+ -0.887 0.067 -13.280 0.000 -1.018 -0.756 
PRESAPP -0.266 0.040 -6.690 0.000 -0.344 -0.188 
CONGAPP 0.078 0.045 1.750 0.080 -0.009 0.165 




Table C.8 Odds ratio of the logistic regression of local temperatures, gender, party 
identification, education, age, presidential approval, and Congressional approval on the 





Err. z P>z 
[95% 
Conf. Interval] 
ddt_week 1.004 0.003 1.610 0.107 0.999 1.009 
Female 1.526 0.058 11.180 0.000 1.417 1.644 
Independent 0.507 0.036 -9.510 0.000 0.441 0.583 
Republican 0.241 0.010 -35.290 0.000 0.223 0.261 
Some College 1.407 0.068 7.070 0.000 1.280 1.546 
College Grad Only 1.605 0.087 8.770 0.000 1.444 1.784 
Post-grad 2.143 0.117 14.020 0.000 1.927 2.385 
30-49 0.911 0.060 -1.410 0.158 0.801 1.037 
50-64 0.718 0.047 -5.030 0.000 0.631 0.817 
65+ 0.412 0.028 -13.280 0.000 0.361 0.470 
PRESAPP 0.766 0.031 -6.690 0.000 0.709 0.828 
CONGAPP 1.081 0.048 1.750 0.080 0.991 1.180 
_cons 3.731 0.267 18.370 0.000 3.242 4.294 
 
